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 This thesis will offer a survey of John McIntyre’s major theological works, argue for 
the presence of a single systematic project, identify the key components of that proposed 
theological system, and conclude by offering an evaluation of that system.   
 The survey of McIntyre’s works is not meant to be exhaustive, as this is not a 
historical presentation of McIntyre’s theology.  The key purpose is to point out the unique 
characteristics of key works as components of McIntyre’s proposed theological system.  It 
will be argued that this system stems from the monograph Faith, Theology and Imagination.  
This proposed system is then worked out in varying degrees of completion in The Shape of 
Christology, The Shape of Soteriology, and The Shape of Pneumatology. 
 The key component of this proposed theological system is the concept of 
imagination.  Part of this concept in McIntyre is methodological.  Part of this concept is 
epistemological.  However, these aspects of imagination are derivative of McIntyre’s claim 
that imagination functions as a divine perfection par excellence and by extension is an 
integral part of the imago Dei.   
 The final aim of this thesis will be an evaluation of this system as it stands in 
McIntyre’s own writing, and in these works in particular.  This evaluation will consist of 
identifying parts of the theological vision laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination that 
have not been fleshed out, namely a fully developed doctrine of God and doctrine of 
creation.  The conclusion of this evaluation will identify key points for developing these 
doctrines along McIntyrian lines, specifically beginning with claims that McIntyre makes in 
The Shape of Pneumatology that point towards a doctrine of creation and claims in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination that point back to On the Love of God as an outline for developing 












 This thesis will offer an overview of the theologian John McIntyre to see if any of his 
books fit together as a series with a single aim.  I am arguing that four books are at least 
functioning as a series with one idea and one aim. 
 The idea is that imagination is an attribute of God.  That is to say that, just like God is 
merciful, gracious, et cetera, God is also imaginative.  However, in McIntyre’s system God is 
more than just imaginative.  In Christian theology it would be said that ‘God is love’ rather 
than that ‘God is loving,’ because God’s existence is equated with that attribute.  This is 
called a divine perfection.  McIntyre is making the claim that imagination is not just an 
attribute of God (God is imaginative) but in fact that imagination is a divine perfection (God 
exists in his imagination).  As a consequence of this claim, imagination becomes important 
to who people are as people made in God’s image; and this in turn becomes important for 
how people can and should approach knowledge of God. 
 The problem is that there are some pieces missing for this group of books to cover 
the ideas that theologians would expect them to cover in a more complete theological 
system.  What I will be doing in conclusion is identifying these gaps and proposing ways to 
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 This thesis can be broken down into three parts with three aims.  The first part is the 
survey.  This survey will offer a brief biographical introduction to John McIntyre and a review 
of his theological publications.  The purpose of these two components is to provide context 
for the argument that Faith, Theology and Imagination; The Shape of Christology; The 
Shape of Soteriology; and The Shape of Pneumatology are part of a single theological 
vision.  Faith, Theology and Imagination lays out this vision, and the other ‘Shape of’ books 
are further developments of this singular theological vision. 
 The second part consists of chapters 2-5.  These chapters are going to break down 
the components of this theological system.  This starts with the theological vision that 
McIntyre lays out in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  It will be argued that the key claim of 
this book is found in McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category.  This 
begins with the central and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s 
being.  This in turn informs the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of 
imagination might inform and be formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a 
doctrine of the incarnation, a doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.   
 It will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this theological 
vision.  This is done somewhat retroactively in The Shape of Christology, since the first 
edition predates the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination.  That said, there are two 
reasons this is not necessarily problematic.  One, there is evidence that McIntyre was 
working in the area and on the concept of imagination before the first edition of The Shape 
of Christology is published.  Two, the second edition of The Shape of Christology is 
significantly reworked in ways that are compliant with the vision laid out in Faith, Theology 
and Imagination. 
 The other ‘Shape of’ books follow this pattern more explicitly, since they do not have 
the added complexity of timeline.  Thus it will be argued that The Shape of Soteriology gives 
further shape and definition to McIntyre’s claim from Faith, Theology and Imagination that 
imagination is a category of the atonement.  Key to this claim is the argument that McIntyre’s 
use of the concept of models function as a methodological placeholder for imagination.  This 
is especially important in an evaluation of The Shape of Soteriology, since this is McIntyre’s 
most explicit and sophisticated presentation of the concept. 
2 
 
 This second part will conclude with the argument that The Shape of Pneumatology is 
an outworking of McIntyre’s claim in Faith, Theology and Imagination that imagination is a 
category of the Holy Spirit.   
 The third and final part of this thesis will argue two things.  One, it will argue that 
McIntyre’s theological vision laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination is incomplete.  
Specifically, it does not offer a complete formulation or outworking of a doctrine of God or a 
doctrine of creation.  Two, it will argue that McIntyre provides a starting point for developing 
these two unrealized areas of his theological vision. 
 In Faith, Theology and Imagination McIntyre makes an argument for imagination 
being a divine perfection, but this claim and idea is not given fuller shape like the doctrines 
of Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology.   
 This is also true of the doctrine of creation, and this creates problems of consistency 
within McIntyre’s system.  On the one hand, a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation 
could be helpful in highlighting traditional notions of imagination and imaginative activity to 
the divine activity of creation.  On the other hand, without a fuller presentation of the doctrine 
of creation McIntyre’s focus on imagination as a component of the imago Dei is absent, 
which is in its own right a foundational idea upon which McIntyre bases the idea that a 
theological method and epistemology should begin with imagination. 
 Once these gaps have been identified, the final task becomes proposing a way to fill 
them.  The argument that this thesis will conclude with is two-fold.  First, it will be argued that 
in order to fill the gap left by an undeveloped doctrine of God in McIntyre’s theological 
system in a way that is true to McIntyre’s own theological vision, a doctrine of God must be 
formulated in which imagination is a divine perfection and that his book On the Love of God 
must be re-interpreted in terms of imagination.  This is what McIntyre has in mind when he is 
making the claim for the primacy of imagination in the being of God as a divine perfection. 
 Second, it will be argued that the doctrine of creation must not simply be a 
development of the outline provided in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  Any doctrine of 
creation developed along McIntyrian lines must take into account one of the major claims of 
The Shape of Pneumatology, that any full account of creation must incorporate the 
presence, activity, and agency of the Holy Spirit in the divine activity of creation. 
 Finally, it will be argued that McIntyre’s theology proposes a theological vision that is 
incomplete but also one that is still a live option.  We are fortunate that McIntyre’s central 
claim is a beginning and not an end.  The idea that imagination is a divine perfection of God 
is not a conclusion that simply adds to the list of tried and true divine attributes.  Instead, it is 
a claim central to the being and activity of God that invites a total re-imagination of who we 
understand God to be in those terms. 
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Chapter 1: Survey 
 
 This survey is going to provide background on McIntyre and his writings as well as a 
jumping off point for the overall aims of this thesis.  First there will be a brief biographical 
introduction to John McIntyre.  Since study and treatment of McIntyre has, up to this point, 
been rather limited, some historical and biographical context should be helpful to people less 
familiar with him and his work.   
 After that, there will be a review of McIntyre’s theological publications.  The point 
here is not to be exhaustive.  This is not a historical treatment of McIntyre.  This is a 
systematic engagement with his thought.  The aim of this survey is to provide the reader with 
enough familiarity with McIntyre’s publications to understand how Faith, Theology and 
Imagination along with the ‘Shape of’ books stand out as unique pieces within McIntyre’s 
broader corpus.  This is in turn important for the reader to follow the argument that these 
books are part of a single theological vision. 
 This survey will conclude with a basic version of this argument in order to set up 
further support by treating these four books and their content in succession in support of this 
claim.  The central claims of this argument are: 1) Faith, Theology and Imagination lays out 
an outline of McIntyre’s theological vision 2) The Shape of Christology gives shape to the 
way that McIntyre sees imagination as a theological category of the incarnation 3) The 
Shape of Soteriology gives shape to the way that McIntyre sees imagination as a theological 
category of the atonement 4) The Shape of Pneumatology gives shape to the way that 
McIntyre sees imagination as a theological category of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
 
1. Biographical Overview 
John McIntyre lived from 1916-2005.  His education began at Bathgate Academy 
before going to university at Edinburgh, where he received a First Class Honors degree in 
Mental Philosophy.1 During this time he studied under A.E. Taylor and Norman Kemp Smith, 
the influence of whom can be seen at various junctures in his theological writing.2 McIntyre 
                                                        
1 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.2.6.  This file contains original copies of McIntyre’s degree 
certificates as well as other documentation related to his academic performance at Edinburgh.  These 
include letters from faculty, presumably letters of recommendation, that relate to the quality of his 
academic performance. 
2 Kemp Smith was primarily an influence in the way that McIntyre addresses topics relating to logic and 
epistemology.  This makes sense given the extensive notes that McIntyre took and preserved while a 
student under Kemp Smith. McIntyre’s notes from Kemp Smith’s course on the problems of logic can be 
found in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.1 and his notes on Kemp Smith’s lectures on General Philosophy, 
History or Philosophy, Logic and Psychology can be found in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.10.  That said, 
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continued onto the B.D. and completed his study in 1941.  In 1945, he was married to Jan 
Buick.  They had three children together.3 
 From 1945-1956 McIntyre served as the Hunter Baillie Chair of Theology at St. 
Andrew’s College in Sydney.  During this time, McIntyre was active as an educator, 
administrator, and as a scholar.  He taught a wide variety of subjects to ministry candidates, 
and served part of his time as the Principal of St. Andrew’s College.4   It was during this time, 
in 1954, that work St Anselm and His Critics; a Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo was 
published with Oliver and Boyd.  Additionally, he became something of a public figure in 
Sydney through a series of public debates with John Anderson, the atheist philosopher who 
was the Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney at the time.5 
 The year, 1956, marked McIntyre’s return to Scotland, where he succeeded John 
Baillie as the Professor of Divinity at The University of Edinburgh, New College.  The 
following year his monograph The Christian Doctrine of History was published with 
Eerdmans.  From 1968 until his retirement from the university in 1986, McIntyre served in a 
wide variety of academic and administrative roles in addition to his teaching and research. 
 He was the Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, the Principal of New College, Principal Warden 
of Pollock Halls, and the Acting Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Edinburgh.6  Early in his time at the University, he published two works that continue to be a 
part of his legacy.  His 1962 work On the Love of God, though not his most polished book, 
was widely read and used by ministers in the Church of Scotland.  However, the publication 
of the first edition of The Shape of Christology: Studies in the Doctrine and Person of Christ 
was significant in establishing his reputation as an academic theologian.  However, as a 
result of the significant demands of his administrative roles within New College and the 
University his output of publications was certainly diminished.  It was not until after his 
retirement from the university that he published his next book. 
 McIntyre proved to be surprisingly prolific in his later years.  His book Faith, Theology 
and Imagination was published in 1987, the year after his retirement.  The book marked the 
culmination of a long-term interest in the topic of Imagination as a theological idea.  This was 
followed by the publication of The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death 
of Christ in 1992 and The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the influence of Taylor should not be underestimated.  There are also course notes from Taylor’s lectures 
on Plato in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.3 and on Kant The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.4, but there is also the 
fact that these topics feature heavily in the topics McIntyre selected for his Moral Philosophy, Honours 
papers which can be found in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.15. 
3 Obituary of the Very Rev Prof John McIntyre, The Telegraph, 22 December 2005. 
4 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.10.   




in 1997.7  The following year McIntyre released a second edition to The Shape of 
Christology.  This second edition, though largely overlooked as a reprint, proved to contain 
significant movement from his conclusions in the first edition.  These changes offer 
significant insight into the way that McIntyre’s theology developed, and they deal directly 
with the balance of maintaining a theological tradition and the task of (in McIntyre’s own 
terms) re-Imagining theology.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 Some of the earliest publications that we have of McIntyre’s writing are really rather 
limited in their ability to shed light on the future direction of his thought and career.  Some of 
this is a direct result of his function as the Hunter Baillie Chair of Theology at St. Andrew’s 
College in Sydney.  In these early years, McIntyre functions as a rather public figure.  For 
instance, the first recorded publication that Gary Badcock hunted down was an address to 
the Conference of the Presbyterian Assembly of New South Wales from 1946.8  However, 
similar addresses and articles of a less academic nature and thematically separate from his 
academic work are common in these early years in Australia.9  Other citations that would fit 
in this category would be his two part series in Australian Christian World titled “In the 
Fullness of Life” and “In the Fullness of Time” in 1947 and the essay on St. Andrew for The 
New South Wales Presbyterian titled “St Andrew and 1948” published 1948.10   
 A few of these articles do share some cross over thematically and are more directly 
related to his work and thought. Works that would follow this pattern would be his two 
addresses to the Student Christian Movement in 1948 and 1949.  His 1948 topic of 
“Freethought and Christianity” shares important sentiments that McIntyre held about the 
importance of free inquiry not only in a Christian, theological context but also in a broader 
                                                        
7 It should be noted that 1997 was also the year that Theology After the Storm: Reflections on the 
Upheavals in Modern Theology and Culture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) was published.  
Chronologically, it was published before The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997); however this work is significantly different in nature to the other 
books that McIntyre published.  The volume is actually a collection of essays from previously abandoned 
projects that were selected and edited by Gary Badcock.  It contains “The Humanity of Christ” and 
“Theology of Prayer” which were originally written in (or around) 1970.  The essay “The Cliché as 
Theological Medium” is also included, and was written for the publication of the book in 1997.   
8 John McIntyre, “Spiritual Reconstruction” in John McIntyre et al. Spiritual Reconstruction: Addresses 
Delivered in the Conference of the Presbyterian Assembly, New South Wales, May, 1946 (Paramatta, 
Australia: 1946), 13-21.  
9 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.10.   
10 John McIntyre, Australian Christian World,  The New South Wales Presbyterian (For a complete listing of 
these types of articles addresses etc., that have been published see works as a public figure).  Note there 
are a large number of works that would fit this category in the New College Archives, such as McIntyre’s 
meticulous notes on his time as the chaplain for the Order of the Thistle in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.6, 
and his time as Moderator of the General Assembly in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.5.1. 
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Christian context, while at the same time offering a harsh critique of the ‘freethinking’ 
philosophy that was prominent in Australia at that time.11  This is followed by his 1949 
address on the topic of “Christ the King in the Church, and in the World and History.”12  Here 
McIntyre is addressing themes directly related to his research on the importance of 
historicity to Christology.   
 This is a theme that is frequently present in his earliest publications beginning with 
what should probably be categorized as his first academic publication, “History and 
Meaning” which was published in 1947 in the Reformed Theological Review.13  This essay 
establishes two things that are significant for studying and understanding this early part of 
McIntyre’s career and the development of his early thought.   
 First, there is the theme of history and meaning.  This theme stays with McIntyre 
throughout his career as a theologian.  Even at this early juncture he realizes that he is 
going to have to deal with the issue of historicity as it relates to the atonement in order to do 
justice to the study of Anselm.  This is something that he is actively working on when he 
writes this article, and we can see atonement and indeed Anselm in the background.  While 
history is the theme, the real topic is atonement.  This is true of all of McIntyre’s historical 
texts, and we can see a strong consistency among these texts beginning here and working 
all the way to 1957 and the publication of The Christian Doctrine of History.  Some of the 
sources and arguments are identical to the ones that he employs in The Christian Doctrine 
of History a full ten years later.  However, his insistence on the connection between 
historicity and atonement is a theme that extends well beyond this milestone in his career.  
Most notably in The Shape of Soteriology we can still see McIntyre addressing the problem 
that any atonement theology must overcome, the problem of making a historical atoning 
event accessible in the present in ways that are salvifically efficacious.14   
The key components of this focus in McIntyre’s theology are first a focus on the 
historicity of the incarnation itself.  McIntyre never moves away from a thorough defense of a 
historical incarnation and a reliable account of it.15  The second focus is on the obscuring of 
the incarnation by history.  This includes both an acknowledgement of the inherent 
challenges posed to knowing things that are obscured through the passing of time and an 
affirmation of the possibility of historical knowledge.  McIntyre points to severe skepticism 
                                                        
11 John McIntyre, “Freethought and Christianity: Being Two Addresses,” Delivered by Prof. J. McIntyre to 
the Student Christian Movement in the University of Sydney SCM (Sydney, 1948). 
12 John McIntyre, “Christ as King in the Church, and in the World and History,” in John McIntyre et al., 
Christ the King, Australian Student Christian Movement (Sydney, 1949). 
13 John McIntyre, “History and Meaning,” Reformed Theological Review 6, no. 2 (1947): 7-23. 
14 John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ. (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1992), 88-108. 
15 John McIntyre, The Christian Doctrine of History (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 1957), 45-46. 
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that calls into question any possibility of apprehending historical knowledge as an 
undermining of the possibility of all knowledge and learning.16  This brings us to the third 
component, where McIntyre addresses how the problem of knowing Christ is both a 
theological problem (i.e. How can we know God?) and a historical problem (i.e. How can we 
know anything about Jesus of Nazareth?).  Consequently, in the case of the atonement, it is 
not simply a question of how God saves, or even how one is capable of accessing it; instead 
it is a question of how a historically salvific act can be accessed contemporaneously in the 
present.17  This is why McIntyre is not only concerned with the soteriological models 
themselves but also with the ways that these models are universalized in order to be 
universally accessible, are relatable to those people to whom they are accessible, and how 
they can be made contemporary.  The encompassing concept that McIntyre chooses to 
represent this process is the concept of identification.18  This is a concept that McIntyre 
traces back to John McLeod Campbell.19  It is a concept that H.R. Mackintosh develops 
particularly to offer an account of the love of God.20  Finally, it is a concept that McIntyre 
himself employs liberally in his own account of the love of God.21 
 Second, it is McIntyre’s first collaboration with the Reformed Theological Review.  In 
the 10 years from 1947-1957 McIntyre published ten articles and seven reviews in this, 
culminating in his three part series on “Christology and Revelation.”  At the time the review 
was a relatively young publication.  Founded by the Presbyterian Church of Eastern 
Australia (PCEA) in 1942 it was only five years old.22  When McIntyre arrived in Australia 
there was a certain amount of publicity around his appointment, and it was not long before 
McIntyre was something of a public figure.23  The fact that McIntyre was an interesting figure 
is not surprising given the closely linked history of the various Presbyterian denominations of 
Scotland and Australia.24  That said, there also may have been some affinity with the first 
                                                        
16 CDH, 20-34. 
17 SOS, 103-108. 
18 SOS, 108. 
19 The root of this idea is a theme in John McLeod Campbell, On the Nature of the Atonement.  McIntyre 
traces this idea back to McLeod Campbell through the Scottish theological tradition in his pamphlet 
McIntyre, John Prophet of Penitence: John McLeod Campbell, Our Contemporary Ancestor (Edinburgh: St. 
Andrew’s Press, 1972). 
20 H.R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London: Nisbet, 1927), 118. 
21 John McIntyre, On the Love of God (New York: Harper, 1962), 186-222. 
22 Rowland S. Ward, The Bush Still Burns: The Presbyterian and Reformed Faith in Australia 1788-1988 (St. 
Kilda: Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia, 1989), 513. 
23 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.7.   
24 A full account of the founding and history of the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia (PCEA) is also 
provided by Rowland S. Ward in Rowland S. Ward, The Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia 1846-
2013 (Wantirna: New Melbourne Press, 2014).  Ward demonstrates this close historical relationship 
through the involvements of the Church of Scotland, the Free Church of Scotland, and the Free 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland in the politics of the PCEA and its preceding institutions. 
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editor of the journal, Arthur Allen.  Allen was a PCEA minister at St. George’s in Sydney 
when the review was founded, who had spent some time in Scotland both at the University 
of Edinburgh and the Free Church College.25 
The collaboration produced some of McIntyre’s most concise and unencumbered 
work.  His articles and reviews are incisive, thorough, and wide ranging both in the subjects 
selected and in his treatment of them.  It is not until 1954 that McIntyre publishes anything 
(other than his monographs) anywhere else, and these are extremely limited until after his 
installation in Edinburgh. 
 Another significant track in McIntyre’s thought also emerges in 1947 in the Reformed 
Theological Review with McIntyre’s review of Cornelius van Til’s book The New Modernism: 
An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner.  Given the biographical timeline it is not 
surprising that the reception of neo-orthodoxy in general and Karl Barth in particular is not 
surprising.  However the tradition of engagement with Barth at Edinburgh ensured that this 
was a recurring theme throughout his career.  Consequently, this early engagement with the 
conversation surrounding this theological movement proves insightful.  Even at this early 
juncture, McIntyre shows skepticism about the neo-orthodox movement and Barth in 
particular.  This is not to say that he is dismissive or Barth or rejects Barth out of hand.  It is 
simply to say that he is sympathetic to some of the critiques raised by van Til, especially 
concerns raised by the lack of philosophical foundation for Barth and Brunner’s neo-
orthodox project.26  He writes that van Til “has demonstrated also the fatal nature of the 
results that ensue when theologians attempt to discard philosophy, or to show contempt for 
metaphysical or epistemological inquiry… [and] he has raised the issue which our 
generation has yet to solve-viz., how far the general analysis of the theory of knowledge 
affects theological enquiry into our knowledge of God.”27  While McIntyre does not in the end 
agree with van Til’s assessment it is telling that these are the points at which he takes issue 
with the neo-orthodox program.28   
 The fact is that as a trained student of philosophy, McIntyre is constantly concerned 
with philosophical consistency and methodological groundwork.  If anything, it can be said 
that McIntyre is primarily interested in the question of how our philosophical notions of 
epistemology relate to and form our knowledge of God.  The fact that this is not necessarily 
happening in the equation of crisis theology, is both problematic for McIntyre and an 
opportunity to offer what we might call corrective engagement by providing philosophical 
                                                        
25 Rowland S. Ward, The Bush Still Burns (St. Kilda: Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia, 1989), 551. 
26 John McIntyre, Review of The New Modernism, by Cornelius van Til, Reformed Theological Review 
6 (1947): 39. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 40-41.  
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frames for neo-orthodox ideas.  We can see additional engagement with these themes in 
McIntyre’s 1948 reviews of D.M. Baillie’s classic God was in Christ29 and Emil Brunner’s 
Revelation and Reason.30 
 In 1949 McIntyre continues to address the theme of the relationship between history 
and theology, especially as it relates to Christology.  At the same time that he is talking to 
the Student Christian Movement about “Christ as King in the Church, and in the World and 
History” he is also writing in the Reformed Theological Review on the topics of “Christianity 
and Civilization” and “Christ and History.”31  The bulk of this material makes its way into The 
Christian Doctrine of History, which is not published until 1957.  That said, even at this early 
juncture McIntyre is dealing with the same problems that he is addressing in the later 
monograph.  His is bothered by the skepticism that is being expressed in views and notions 
                                                        
29D.M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (London: Scribner’s, 1948).  This was a work that continues to be widely 
influential, and the theology of John McIntyre is no exception.  In some ways, McIntyre can be seen to be a 
torchbearer of the kind of theology and mediation that Baillie was in his own career.  Baillie’s treatment 
of “Docetism” and the new “historical radicalism” closely resemble McIntyre’s own rejection of 
Christological ideas and themes for being either ahistorical on the one hand and a theological on the 
other.  Barth for instance bears the brunt of both Baillie and McIntyre’s criticism on this exact point.  For 
Baillie, “A toned down Christology is absurd.  It must be all or mothering- all or nothing on both the divine 
and the human side” Ibid., 132.  Baillie’s now famous turn engages with the conveyance of these things 
doctrinally as the doctrine of the Trinity emerges in response to the historical act of the incarnation, Ibid., 
151.  This Trinitarian doctrine in turn offers assurance of the fact that it was God who was with us in 
Christ and that it is God who is present now by the Spirit. Ibid., 154.  This focus on the being of God, rather 
than detached personal treatments of the divine persons, is something that McIntyre also retains.  While 
there might be some divergence between the two in their respective treatments of atonement, we can still 
see Baillie’s influence on McIntyre in his insistence on the fact that the atonement and forgiveness are 
Christological concerns. 
30 Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946).  The fact that McIntyre 
engages with this book so early is significant, if for no other reason than the way that the Barth v. Brunner 
debates were so dominant on the theological landscape during McIntyre’s career.  On the one hand, it is 
somewhat surprising that McIntyre does not take up Brunner’s side of the debate when it comes to the 
loci of revelation.  Where Barth insists on revelation being in Christ along, Brunner argues for a wider 
distribution by affirming the revelatory function of creation, the Old Testament, Holy Scriptures, the 
Church, and the Spirit.  While Barth’s position is more nuanced on these topics, there is a definite 
resistance to anything that might be construed as Natural Theology or anything that is construed as 
revelation apart from Christ.  Given McIntyre’s own criticism of this aversion to natural theology and 
advocacy for an increased emphasis on creation and pneumatology, this would seem like a natural fit.  
The problem for McIntyre with Brunner lies at a more fundamental level in their philosophical 
frameworks and their understanding of history.  McIntyre is frequently wary of the influence of 
Kierkegaard and Buber on Christian theology, whereas these are the primary sources that Brunner turns 
to at these junctures.  For McIntyre the existential nature of Kierkegaard and the skepticism that justifies 
it stand opposed to the realism and idealism with which McIntyre operates. S. Kierkegaard, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  Whereas for McIntyre Buber’s 
emphasis on the “I and Thou” is helpful to a point, but falls short of acknowledging the distinctiveness of 
the divine encounter. Martin Buber, I and Thou (New Yok: Simon Schuster, 1996).  It is safe to say that 
McIntyre’s relationships with both Barth and Brunner are complicated.  Brunner’s more familiar 
systematic format is undercut by key philosophical differences, while Barth’s shared theological 
convictions are often undercut by the unique conclusions that Barth’s system sometimes produces. 
31 John McIntyre, “Christ and History” citation. & “Christianity and Civilization pt 1 Foundations” The 
Reformed Theological Review, 8 no 2 3 Aug 1949, p 9-42. 
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of history, which he associates with Collingwood.  He is critical of the sources of this type of 
skepticism, which he consistently blames on Kierkegaard and his Unscientific Postscripts.  
That said, there are significant developments between these texts and their final form in The 
Christian Doctrine of History.  The fact is that the content of these particular publications 
remains largely unchanged. 
 In this early period most of McIntyre’s original and academic writings are focused on 
themes related to the two concerns of history and the atonement.  For McIntyre these two 
themes are never far apart.  On the one hand, there are the traditional issues surrounding 
the mechanics of atonement.  Concepts like satisfaction are certainly concerns.  However, 
part of McIntyre’s thesis here is that this concept is not singular in describing the actions of 
God for the purposes of atonement.  There are a wide variety of images that are employed 
to elucidate an understanding of what atonement is.  Part of the challenge that is posed by 
the problem of atonement is that the actions and functions of the process of atonement are 
historically inaccessible to people today.  Thus the contemporary problem of the atonement 
is the accessibility of the atonement.  Through the process of history Christ has become just 
as abstract and removed from us as the God that Christ is meant to reveal to us. 
 This is why it is not surprising to see these themes treated in tandem during these 
early years of publication.  He is at once dealing with aspects of Anselm’s theology and 
problems of history.  One the one hand he is engaging with Anselm’s method in the essay of 
the same name, “Remoto Christo,”32 as well as a survey of philosophical proofs of God, 
among them Anselm’s ‘ontological argument’ is significant.33  On the other hand, he is 
writing about “The Incredibility of Faith”34 and Brunner’s ideas on Christianity, civilization, 
and revelation.35 
 1954 signals something of a shift for McIntyre from a biographical perspective.  It is 
at this juncture that there appears to be a turn back towards Scotland.  With the publication 
of St Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo, McIntyre raised his 
profile as an international scholar.  The book was widely reviewed to much acclaim from a 
range of established scholars.36  A field like Anselm studies is a crowded field, and it is rare 
                                                        
32 John McIntyre, “Remoto Christo: The Problem of the Cur Deus Homo,” Reformed Theological Review 9  
(1950): 3-17. 
33 John McIntyre, “The Proofs,” Reformed Theological Review 11 (1952): 81-93. 
34 John McIntyre, “The Incredibility of the Faith,” Reformed Theological Review 10 (1951): 69-72. 
35 John McIntyre, Review of Christianity and Civilization: Part 1, Foundations in Reformed Theological 
Review 8 no 2 May (1949): 16-18. 
36 Notable reviews include Stuart Barton Babbage, Review of St Anselm and His Critics (London: Oliver, 
1954), in Reformed Theological Review 17, no. 2 (1958): 55-56.  Babbage at the time would have been the 
Dean of Melbourne Cathedral and the Principal of Ridley College, where he preceded Leon Morris.  This is 
before he would go on to be one of the founding faculty members at Gordon Conwell Theological 
Seminary.  A notable, if not unsurprising, positive review J. Baillie, Review of St Anselm and His Critics 
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for a work to have major and significant.  This book was seen as having this kind of impact 
early on, and that view has been confirmed in the widespread use of the text in 
contemporary scholarship.  McIntyre changed the way that Cur Deus Homo was and is 
read.37  
 Central to his thesis is the claim that Cur Deus Homo is not a formulation of an 
atonement theory.  The work is more than simply an early scholastic response to figure out 
the problem of atonement.  This is not to say that Anselm does not treat the problem of 
atonement in a more specific and methodological way than his primarily patristic 
predecessors.  It is simply to say that Anselm is not so removed from the patristic tradition 
and/or so completely steeped in the scholastic movement for this to be a theoretical 
philosophical treatment of the subject. 
 Significant themes that contribute to this thesis are 1) the diversity of expression in 
Anselm’s account of the atonement 2) the centrality of Christological questions in the text 3) 
the defense of the freedom of God’s actions and in Christ’s actions against Aristotelian 
notions of necessity. 
 The first is concerned with defending Anselm against mis-categorization.  The trope 
is that Anselm develops the concept of ‘satisfaction’ into an account of how the sins of 
humanity are atoned for through the satisfaction of God’s wrath in the sacrifice of Christ on 
the cross.  The idea presented is that Anselm systematically works out how it must be that 
Christ’s sacrifice becomes necessary for atonement.  Thus presenting a theory of how it is 
that the work of atonement functions. 
 In regards to the first point here, McIntyre points to the employment of other images 
by Anselm in order to offer expression to what God is doing in the work of atonement.  While 
there are many things that could be indicated as key, such as the fact that there are other 
values that Anselm associates with Christ’s death that are separate from concerns about 
satisfying God’s wrath, the presence of Christ’s death as an exemplary act in Anselm 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(London: Oliver, 1954), in The Journal of Theological Studies 7, no. 1 (1956): 144-146 was written by his 
mentor and one of his predecessors at New College, John Baillie.  The book also received high praise from 
two of the faculty members at Princeton Theological Seminary.  Norman Victor Hope, Review of St Anselm 
and His Critics (London: Oliver, 1954), in Theology Today 16, no. 3 (1959): 397-398 was written by the 
longtime Professor of Church History, Norman Victor Hope.  Finally, and perhaps most interesting is the 
engagement provided by the enigmatic French polymath Emile Cailliet, who finished his career there as 
the Professor of Christian Philosophy, Emile Cailliet, Review of St. Anselm and His Critics (Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1954), in Religion in Life 24, no. 4 (1955): 613-614. 
37 Preeminent Anselm scholar, G.R. Evans, gives special attention to McIntyre’s reading of Cur Deus Homo 
and holds up his reading as an exemplary perspective on the significance of McIntyre’s work. G.R. Evans, 
‘The Cur Deus Homo: The Nature of Anselm’s appeal to Reason” Studia Theologia 31 (1977): 33-50. She 
also uses McIntyre to help emphasizes Anselm’s place as a transitionary figure into the scholastic age.  
G.R. Evans, Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).  This reception legacy 
has also been taken up by a more recent generation of scholars in Giles E.M. Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury 
and his Theological Inheritance (New York: Routledge, 2004).  
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indicates in a clear and substantial way that Christ’s death is not solely about satisfaction.  
As McIntyre states directly: 
St. Anselm introduces the Death of Christ as an example of steadfast perseverance 
in the way of righteousness, no matter the misery or the suffering which it entails.  
The popular distinction is drawn between subjective and objective theories of 
Atonement, and it is therefore of interest that St. Anselm, who is normally presented 
as an exponent of the latter should find a place within his scheme for the former.38  
 
The logic being that if God’s wrath is satisfied by Christ’s death, why would his death serve 
as an exemplary act at all?  The whole point is that people do not need to act in order to 
satisfy God’s wrath, because Christ has already satisfied it once and for all.  Thus when 
Anselm presents Christ’s death as an exemplary act that we should follow, it must be for 
reasons and values other than satisfaction.  For instance, Anselm writes of this function of 
example:  
 The general contention is that the Death of Christ does not have only a God-ward 
 reference, nor is its significance exhausted in the fact that Christ offers it up as a gift 
 to God by way of private transaction.  His Death is a public event, with, as it were, a 
 horizontal reference.  It provides an example of the price that is to be paid by those 
 who earnestly seek to obey God’s Will.39 
 
As a result McIntyre is right id defending Anselm from the anachronistic criticism of the Cur 
Deus Homo as an atonement theory.  
 In regards to the second point, McIntyre makes a strong case that the central theme 
of Cur Deus Homo is not the atonement per se but is instead Christology.40  It is all about the 
necessity of the incarnation for salvation, not the other way around.41  Christology is the 
prime concern.  The efficacy of our salvation is what is accomplished in and by Christ in his 
incarnation, life, and death.   
 In regards to the third point, this turns the notion of necessity around.  It is not a 
deterministic, causal necessity in which Christ is the passive object in an act of divine 
providence of the Father for our salvation.  Instead, it is Christ (the Deus-Homo) acting in 
complete freedom to do whatever was necessary for our salvation.  It is not something that 
is forced upon him from some external circumstance or logical proposition.  Instead, it is an 
internal compulsion on the part of Christ to freely act in accordance with his being.42  Thus 
                                                        
38 John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Reinterpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh:  
Oliver and Boyd, 1954), 185. 
39 Ibid. translation McIntyre’s of Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt O.S.B. (Rome, 1938), Cur 
Deus Homo, II.11, II.18. 
40 Ibid., 121-135. 
41 Ibid., 117-120. 
42 Ibid., 164-167.  This both encompasses an understanding of necessity that is meant to preserve the 
voluntary nature of Christ’s sacrifice and as a means of maintaining the aseity of God in this act. 
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Christ is not the logical solution to a soteriological problem, but instead the free initiator of a 
salvation that satisfies any conceivable condition necessary for salvation. 
 What continues to set this book apart, is not only the radical re-interpretation that it 
contains, but also the active engagement with contemporary theological writers and issues.  
Not only did the work satisfy the critical expectations of Anselm scholars, it also inspired 
admiration from the theological community as representing a historically engaged theology.43  
Here McIntyre offers contemporarily relevant theological engagement with figures like Barth, 
while still actively engaging with Anselm directly.44 
 The publication of Anselm and His Critics also coincides with McIntyre’s first 
publication outside of the Reformed Theological Review.  While McIntyre continued to write 
significant pieces for the review, the publication of “The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic 
Thought” in the Scottish Journal of Theology seems to signal McIntyre’s interest in moving 
on from being strictly an Australian theologian and from being strictly an Anselm scholar.45  
While moving back to Scotland was a hard personal decision for McIntyre, and while the 
prospect of staying in Australia was an appealing one for the McIntyre family, there certainly 
does seem to be a shift here.  By the time John Baillie reviewed St Anselm and His Critics in 
The Journal of Theological Studies in 1956, the two of them were in correspondence about 
the possibility of McIntyre returning to New College.46 
 The final bit of overlap is a three-part article on Christology and revelation that 
McIntyre publishes in the Reformed Theological Review from 1956-1957.  In these three 
articles, McIntyre lays out a survey of scriptural concepts of revelation, a survey of  
contemporary thought on the subject of revelation, an analytic of what is meant by 
revelation, and finally there is an evaluation of the Christological implications of this analytic. 
 First, while a number of authors are surveyed, it is clear that the survey is primarily a 
response to Barth, secondarily to Brunner, and thirdly in response to their respondents.  In 
many ways, McIntyre is rejecting attempts to side-step Barth.  In this way, we can see the 
manner in which McIntyre could be said to be a Barthian.  His approach is not without 
substantive critiques, but his acceptance is not complete either.   
                                                        
43 The fact is that this is seen in the reception of this book.  We can point to the engagement with the text 
by an established authority like G.R. Evans to see the continued impact that this work has had in that field.  
We can look to the review by Cailliet to see its importance to a philosophical as well as a theological 
understanding of Anselm.  Finally, part of the reason that Baillie has such high praise for the book is the 
way that it keeps a weather eye on the relevance to the contemporary theological conversation. 
44 Ibid., 24-38. 
45 John McIntyre, “The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought,” Scottish Journal of Theology 7 (1954): 353-
75. 
46 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.2.3.   
14 
 
 The key distinction that McIntyre makes is that a function of revelation in scriptural 
terms must be based on the idea that the life and existence of Christ observed must reveal 
something true about the nature of God’s being in order for someone to know Christ and 
receive from Christ what is intended to be revealed.47  Without this disclosure of God’s inner 
being, revelation is nothing more than an appreciation on the human side of the exceptional 
character of Christ’s life and work.48  
 Thus in response to A.M. Fairweather’s The Word as Truth, McIntyre is critical of the 
claim that all knowledge of God must be mediated by that which is outside of God.49  As 
such, there is no account of divine action in revelation.  God is not revealing himself directly, 
and that revelation is not being directed by God.  The media of revelation are always outside 
of God.  However, this rejects the idea that Christ incarnate is a medium of revelation or the 
idea that Christ is himself God.  
 For McIntyre, Brunner’s assertion that “Through God alone can God be known” takes 
not only the completely opposite position but also commits the completely opposite error.50  
That is that in focusing on how God is revealed through God alone, however there is no 
“account of the part played by the other-than-God in the situation.”51 
 Barth, on the other hand, offers a complete account of the Biblical notion of 
revelation.  The fact that “God reveals Himself through Himself” shows both the fact God is 
revealing himself and that it is through himself that God is revealed.52  There is no lapse in 
the revelatory pattern. 
 The criticism is not with the pattern of revelation itself but instead with the notion that 
the content of Christ as revelation is identical with the inner being of God.  As a result the 
content of both become an abstraction, because there is no account of the reality in which 
revelation occurs.  As McIntyre puts it, “Barth’s analysis is very partial, e.g., he neglects the 
historical situation which is the basis of the occurrence of revelation” and “He does not 
appreciate the non-analytical character of the identification of God as incarnate in Jesus 
Christ with the essence of God.”53  This provides the same basis for the mechanism that 
McIntyre uses to criticize Barth on the topics of Natural Theology or general revelation and 
                                                        
47 John McIntyre, “Christology and Revelation II,” Reformed Theological Review 16 (1957),14-15. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 18. 
50 Emil Brunner, The Mediator (London: Lutterworth, 1934). 
51 John McIntyre, “Christology and Revelation III,” Reformed Theological Review 16 (1957), 46. 
52 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 31 vols. (London: T&T Clark, 2009), I/1, §8. 
53 John McIntyre, “Christology and Revelation III,” Reformed Theological Review 16 (1957), 46. 
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on the undue onus that Barth’s system places on the doctrine of Christ (not necessarily the 
person of Christ) to hold the weight of all revelation.54 
 1957 was the final part of this pivotal transition.  Besides the two final installations of 
his series for the Reformed Theological Review, 1957 was the year that The Christian 
Doctrine of History was published and the year that McIntyre gave his inaugural address 
“Frontiers of Meaning” at New College. 
 The publication of The Christian Doctrine of History in many ways is the culmination 
of the work that McIntyre had been doing up to this point in that it still functions as a mostly 
academic exercise.  If anything it represents the last point at which McIntyre is writing in 
order to think himself out of his qualms with Barthian Christology.  Once again, this is not a 
claim that he abandons Barth at this juncture, nor does it mean that McIntyre does not 
continue to take issue with Barth at key junctures.  Instead, it crystallizes the problem that 
McIntyre has with Barth’s notion of revelation.  McIntyre cites the Barthian claim that “God is 
the Lord” is the sole content of revelation.55  While McIntyre is in favor of the idea that the 
Lordship of God, sovereignty, and providence are “integrally involved in and revealed 
through the Revelation in Jesus Christ,” he is also concerned that this ultimately makes the 
incarnation ahistorical.56  McIntyre is also concerned that calls for strictly historical accounts 
of Christ are either equally atheological, or at least theologically reductionistic.  For McIntyre, 
it is the convergence of these two things that affirm both aspects of the historical nature of 
the incarnation as temporal moment and a fulfilling moment of providential and sovereign 
act.  He writes that:  
It is not only that we are first sure of salvation in Jesus Christ, and that we argue 
inductively to the Lordship of God and to His providential guiding of the Universe as 
the grounds both of the actuality and the possibility for us of this salvation, but that 
the manner in which God works and reveals Himself in Jesus Christ is the manner in 
which He works providentially throughout the whole of history.57 
 
For McIntyre, the reality of God Himself working in and within history does not make sense 
of history in terms of a theological narrative.  Instead, it creates new problems of theological 
challenge when on the one hand God’s presence in the story complicates the story by 
creating meaninglessness where there was none before and creates meaning where no 
other meaning could be historically found.58 
                                                        
54 John McIntyre, The Shape of Christology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Person of Christ 2nd  
ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 169-70. 
55 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, §9. 
56 John McIntyre, The Christian Doctrine of History (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 36. 
57 Ibid. 
58 CDH, 114-115. 
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 As such the incarnation functions as the culmination of God’s involvement in history.  
It is not the only event of God’s involvement, and is thus not the sole revelatory act of God in 
relation to people.  However, it is central in that it epitomizes the way that our understanding 
of history must completely change in relation to Christ.  This is not to say that tried and true 
historical methods must be abandoned.  It is simply to say that a Christian doctrine of history 
must give theological account of historical realities and in turn condition those historical 
realities with theological import. 
 It is not surprising then, that in his inaugural lecture “Frontiers of Meaning” McIntyre 
decides to touch on the way that the discipline of theology functions in relation to other 
fields.59  This lecture signals a few things for McIntyre’s thought and career.  First, there is 
continuity with his understanding of the relation of theology and history. Second, there is the 
belief that similar types of convergence can happen between and among theology and other 
fields of study. Third, there is a two-fold defense of what might be called the unique methods 
of theology and their place (along with the place of all theological education) in the 
university. 
 The first part of this is important in that it shows McIntyre’s desire and attempt to be 
consistent.  It also shows that McIntyre is committed to systematic thinking.  McIntyre is not 
just trying to paint himself out of a historical corner.  Instead, he is thinking at the macro level 
about what exactly theology is and how it relates to broader systems of knowing.  Thus it is 
not just about how theology relates to traditionally associated fields like history and 
philosophy.  It is also about the way that theology relates to scientific fields and fields not 
traditionally associated with theology.60  One of the key areas that McIntyre sees promise for 
these types of interaction is the realm of method.  For him, method more than anything is a 
place where the exchange of ideas can happen.  As McIntyre puts it: 
…the Church must come to terms with the difficulties and problems which she shares 
with her contemporaries across the frontiers…. namely, that the relation of Church 
language to ordinary language is not that of two fields of knowledge separated by 
frontiers of meaninglessness…  Thus, it will be seen that it is not some special 
theological speech that it to fulfill this role, but the ordinary language and terminology 
of every day.61 
 
Method is the ultimate transferable skill, and it has the potential to both enrich theology as a 
discipline and inform other disciplines.  Consequently, McIntyre sees method as a key area 
for theologians to be working in order to demonstrate their worth and place in the university 
setting and to establish themselves at the frontiers of meaning. 
                                                        
59 John McIntyre, “Frontiers of Meaning,” Scottish Journal of Theology 10 (1957), 179. 
60 Ibid., 180. 
61 Ibid., 187. 
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 That said, McIntyre is also offering something of an apology for the continued 
presence and relevance of theology in the university.  A key part of this defense, for 
McIntyre, is defending the methods that are unique to theology.  Not only is methodology a 
place of convergence among fields, but it is also a place of divergence.  McIntyre argues 
that each field and discipline has methods that are unique to its own specific set of 
problems.  Physics is allowed unique methods, along with Chemistry, Biology, Medicine, et 
cetera.  Honing in on the idea of Philosophy of Religion, McIntyre advocates a kind of 
methodologically rigorous scholarship that both helps the church grapple with the challenges 
that she faces, while also communicating her central ideas in transferable language.   
Philosophy of Religion is the Church’s taking seriously her responsibilities to this task 
of proclamation…  We must affirm that Philosophy of Religion represents the 
Church’s attempt to understand her own message… to understand her own 
methodology and particularly her own criterion of truth and her methods of proof.62 
 
Consequently, theology should not be singled out for using unique methods.  Methods 
informed by faith and with different philosophical foundations are not anathemas to the credo 
of the university.  For McIntyre, “If Philosophy of Religion can assist the Church in honouring 
these responsibilities, she will have gone a long way in keeping open those frontiers 
between theology and those proximate fields of study and action.”63  Instead, they are simply 
the unique methods of a field that has much to learn and much to contribute in a vibrant 
university community.   
 In many ways these arguments set the tone for his long tenure at the University of 
Edinburgh, and he backed up these claims by consistently looking for points of convergence 
with thought and culture, consistently defending the unique content of Christian theology, 
and by being deeply committed to enriching university life through his service.  So it is not 
surprising that McIntyre’s earliest publications while in his post at Edinburgh deal explicitly 
with these themes.   
 He writes about the relationship between science and religion, he delves into the 
methodological aspects of analogy, and focuses on the structure of theological education. 
In many ways these early years are an outworking of the manifesto of his “Frontiers of 
Meaning” address.  There is an argument for increased integration between science and 
religion, even if bias and mutual skepticism persist.64  McIntyre is outlining what he thinks 
                                                        
62 Ibid., 188-189. 
63 Ibid., 190. 




theological education should be and could be.65  And his work on analogy provides an early, 
accessible, interdisciplinary work that proves significant, as McIntyre increasingly views the 
content of theological inquiry as referentially analogical to God.66  This is especially true as 
the notion that “with the exception of the statement about Being Itself, all language about 
God is analogical” becomes a premise of his theological method and the implementation of 
imagination as a theological concept.67 
 1962 present a strange convergence of publications for McIntyre.  On the one hand, 
there is the publication of On the Love of God and the two part series in the Expository 
Times on “The Place of Imagination in Theology.”68 
 In On the Love of God, McIntyre draws on familiar themes from both Anselm and His 
Critics and The Christian Doctrine of History.  When McIntyre writes about God’s love in 
terms of commitment, he interprets classical concepts of necessity and providence he 
originally treated in Anselm and His Critics and interprets them in terms of God’s love; and 
when McIntyre writes about God’s love as identification, he is developing the term that he 
uses in The Christian Doctrine of History to describe the historical nature of the incarnation 
beyond fulfillment.  However, in On the Love of God McIntyre also develops themes that 
foreshadow his later theological method and areas of interest.   
 There are two things that stand out in On the Love of God in regards to the way that 
it is formative in the development of McIntyre’s thought.  First, there are proto-elements of 
McIntyre’s mature method in the work.69  Here he is already using the notion of the given in 
much the same way that he does in his later works, and he makes reference to 
                                                        
65 John McIntyre, “The Structure of Theological Education,” Expository Times, 70 no 7 April (1959), 210-
215. 
66 John McIntyre, “L’analogie,” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 8 (1958): 81-99.  An English language 
version of this same paper was later published as “Analogy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 12 (1959): 1-20.  
67 This is a line from Tillich that McIntyre references in SOC, 62.  It is interesting to note that this is not the 
only time that McIntyre employs Tillich in an axiomatic manner while at the same time never offering any 
substantive engagement with his work.  For Tillich “The knowledge of revelation, directly or indirectly is 
knowledge of God, and therefore it is analogous or symbolic.  The nature of this kind of knowing is 
dependent on the nature of the relation between God and the world.”  Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967), vol. 1, 131.  While this might be viewed as a liberal statement in 
the context of 20th century theology, both authors refer back to the classical concept of the analogia entis 
to defend their respective positions. 
68 John McIntyre, “The Place of Imagination in Theology I,” Expository Times 74, no. 1 (1962), 16-21 this 
was followed in the same year by “The Place of Imagination in Theology II,” Expository Times 74, no. 2 
(1962), 36-39.  These two papers consist of the content of the four lectures that McIntyre prepared for 
the McCahan Lectures in Belfast in May of 1962.  This marks the beginning of the long saga of preparation 
that led to the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination in 1987. 
69 That said, I would not agree with Kevin Vanhoozer, who at least implies, that McIntyre is already using 
the concepts of ‘models’ as a methodological device in On the Love of God (London: Harper, 1962).  This 
mention of McIntyre’s presentation of loves as being presented in six models was originally published in 
his introduction to the edited volume Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of 
God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); but it was placed in the broader context of his own work, First 
Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2002). 
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understanding the love of God in terms of a variety of concepts being ‘multi-faceted.’70  This 
is a concept that McIntyre uses heavily when discussing models later, especially in The 
Shape of Soteriology.71  That said McIntyre eventually uses the concept of models in a very 
particular and technical way in his later writings.  The fact that McIntyre’s terminology in On 
the Love of God reflects his later terminology in the implementation of models is not the 
same as using models in general, especially as a highly developed methodological concept.  
Consequently, the idea of models should not be read back into On the Love of God too 
directly when one is interpreting this book as it was written. 
 Second, On the Love of God provides an insight into McIntyre’s thought in that it is 
his closest thing to a complete theology.  Of all of his writings, it does the most to integrate 
the broadest range of doctrines into a cohesive whole.  As such, it also contains his most 
complete and distinct doctrine of God.  This does not mean that On the Love of God 
provides a complete doctrine of God or that it was ever intended to do so.  What it does 
mean for this study is that it provides a broader theological context and framework within 
which to locate McIntyre’s Christology.  It shows the prominence of Christology in his 
thought as a whole and provides reasons for why Christology is such a central focus of 
McIntyre’s work moving forward. 
 Despite the fact that On the Love of God is still not representative of McIntyre’s 
mature thought, I would still argue that it does signal the beginning of McIntyre’s constructive 
theological project.  For example, it does not include any mention of Imagination, a fact that 
McIntyre himself later expressed as something he would have changed by the time he was 
writing Faith, Theology and Imagination.  That said, the less measured style of this earlier 
work shows McIntyre at his most direct and impassioned.72  In many ways this allows On the 
Love of God to function as a manifesto of sorts, even if it does prove to be a mild one.   
 The fact that the essays on imagination are published the same year is significant, 
because this, more than anything else shows a distinct change in McIntyre’s thinking from 
1962 to the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination.  On the one hand, there is 
consistency in the sense that the content of these essays are not substantially different from 
the content in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  What McIntyre says in these essays is 
representative of his later position.  What transpires over those twenty-five years though is 
significant, because it provides McIntyre ample time and opportunity to develop his thought.  
What emerge are not different ideas but an expansion of those ideas.   
                                                        
70 John McIntyre, On the Love of God. (London: Harper, 1962), 202. 
71 John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1992), 81. 
72 This is in reference to his published works.  There are notable exceptions that might be noted in 
McIntyre’s preaching, where his style is more direct. John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers AA.4.1.11. 
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 This happens to such a degree that in 1962 McIntyre is able to publish both On the 
Love of God and his McCahan Lectures on “The Place of Imagination in Theology.”73  By 
1987 McIntyre is ready to re-write the entirety of On the Love of God in terms of imagination, 
as a response to the further development of the place and function as not only a divine 
perfection but a divine perfection that has an integral role in accounting for other divine 
activity.  As a result, I am inclined to argue against any inclusion of On the Love of God as 
part of McIntyre’s systematic theological project.  While valuable to understanding what 
McIntyre thought in a historical, developmental sense, there are key components of 
McIntyre’s systematic project that are certainly not in place at this juncture.  In many ways 
the publication of the McMahan lectures makes this painfully obvious, in that McIntyre while 
heading in a certain direction is not yet willing to take imagination to all of the places the he 
is 25 years later. 
 It is not until 1966 that we see another major publication from McIntyre.74  The 
publication of the first edition of The Shape of Christology in 1966 marks the beginning of 
what might be considered McIntyre’s mature theological work.   
Originally developed as the Warfield Lectures, presented at Princeton Theological 
Seminary in 1965, this work marks the first that I would include in McIntyre’s overall 
theological project.  It introduces a structure and method that McIntyre would go on to use in 
his treatment of soteriology and pneumatology.  There is a consistent focus on formulating 
theology in light of the given of Christology; McIntyre is employing a fully developed method 
of using models to formulate that theology; he discusses different ways that the employment 
of models gives a shape and image to presentations of theology; and there is an 
employment of the type of Imagination that McIntyre was a proponent of.   
 The only reticence that one might have in classifying this work as representative of 
McIntyre’s thought is found in the fact that the second edition of this work includes 
substantial additions to the first edition.  Additionally, there is the question of time.  It was not 
until 1987 that his next book, Faith, Theology and Imagination, was published; and it was not 
until 1998 that the second edition of The Shape of Christology was published.  These gaps, 
and all that fills them, provide a particular challenge to treating the first edition of The Shape 
of Christology in relation to McIntyre’s other mature works, since it has its own distinct 
historical context.  However, the similarities between this book and McIntyre’s later writings 
                                                        
73 John McIntyre, “The Place of Imagination in Theology I,” Expository Times 74, no. 1 (1962): 16-21; and 
“The Place of Imagination in Theology II,” Expository Times 74, no. 2 (1962): 36-39.  These are the 
published version of McIntyre’s McMahan Lecture at Assembly’s College (Now Union Theological 
College), Belfast on 25 May 1962. 
74 In fact, the only publication during that time period is John McIntyre, Review of God is No More, by 
Werner and Lotte Pelz (Philadelphia, 1962), in Expository Times 74 (1963): 230. 
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are much more direct that any associations that it has with the earlier writings already 
discussed.   
 This is highlighted by the fact that the two editions of The Shape of Christology are 
basically similar in the content that they share in common.  The first edition was originally 
organized into seven chapters.  In the second edition the first six chapters from the first 
edition are grouped into two parts.  The first three chapters are grouped into a section on 
“Christological Method.”  The fourth through sixth chapters are grouped into a section on 
“Chalcedon-Based Models” of Christology.  The seventh chapter from the first edition serves 
as a conclusion to that edition, but it is used only as a conclusion to the first part of the 
second edition.  As such, the first three chapters of the first edition and the conclusion to the 
first edition form the core of the common material between these two editions.   
 The main differences in content/subject-matter between the two editions are more 
directly related to the Sitz im Leben of each edition more than to drastic changes in 
McIntyre’s thought.  For instance, when McIntyre is writing the first edition his primary points 
of interaction are with the traditional “Two-Nature Model,” “The Psychological Model,” and 
“The Revelation Model.”  For 1966, these models are fully integrated into contemporary 
concerns about Christology.  It shows an active interaction with the Barthian proponents of a 
revelatory Christology and the fallout that it caused.  By the time McIntyre wrote the second 
edition, McIntyre is not content to rehearse these concerns.  He offers an even larger 
evaluation of Process Christology75 and what he terms “Neo-Chalcedonian” christologies.76  
These areas of concern are developments in the field that postdate the original publication 
and demonstrate McIntyre’s continued engagement with the field of Christology.  However, 
the reception and reading of the first edition in light of the second edition is a broader topic 
than the one being addressed here.  Suffice it to say that while not McIntyre’s final word on 
Christology, the first edition is a foundation and important work for understanding McIntyre, 
his theology, and all of his subsequent works.   
 Despite the fact that 1966-1987 represents a gap in the publication of monographs, 
McIntyre was very active during this period of time.  It was during this time that McIntyre was 
                                                        
75 McIntyre devotes one chapter to David R. Griffin, A Process Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1973).  He also offers an evaluation of John B. Cobb Jr and his version of process Christology.  McIntyre 
takes into account Cobb’s original position in Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975) 
and modifications made that are part of his contribution to the edited volume, Encountering Jesus: Debate 
on Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).  The final proponent that he interacts with is Norman 
Pittenger, especially his books The Word Incarnate (London: Nisbet, 1959) and Christology Reconsidered 
(SCM Press, London, 1970). 
76 By this McIntyre is simply referring to authors or works contemporary to him that support a return to 
or a reformulation of the Chalcedonian definition.  While there are other authors and works that could 
have been used, McIntyre focuses on John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 
1990) and Gerald O’Collins, Christology (London: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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heavily engaged in a variety of administrative roles.  This included his involvement in the 
administration of New College.  He served as the Principal of New College and was the 
Dean of the Faculty of Divinity from 1968-1974.  In this capacity he took on major 
renovations of the facilities and was active in managing the property.  He is also notable for 
the introduction of Religious Studies as a subject at New College.  It proved to be significant 
for the future of New College in offering a broader range of subjects and in diversifying the 
faculty to meet the demands of the new subject area.  It was also significant that the 
theology and religions faculties were integrated, which was not the case at many 
universities.  McIntyre was also instrumental in diversifying the theology faculty at New 
College by supporting the appointment of Noel O’Donoghue and James Mackey the first 
Roman Catholic to the New College Faculty and the first Roman Catholic to hold a chair at 
New College respectively.77  However, this commitment to expansion and innovation was 
always balanced by a commitment to the tradition of New College as a place of training 
ordination candidates for the Church of Scotland and to his role as an educator.   
 McIntyre also engaged in roles within the university outside of New College.  He was 
the first Senior Warden of Pollock Halls and served in this capacity during construction.  His 
place in the university is highlighted by his stints as acting Principal and Vice-Chancellor of 
the university at two key junctures, in 1974-5 and again in 1979, when the university was in 
need of someone to fill these roles.  A tribute to the extent and appreciation of this service is 
the naming of the McIntyre Centre in Pollock Halls after John McIntyre.  Given his extensive 
involvement, there was no question of whether the divinity faculty was fully integrated into 
university life. 
 In addition to his responsibilities within the university, McIntyre was very active as a 
minister in Church of Scotland.  He frequently preached in churches around Scotland, and 
was involved in the training of ordination candidates.  He served as both the Dean of the 
Order of the Thistle and as Chaplain to the Queen in Scotland from 1975 until 1986,78 and in 
1982 he served as the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.79  It 
was in his capacity as Moderator that he welcomed Pope John Paul II in the New College 
courtyard, during his historic visit to Scotland.   
 The temptation biographically at this juncture is to acknowledge the gap in writing 
production and to attribute that relative silence to the busyness of McIntyre’s university and 
ecclesiastical career.  This was a time that McIntyre took on major responsibilities for the 
                                                        
77 Gary Badcock and David Wright eds., Disruption to Diversity: Edinburgh Divinity 1846-1996 (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996). 
78 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.6 
79 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.5.1 
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college and for the university.  His years of service and the toll they took on his ability to 
complete work and research should not be underestimated.  However, I would argue that it 
also indicates a shift in the way that McIntyre approaches themes that he had already been 
thinking about, lecturing about, and to at least some degree writing about.   
 While the reception of the first edition of The Shape of Christology was largely 
positive, there is something to be said for the fact that, the reviews at least, missed the 
point.80  I think it can be argued that McIntyre was already working with the concept of 
imagination in place.81  The popularity of the concept of models at that particular juncture 
made his research seem apropos to the time, and I think that connection between the two 
things was implicit and obvious.  The fact that the reviewers and his general readership did 
not see the connection or note that he was proposing and indeed doing something 
substantially different than his colleagues like Barbour, Ramsay, et al., posed a problem for 
McIntyre.  In a sense the lack of comprehension of The Shape of Christology demonstrated 
to McIntyre the fact that he was going to need to provide his work with a much stronger 
philosophical, methodological, and conceptual foundation. 
 While it was certainly something that he had thought about, and it was certainly 
something that was part of his work as a lecturer and preacher, McIntyre was not prepared 
at that early juncture to provide that foundation.  This at least contributes to the slow release 
of Faith, Theology and Imagination nearly twenty years later.  It also explains why we see a 
                                                        
80 It is possible that the reception of the 1st edition sends McIntyre back to the drawing board.  While this 
is speculative, if McIntyre does have a larger agenda in mind when he writes The Shape of Christology 
there is no indication that is recognized in the reception literature.  The reviews for the first edition are 
widely positive.  C. Brown, Review of The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 1966), in Churchman 80, 
no. 3 (1966): 224-225; E.L. Mascall, Review of The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 1966), in Church 
Quarterly Review 167, no. 365 (1966): 499-501; and C. Miller, Review of The Shape of Christology 
(London: SCM, 1966), in Reformed Theological Review 25, no. 3 (1966): 111-112.  All offer reviews of a 
positive but generally vague sort.  The review, John Macquarrie, Review of The Shape of Christology 
(London: SCM, 1966), in Expository Times 78, no. 3 (1966): 78-79; is the most engaged and in some ways 
most critical.  Macquarrie seems most aware of the implications of what McIntyre what is saying, 
especially in relation to the minority reading of Chalcedon that he provides in relationship to Ephraim of 
Antioch.  Macquarrie makes some attempt to raise the alarm without attacking McIntyre too directly.  
However, Macquarrie’s Christology is examined in the 2nd edition and evaluated according to its 
accordance with the criteria of Chalcedon, which in turn prompted two reviews from Macquarrie, Review 
of The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 1966), in Expository Times 110, no. 6 (1999): 193; and Review 
of The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 1966), in Theology 102, no. 806 (1999): 138-139. If that is the 
case, it would make sense that McIntyre would need to offer additional signposting and background 
before moving forward with his theological project.  Faith, Theology and Imagination certainly offers the 
context and background that the ‘Shape of’ books do not have without it.  In the case of the 1st edition, this 
‘background’ is simply provided post facto. 
81 The McCahan lectures that are the original core of Faith, Theology and Imagination were first presented 
in 1962.  What appears to be a slightly modified version of these is in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.14.15.  
These are dated 1967-1969, and may be the lectures that McIntyre presented at the centenary 
celebration of St. Andrew’s College, Sydney.  In either case, the concept of imagination is firmly 
established as a theme in and around this same time period. 
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greater amount of focus in the smaller publications and the lectures that McIntyre produces 
during this time period. 
 One of the roles that McIntyre fills is that of a representative of both reformed and 
Scottish Christianity.  One example of this is his being selected to represent religious life in 
Scotland in a series on “Current Theology Around the World.”82  It also falls to him to write 
an obituary for Karl Barth in The Scotsman in 1968.83  That said, there are still some 
example of his engaging with his own work outside of the classroom.  This continues to be 
represented in a very wide range.  One of the great honors that he received as an Anselm 
scholar was his invitation to contribute to the volume Sola ratione: Anselm Studien.84  This 
was a volume in honor of F.S. Schmitt in celebration of his 75th birthday.  Schmitt was the 
editor and translator of the authoritative Latin text of Anselm’s works.  The community of 
Anselm scholarship always had a special hold on McIntyre, and this is an honor that shows 
how that relationship was reciprocated. 
 Another project that McIntyre held dear was his work on Prophet of Penitence: John 
McLeod Campbell Our Contemporary Ancestor.85  McLeod Campbell was a theologian that 
McIntyre admired tremendously.  Not only was their overlap in the content of their 
theological interests, there was a shared outlook.  McIntyre saw something of himself in 
McLeod Campbell that made this a deeply personal project. 
 Some of the publications during this time period are more mundane.  McIntyre 
helped fill the pages of the New College Bulletin; New College Newsletter; and the University 
of Edinburgh Journal.86 However, McIntyre still managed to write on the topic of imagination.  
A sermon of his from 1973, “How Shall We Picture the Kingdom,” was published in Liturgical 
Review, and it contains the closest thing to a lay explanation of imagination that McIntyre 
provides.87  In it he clearly and concisely states how the images that God presents himself in 
are valuable as the images, as products of God’s imagination, and not just for what they 
signify.88  In a more academic context his essays “Theology and Method” and “New Help 
                                                        
82 John McIntyre, “Current Theology Around the World: Scotland,” Religion in Life 37 (1968): 180-90. 
83 John McIntyre, “Obituary of Professor Karl Barth, Renowned Swiss Theologian,” The Scotsman (1968): 
3. 
84 John McIntyre, "Cur deus-homo: The Axis of the Argument," in Helmut Kohlenberger, ed., Sola ratione: 
Anselm-Studien fr Pater Dr h c Franciscus Salesius Schmitt OSB zum 75sten Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1970): 
111-18. 
85 John McIntyre, Prophet of Penitence: John McLeod Campbell Our Contemporary Ancestor 
(Edinburgh, 1972). 
86 John McIntyre, "Frontiers of Theological Existence," New College Bulletin 6 (1971): 10-15; “Reflections 
on a Decade,” New College Bulletin 8 (1974): 15-19; "College, Church and University," New College 
Newsletter, no. 4 (1975): 3-5; and “The Shape and Place of a University,” University of Edinburgh Journal 
26 (1974): 308-13. 
87 John McIntyre, "How Shall We Picture the Kingdom?" Liturgical Review 3 (1973): 14-18. 
88 Ibid., 18. 
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from Kant: Theology and Human Imagination” offer significant insight to the way that the 
concept of imagination is continuing to develop.89  While these two essays do not address 
the idea of imagination as divine perfection, they do show a significant maturation of 
McIntyre’s thinking on imagination. 
 This consistent treatment of the subject of imagination helped establish McIntyre’s 
reputation as an expert on theological imagination both before and after the publication of 
Faith, Theology and Imagination.90 
 With the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination in 1987, McIntyre’s 
production of monographs increases.  With the overarching structure of Faith, Theology and 
Imagination there does seem to be a more concrete direction.  This is not to say that Faith, 
Theology and Imagination did not have a complex origin story of its own.91  It is simply to say 
that it marks the end of something of a drought, whether we attribute that exclusively to the 
business of his schedule and duties or whether we accept that this was the final result of a 
long, belabored labor of love. 
 Apart from book reviews, McIntyre only publishes one additional paper before the 
publication of the The Shape of Soteriology in 1992, and that is a return to the christology of 
D.M. Baillie in a volume organized by D.W.D. Shaw.  The Shape of Soteriology itself is an 
interesting book in that there are two ways to read the book.  The first is to read the book as 
a sort of introduction to the field of soteriology.  There is a solid survey of traditional 
atonement theories.  They are presented in almost exclusively positive light, even if 
structural shortcomings are acknowledged as each one reaches the limits of the analogy it 
provides.  The second, takes a second look and realizes that McIntyre is slowly but surely 
making significant claims about the field of soteriology itself.  It is an example of how 
McIntyre’s quiet, steady, unassuming style sometimes allows his ideas to fly under the radar.  
                                                        
89 John McIntyre, "Theology and Method," in Richard McKinney, ed., Creation, Christ and Culture: Studies 
in Honour of T F Torrance, (Edinburgh, 1976): 204-30; and "New Help from Kant: Theology and Human 
Imagination," in J. P. Mackey, ed., Religious Imagination (Edinburgh,1986): 102-22. 
90 John McIntyre, "Imagination," The Dictionary of Pastoral Care, ed. Alistair V. Campbell (London, 1990): 
126-27; and "Imagination," New Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richard-son and John Bowden 
(London, 1983): 283-84. 
91 This book notably began as the McGahan Lecture in Belfast in 1962.  The content of this lecture was 
published in two parts in Expository Times in two parts under the title “The Place of Imagination in 
Theology.”  This original core was later developed into a series of four lectures for the centenary 
celebrations at St. Andrew’s College Sydney.  Further development of the philosophical material took 
place in 1977-1978, which McIntyre spent in residence with the Philosophy Department of the University 
of New England, New South Wales, while on sabbatical.  The remainder of his sabbatical was spent at 
Princeton Theological Seminary was spent developing the more theological aspects.  The final stage 
appears to be a push for publication after this material was reworked as the Margaret Harris Lectures on 
Religion in 1984.  It is this long path to publication that, in conjunction with other work and 
responsibilities, precludes any notion that this was a sparse period in McIntyre’s overall production.  It is 
also clear that much of the material that he developed along the way influenced his course lectures on 
imagination, pneumatology, and hermeneutics. 
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Most of the reviews of The Shape of Soteriology are positive, however most of them only 
acknowledge the first reading to any significant degree.92  One notable exception on this 
front is David Fergusson, who is keenly aware of the fact the McIntyre is operating on two 
different levels.93  
 Once again, there is a relatively short time between the publication of The Shape of 
Soteriology and The Shape of Pneumatology in 1997.  Once again, the period between 
publications was not particularly full.  With the exception of book reviews, McIntyre’s sole 
contribution during this period is a chapter on historical criticism submitted to a volume in 
honor of his former colleague and longtime friend James Barr.94  Barr was an early ally of 
McIntyre when he first returned to New College, and McIntyre hated to see him and his 
family go.   
 The year 1997 is a significant year for any treatment of McIntyre and his theology for 
a number of reasons.  Not only did it mark the publication of The Shape of Pneumatology, 
but it also marked the release of Theology After the Storm which brought to light earlier 
works of McIntyre’s that had remained unpublished.  The impetus for the release of this book 
was the work of Gary Badcock.  He is credited with finding the manuscripts in a drawer at 
New College.95  He deserves additional credit for seeing the value of what he found, and 
putting in tireless work with McIntyre to bring them up to date for publication.  Given 
McIntyre’s notoriously meticulous habits, attention to detail, and sometimes fastidious habits 
this was no small feat.  In addition to this work, Badcock also offers the first critical 
introduction to McIntyre’s theology, which for many will be their first and in some cases only, 
exposure to McIntyre as an independent theological thinker.  As such, it is in an invaluable 
resource.  The book was released to unanimously positive reviews by David Fergusson, 
George Newlands, and Fergus Kerr.96 
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 It also appears that the release of Theology After the Storm contributed to 
heightened interest in The Shape of Pneumatology given the fact that this is the most 
reviewed book of any of McIntyre’s works.97  Of these, it is the later review by Badcock that 
merits additional attention.  Namely, Badcock deserves credit for noting the fact that the 
publication of The Shape of Pneumatology demonstrates the ‘Shape of’ books have 
graduated beyond the realm of occasional, unrelated publications.  Badcock suggests that 
the ‘Shape of’ books in conjunction with On the Love of God and Faith, Theology and 
Imagination constituted the closest thing to a complete systematic theology to be composed 
in Britain in the 20th century.98  While this is a high claim, it illustrates the potential the 
Badcock sees in the constructive value of McIntyre’s thought. 
 The following year marks the publication of the 2nd edition of The Shape of 
Christology.  This opportunity was something of a surprise for McIntyre.  It was not 
something that he initially considered doing, but it was something that his publisher 
approached him about.  McIntyre took full advantage of the opportunity and offered a 
significantly revised and updated version.  Unfortunately, this was widely dismissed as a 
reprint.  The major exception of this was John Macquarrie who wrote multiple reviews of the 
updated edition.  His interest was somewhat personal.  Macquarrie had been critical of the 
first edition, and his own Christology was subsequently featured in McIntyre’s updates.  
While the exchange remained civil, it is clear that Macquarrie took exception. 
 The remaining publications are primarily related to history, though there is some 
indication that McIntyre was developing something of an interest in the doctrine of creation.  
However, how involved this interest was remains unclear.  While McIntyre published and 
spoke widely and freely, he carefully curated the final products.  Each of the ‘Shape of’ 
books is the product of a long development.  This is especially true of Faith, Theology and 
Imagination.  However, it can also be seen in the exacting process of releasing Theology 
                                                        
97 Ralph Del Colle, Review of The Shape of Christology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), in Theological Studies 
59, no. 4 (1998): 747-749; Nouvelle, Revue. Review of The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in Theologique 120 (1998): 639; Hugh S. Pyper, Review of 
The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in 
Theology 101, no. 799 (1998): 45-46; Jacques Lison, Review of The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the 
Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in Science et Esprit 51, no. 2 (1999): 252-253; 
Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, Review of The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in Scripta Theologica 31, no. 1 (1999): 267; Ralph Del Colle, Review 
of The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in 
Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 4 (2000): 535-538; and Nothan K. K. Ng, Review of The Shape of 
Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), in Hill Road 4, no. 1 
(2000): 119-122. 
98 Gary D. Badcock, Review of The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit 








 This concludes the first part of the thesis, which is the survey.  This survey has 
offered a brief biographical introduction to John McIntyre and a review of his theological 
publications.  The purpose of these two components is to provide context for the argument 
that Faith, Theology and Imagination; The Shape of Christology; The Shape of Soteriology; 
and The Shape of Pneumatology are part of a single theological vision.  Faith, Theology and 
Imagination lays out this vision, and the other ‘Shape of’ books are further developments of 
this singular theological vision. 
 The second part will consist of chapters 2-5.  These chapters are going to break 
down the components of this theological system.  This starts with the theological vision that 
McIntyre lays out in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  It will be argued that the key claim of 
this book is found in McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category.  This 
begins with the central and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s 
being.  This in turn informs the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of 
imagination might inform and be formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a 
doctrine of the incarnation, a doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.   
 It will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this theological 
vision.  This is done somewhat retroactively in The Shape of Christology, since the first 
edition predates the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination.  That said, there are two 
reasons this is not necessarily problematic.  One, there is evidence that McIntyre was 
working in the area and on the concept of imagination before the first edition of The Shape 
of Christology is published.  Two, the second edition of The Shape of Christology is 
significantly reworked in ways that are compliant with the vision laid out in Faith, Theology 
and Imagination. 
 The other ‘Shape of’ books follow this pattern more explicitly, since they do not have 
the added complexity of timeline.  Thus it will be argued that The Shape of Soteriology gives 
further shape and definition to McIntyre’s claim from Faith, Theology and Imagination that 
imagination is a category of the atonement.  Key to this claim is the argument that McIntyre’s 
use of the concept of models function as a methodological placeholder for imagination.  This 
is especially important in an evaluation of The Shape of Soteriology, since this is McIntyre’s 
most explicit and sophisticated presentation of the concept. 
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 This second part will conclude with the argument that The Shape of Pneumatology is 
an outworking of McIntyre’s claim in Faith, Theology and Imagination that imagination is a 
category of the Holy Spirit.   
 This is the final piece that concludes the overall argument of part two that the 
development of imagination in McIntyre’s thought is a pivotal concept that allows us to see 
McIntyre’s work as a single project.  Before the emergence of this concept that was not 
possible.  It is only in light of this concept, that McIntyre’s works begin to take shape into a 
unified whole. 
 The third and final part of this thesis will argue two things.  One, it will argue that 
McIntyre’s theological vision laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination is incomplete.  
Specifically, it does not offer a complete formulation or outworking of a doctrine of God or a 
doctrine of creation.  Two, it will argue that McIntyre provides a starting point for developing 
these two unrealized areas of his theological vision. 
 In Faith, Theology and Imagination McIntyre makes an argument for imagination 
being a divine perfection, but this claim and idea is not given fuller shape like the doctrines 
of Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology.   
 This is also true of the doctrine of creation, and this creates problems of consistency 
within McIntyre’s system.  On the one hand, a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation 
could be helpful in highlighting traditional notions of imagination and imaginative activity to 
the divine activity of creation.  On the other hand, without a fuller presentation of the doctrine 
of creation McIntyre’s focus on imagination as a component of the imago Dei is absent, 
which is in its own right a foundational idea upon which McIntyre bases the idea that a 
theological method and epistemology should begin with imagination.  Ultimately, the lack of 
a doctrine of creation represents the fact that McIntyre’s system is by no means complete 
and is in need of significant development and rehabilitation before it can be formulated into 
any type of fully fledged theological system. 
 Once these gaps have been identified, the final task becomes proposing a way to fill 
them.  The argument that this thesis will conclude with is two-fold.  First, it will be argued that 
in order to fill the gap left by an undeveloped doctrine of God in McIntyre’s theological 
system in a way that is true to McIntyre’s own theological vision, a doctrine of God must be 
formulated in which imagination is a divine perfection and that his book On the Love of God 
must be re-interpreted in terms of imagination.  This is what McIntyre has in mind when he is 
making the claim for the primacy of imagination in the being of God as a divine perfection 
par excellence.   
 Second, it will be argued that the doctrine of creation must not simply be a 
development of the outline provided in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  Any doctrine of 
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creation developed along McIntyrian lines must take into account one of the major 
breakthrough claims of The Shape of Pneumatology, that any full account of creation must 
incorporate the presence, activity, and agency of the Holy Spirit in the divine activity of 
creation. 
 Finally, it will be argued that McIntyre’s theology proposes a theological vision that is 
incomplete but also one that is still a live option.  We are fortunate that McIntyre’s central 
claim is a beginning and not an end.  The idea that imagination is a divine perfection of God 
is not a conclusion that simply adds to the list of tried and true divine attributes.  Instead, it is 
a claim central to the being and activity of God that invites a total re-imagination of who we 

















Part II: Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Chapter 2: Faith, Theology and Imagination 
 
1. Introduction: Imagination as a Theological Category  
 Here we begin to outline the key parts of McIntyre’s corpus that relate to each other 
as a cohesive theological system.  The foundational claim for this cohesion is found in 
McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category.  This begins with the central 
and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s being.  This in turn informs 
the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of imagination might inform and be 
formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a doctrine of the incarnation, a 
doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  Once this central claim has 
been established, it will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this 
theological vision.   
 The important thing to remember with McIntyre is that imagination is not merely a 
methodological mechanism or an epistemological faculty.  The central claim of McIntyre’s 
theological system is that imagination is itself a theological category.  While imagination 
does play a major role in his theological methodology and is certainly a part of his account of 
epistemology, it is the claim that imagination is a part of the subject and object of theological 
inquiry that completely sets his understanding of imagination apart. 
 Whereas there is a long list of theologians who pay lip service to the importance of 
imagination to theology, the importance is solely about epistemology and method.1  For 
                                                        
1 This is true of the historical, philosophical development of the concept of imagination as well as more 
contemporary treatments.  This is part of what makes MacDonald such an obvious ally for McIntyre.  
There are of course other possible historical allies.  Kant provides some interesting possibilities, which 
McIntyre notes in John McIntyre, “New Help from Kant; Theology and Human Imagination” in ed. Mackey 
Religious Imagination (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1986).  That said, it is not an avenue that 
he pursues further when he publishes Faith, Theology and Imagination the following year.  This is 
probably related to McIntyre’s reticence to identify to fully with any philosophical framework.  There is 
also Schelling, who Mary Warnock credits as the first and most significant innovator of relating the task of 
imagination to religion.  Coleridge also provides a life options, but his Scottish counterpart proves a better 
ally.  That said, Kant’s concept of imagination at its most compatible in The Critique of Judgement is still an 
epistemological exercise, even if it does offer us an account of encountering ‘the sublime.’  Schelling 
drawing on the idealist tradition, even in his application of similar epistemological functions to the divine 
as well as the sublime, does not transfer the concept of imagination as proper to the being of the divine in 
any way.  Thus from a historical perspective, MacDonald does present as a singularly unique source. 
McIntyre mentions other sources that were contemporary to him. Alistair Hannay, Mental Images a 
Defense (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971); Ray Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: 
Herder, 1974); and David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981).  Tracy’s work 
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McIntyre, he is always moving the concept of imagination above and beyond mere 
methodology.  For him it is more than actively working to understand God.  Imagination is 
more than an affirmation of the human coefficient in knowing God.  Rather, it is a radical 
affirmation of the belief that God is himself imaginative and that as a result the concept of 
imagination should be understood as a category of the content of theology itself. 
 First, there is the basic idea of imagination as a theological category.  This is simply 
enough to distinguish McIntyre’s notion of imagination from most theological accounts of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
probably comes the closest to the type of imagination that McIntyre is interested in, in that it accounts for 
the analogical nature of imagination, which in the context of theology maintains an appropriate distance 
between the content of theology and the subject of theology.  That said, this is still completely 
epistemological.  Among his contemporaries, it is Mary Warnock who provides the most aligned stream of 
thought.  Her highly integrated notion of imagination as not only epistemological but also creative and 
generative provided a compatibility with McIntyre’s thinking that was largely absent among his 
theological contemporaries.  In more recent years, there are four authors whose works stand out as the 
most significant contributions when it comes to theology and the religious imagination: David Brown, 
Garrett Green, William Cavanaugh, and Douglass Hedley.  David Brown’s project is the most ambitious in 
scope.  His has two volumes that treat the topic of imagination in a theological context.  The first volume, 
Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), comprises of a 
two-pronged argument.  The first part of this argument is that the Christological narrative follows 
common narrative, revelatory patterns Ibid., 274., and that this provides an opportunity for current 
Christological investigations to incorporate and adapt contemporary equivalents, Ibid.  This does moves 
somewhat beyond the purely epistemological construction of imagination, in that theology is being 
formulated through the implementation of imagination.  That said, at no point is there any indication that 
God is imaginative.  It is only by appealing to other previous efforts at human, imaginative thinking about 
God that Brown advocates for similar types of anthropocentric endeavors.  This is not to say that Brown’s 
account of imagination is not worthwhile.  In the second volume, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian 
Tradition and Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Brown offers a series of studies that function 
like case studies of his imaginative method.  While the actual method might differ, such studies promise to 
offer invaluable insights to anyone exploring what an imaginative encounter with key theological themes 
might look like.  Garrett Green’s study, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), is notable for a number of reasons.  His work comes close after McIntyre’s, but 
there is no indication that he is using McIntyre.  This is perhaps an unfortunate oversight, given that there 
is much between the two that could be seen as compatible.  Green roots his approach to imagination in 
the philosophical tradition, finds alliance in the implementation of imagination in the physical sciences, 
and even goes so far as to relate imagination to ‘The Meaning of Revelation’ and writes in this context 
about Christ as the image of God.  However, after coming that far and that close does not extrapolate that 
to mean that the incarnation is an imaginative act on the part of God or that God would need to be 
imaginative in order to be present in and as such an image.  The strongest conclusion that Green is able to 
make on this point is that “we only have access to the embodied image of God only by way of the 
imagination of the original witnesses.” Ibid, 104.  In some ways, Green is concluding this line of inquiry 
where McIntyre began The Christian Doctrine of History, the question of how we access a historically 
obscured revelatory act.  Douglas Hedley is the most recent of these scholars.  His work, The Iconic 
Imagination (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), is the most recent.  While his work is more closely related to 
aesthetics and the ability to represent religious ideas in the form of images, this volume could prove an 
ally for McIntyre’s thought moving forward.  The idea that art itself can be theological is very similar to 
the way that McIntyre writes about art.  The key point of convergence that Hedley presents is the idea 
that divine attributes can be expressed as image.  While this is still a matter of theology from below, this 
work does present a possible point for convergence.  The reason that more time has not been allocated to 
these works within McIntyre’s account is that McIntyre’s account distinguishes itself as being singularly 
unique in attributing imagination to God as a divine perfection.  These concerns raised by McIntyre’s 




imagination.  The challenge moving beyond this distinguishing characteristic is the locus of 
imagination.  It is a challenge that McIntyre struggles with at a number of different junctures.  
The most crucial being when he relates imagination to the doctrine of God.  Here McIntyre 
desperately wants to locate imagination as central and prime to God’s being and action, 
however he does not always do so consistently. 
 Consequently, we will trace that conflict here and offer a synthesis of McIntyre’s 
positions that offers a consistent framework of imagination that aligns with the more central 
locus of imagination as the impetus of God’s love.  This central location of the concept of 
imagination within the being of God allows us to draw much stronger connections between 
the areas of theology that McIntyre does address, namely creation, Christology, soteriology, 
and Pneumatology. 
 For McIntyre, the task of theology and kerygmatic proclamation is not merely a 
prophetic task of espousing divinely dictated precepts of divine truth; instead it is the process 
necessary for working through the inherent difficulties of expressing that which cannot be 
expressed.  That which one cannot know must be imagined, and God is indeed unknowable.  
McIntyre sees this task as so fundamental to the work of theology that he concludes in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination that Imagination is something that we employ when contemplating 
God, “whether we acknowledge it or not.”2 
 What McIntyre does with Imagination, is to locate it at the very core of theology in 
God’s own existence, God’s work of creation, in the incarnation, in the work of atonement, 
and in the work of the Holy Spirit.  In each instance the intensity and import of this 
imaginative element is heightened and elevated to something so pervasive that it permeates 
the entirety of the life of God and every human response that seeks to know and understand 
him.   
 Drawing on the tradition of 19th century British romantics, McIntyre finds an ally and 
impetus for his cause in the Scottish writer George MacDonald (most recently of C.S. Lewis 
fame).3  Here there are many points that McIntyre treats as touchstones, but there are some 
key discoveries that resonate throughout the rest of Faith, Theology and Imagination. 
                                                        
2 John McIntyre, Faith, Theology and Imagination (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1987), 175. 
3 George MacDonald, A Dish of Orts (London: Edwin Dalton, 1908).  The influence of MacDonald on 
McIntyre is difficult to estimate.  On the one hand, there are clear echoes of MacDonald’s view of 
imagination in McIntyre.  On the other hand, it is unclear if MacDonald is a carefully selected ally or a 
seminal thinker in McIntyre’s development of the concept.  MacDonald is quite different from many of the 
sources with whom McIntyre usually engages.  As a 19th Century Scottish Romantic, MacDonald is 
enamored of his German Predecessors, especially Novalis.  He is a poet and author of everything from 
children’s fairytales like The Princess and Curdie or The Light Princess, to dark novels like Lillith, and 
written sermons.  In either case, MacDonald provides McIntyre with a number of things.  First, he 
provides McIntyre with a relatively neutral interlocutor.  Rather than dealing directly with Kant, 
Schelling, or Coleridge who all come with considerable philosophical, theological, and academic baggage; 
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 The first point is that imagination is an attribute of God and is an integral part of the 
imago Dei; and as such, God is himself the ultimate source of imagination and is its ultimate 
subject.  As MacDonald writes: 
 The imagination of man is made in the image of the imagination of God.  Everything 
 of man must have been of God first; and it will help much towards our understanding 
 of the imagination and its functions in man if we first succeed in regarding aright the 
 imagination of God, in which the imagination of man lives and moves and has its 
 being.4 
 
Here imagination is grounded in God’s being, and imagination is an expression of that being 
in people as God’s creation.  This is something that resonates in McIntyre’s own subsequent 
writing on the subject and that McIntyre makes even more explicit in his presentation of 
imagination as a theological category. 
 The second point is rooted in MacDonald’s presentation of imagination as a task.  
This is certainly part of what McIntyre draws on in agreement with MacDonald, that there is a 
distinction between the real work of imagination and flights of fancy.  The basic function of 
this idea, especially as it relates to knowing and even then particularly knowing and 
imagining God, is rooted in the inherently imaginative task of language.  As MacDonald 
simply states, “The half of our language is the work of the imagination.”5  For him, there is no 
word ever spoken that was not first imagined.  Thus all conceptual endeavors are a work of 
imagination and that work requires constructive effort.6 MacDonald writes: 
 What we mean to insist upon is, that in finding out the works of God, the intellect 
 must labour, workman-like, under the direction of the architect, Imagination.  Herein, 
 too, we proceed in the hope to show how much more than is commonly supposed 
                                                                                                                                                                            
MacDonald is generically influenced by idealism, explicitly Christian, and very original in his thought.  
Second, MacDonald is Scottish.  While this is not a ‘be all end all’ criteria, it is certainly a boon for 
McIntyre whose primary context is the Church of Scotland.  McIntyre is not unique in turning to 
MacDonald among Scottish Theologians.  D.M. Baillie refers to MacDonald in God was in Christ (London: 
Scribners, 1948), as does his brother John Baillie in Our Knowledge of God (London: Scribners, 1959).  The 
third thing that MacDonald provides is a clear advocate for the inclusion of imagination among the 
attributes.  This moves far beyond a selection of convenience.  The question still remains about whether 
McIntyre is using MacDonald as a source or an inspiration.  In either case, McIntyre employs MacDonald’s 
thought to exemplify the highly integrated notion of imagination that McIntyre himself is working with 
and advocating in a theological context.      
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 FTI, 7. 
6 Allison Jack, “Theology, Imagination, and Scottish Literature,” Theology in Scotland, vol. XIV, no. 2 
(2007): 33-50.  This is a theme that Allison Jack takes up in her treatment of McIntyre’s concept of 
imagination as it relates more broadly to themes within the Scottish literary tradition.  She does an 
excellent job of capturing the integrated nature of imagination and the pervasiveness of imagination that 
is present both in MacDonald and in McIntyre.  It should also be noted that this specific volume contains 
the contents of a conference presented in memory of John McIntyre.  Presenters also included D.W.D. 
Shaw, David Fergusson, and George Newlands.  Their papers are also printed in the same volume of 
Theology in Scotland.  These essays provide a small core in the relatively small amount of secondary 
literature on John McIntyre and his theology. 
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 the imagination has to do with human endeavor; how large a share it has in the work 
 that is done under the sun.7 
 
It is this idea that leads McIntyre to affirm the place of imagination in all works of inquiry 
including that of science and history as providing the framework for all of those efforts.  It is 
part of what MacDonald terms “the intellectuo-constructive imagination.”8  In this 
construction imagination is foundational to all tasks of learning and knowing truth and 
transcends discipline and subject, a point that McIntyre also echoes.  This is what lends the 
whole system analogous representation in a field like mathematics.  Though the content of a 
field may be different, the process of pursuing truth is much the same.9 
 The most direct connection between these foundational ideas about imagination and 
McIntyre’s broader theological corpus is McIntyre’s presentation of imagination as a 
theological category.  The primary introduction to this notion is found in the third chapter of 
Faith, Theology and Imagination.  This treatment begins by relating imagination to the being 
of God directly, by establishing imagination not only as an attribute of God but as one that is 
prime in and to understanding the nature of God as loving.  This in turn is related specifically 
to the areas of creation, Christology, soteriology, and pneumatology.  However, this account 
in Faith, Theology and Imagination is more of an outline of what McIntyre is proposing.  So, 
we will attempt to offer a more complete account by filling out these proposals with the 
relevant content from On the Love of God and the appropriate ‘Shape of’ books respectively.   
 When McIntyre begins this task of arguing for imagination as a theological category 
by establishing imagination as an attribute and divine perfection, there are two separate but 
complimentary accounts of imagination that McIntyre offers.  The first account is comprised 
of sections numbered 1-4 of the five full sections of the text.  The first four are directly 
related to particular sections of Barth’s Church Dogmatics in which McIntyre addresses a 
place of compatibility for the language of Imagination to be employed.  These include Barth’s 
treatment of the divine attributes: 1) Love, 2) Freedom, 3) Mercy, and 4) Patience.  The 
second account of the relation of Imagination to the attributes of God is found in the fifth and 
final section under this heading.  This section includes subsections a-e, which outline 
McIntyre’s proposal for integrating elements of Barth’s treatment of attributes in an account 
of imagination as an attribute itself.  However, to fully delineate McIntyre’s position and to 
                                                        
7 FTI, 11. 
8 FTI, 16. 
9 This is a point that McIntyre argued in his inaugural lecture at the University of Edinburgh, “Frontiers of 
Meaning” University of Edinburgh Journal, Autumn 1956, 122-139.  At that point his argument was 
primarily concerned with other humanities as an apology for the place of theology in the academy.  




present it consistently, both accounts of imagination in relation to God and his attributes 
must be examined. 
 
2. The First Account: Imagination and the Attributes of God 
 In the first account, the main focus and argument is that imagination is a concept that 
is compatible with and finds affinity in Barth’s Church Dogmatics.  This is a significant claim 
considering the aversion to analogical language that Barth had and that can be found in 
Barthian interpreters of McIntyre’s time.  Key to this argument is the initial hedging that 
McIntyre employs.  The first claim with which McIntyre hedges his argument is that Barth 
does not fully follow his own emphasis on Divine attributes being perfections, that is the idea 
that God is identical with his attributes.  The classic example of this being the idea that “God 
is love.”10  Here love is attributed to God, but love is defined by and identical to the God 
whose love it is.   
 However, when this is extrapolated to other concepts attributed to God this becomes 
a more difficult position to maintain.  Consequently, it is difficult for Barth to maintain this 
language of perfections and avoid the language of attributes.11  Love becomes a defining 
feature of which grace, mercy, patience, holiness, righteousness, and wisdom are 
referentially attributive.12  John Webster offers an account of this challenge by noting that: 
Constructed with his characteristic layering of themes, Barth is trying to indicate the 
inseparability of divine freedom and divine love.  Divine freedom, because it is not 
abstract but takes form in the acts of creation, reconciliation and redemption, is the 
freedom in which God loves.  Freedom is not anterior to God’s love but its diving 
depth; divine love is the actuality (not the surrender or compromise) of divine 
freedom.13 
                                                        
10 1 John 4:9 
11 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §29.  McIntyre is simply trying to point out the challenge of 
understanding these ideas as perfections rather than as attributes, rather than trying to diminish the idea 
that they should be viewed as perfections rather than attributes.  If anything, this might be a place where 
Barth’s attempts to avoid certain categories create new challenges.   
12 FTI, 43 McIntyre makes this claim in reference to Barth’s treatment of “The Perfections of Divine 
Loving” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §30.  The logistical challenge that McIntyre is referring to is 
that when there are multiple perfections, it is a challenge to speak of these perfections in relationship to 
each other.  When one speaks of attributes of a subject, those attributes are easily related to each other in 
terms of their respective relation to the subject.  Here, after Barth’s defense of perfections in §29, Barth is 
speaking about love (a perfection) in terms of grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, and patience 
and wisdom.  This raises the question of how mercy, for instance, can be a perfection of God if it is in turn 
an aspect (or attribute) of his love.  
13 John Webster, Barth, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 86.  For Webster the key to understanding 
what Barth is doing with this ‘layering’ is that “What is most important about the rather complex way in 
which Barth builds up his account is that it is mobile: the ‘point’ of the argument lies in its entire 
movement and in the intricate sets of echoes, backward and forward references, recapitulations and 
variations by which that movement is carried.” Ibid., 87.  The fact is that I agree with Webster’s analysis 
here.  It matches the kind of complex layering that McIntyre is both referencing and emulating in his 




Thus it is not surprising that Barth speaks of God’s freedom in similar terms of its unity, 
constancy, eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence, and glory all of which are referentially 
attributed to that freedom.14  Secondly, McIntyre hedges his argument with the claim that 
Barth, despite all of his focus on scriptural norms in theology, does not develop his own 
theology and its terminology completely within its bounds.  McIntyre highlights this in relation 
to Barth’s concept of ‘freedom’, and the classical adherence to concepts of hypostasis and 
‘trinity’.  This second qualification is meant simply to handle criticism that his use of the term 
imagination is an infusion alien to scripture and thus somehow inherently incompatible with 
Barth’s theology.   
 With these qualifications of his argument in place, McIntyre begins the content of the 
first account with Barth’s focus on “the being of God as the one who loves.”15  McIntyre 
interprets the claims of Barth at this point to say that “God’s loving… is concerned with 
seeking and creating fellowship without any reference to an existing attitude or worthiness 
on the part of the person concerned.”16  Additionally, McIntyre highlights the importance of a 
range of images that Barth employs to illuminate the concept of God’s love including as a 
shining light and a bridge stretched over a crevasse.   
 McIntyre’s point here is two-fold.  First, there is an inherent connection between the 
function of imagination and the function of love, especially the love of God.  Love of this 
unmerited sort cannot be understood in terms of contractual rules of obligation, but instead it 
requires imaginative and generative beginnings that allow it to function without any merit of 
provocation.  Second, love of this sort is of such a nature that the simple employment of the 
term love is insufficient to illuminate all that the term entails.  This love cannot simply be 
stated.  It must be illustrated; it must be given an image; it must be imagined.  This in turn 
maintains the ethical dimension of love and prevents the concept of imagination from being 
an abstraction.  Here imagination maintains a moral dimension by its relation to love.   
However, even if the must is removed, the nature of this love warrants further explanation 
                                                                                                                                                                            
a certain amount of leeway and space in order for this more complex presentation to take shape and 
develop.  In some ways, McIntyre’s case at this juncture is simply a request for that space, a request that 
his development of imagination as a divine perfection be allowed the same space to take shape.  As he 
himself writes “In the same way Barth has said we do not begin with a definition of the word ‘love,’ but 
with the resolve to let the act of God visible in his revelation speak for itself, and allow the word to take 
on a new meaning which is fulfilled in a way which breaks up and reforms its usual meaning.  I would ask 
no more for ‘imagination.’” FTI, 44. 
14 FTI, 43.  This freedom in turn is vitally important to Barth’s theological program as a whole.  As Bruce 
McCormack highlights the idea that this freedom cannot be abstracted from Jesus, because it is this 
freedom that allows Christ to become both ‘form’ and ‘revelation’ in the stately expression of his divine 
and kingly freedom. Bruce McCormack, Ed. John Webster, “Grace and Being” The Cambridge Companion to 
Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 106. 
15 FTI, 44 
16 FTI, 44. 
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and illustration; and this sort of illustrative and imaginative work is not incompatible with 
Barth’s system, which presupposes the inadmissibility of such analogical approaches. 
 Secondly, McIntyre identifies an affinity of Barth’s presentation of the freedom of God 
with his own concept of imagination.  For Barth, as McIntyre observes, the freedom of God 
“may express itself in his being present with that which is not God, in communicating himself 
in a way which entirely surpasses all that can be effected by way of reciprocal presence, 
communion and fellowship between other beings.”17  For McIntyre, “this projection by God of 
himself into the state and condition of the other who is the sinner is an imaginative activity 
based upon this deep understanding of, and sympathy for, the other.”18  By making this act 
of God an imaginative activity, McIntyre is placing imagination very close to God’s own being 
and existence.   
 For McIntyre, this is very near to providing the basis for the claim of George 
MacDonald that imagination should indeed be considered to be one of God’s attributes.  
However, McIntyre finds one fault with Barth’s presentation of God’s freedom in this activity.  
Namely, he argues that Barth overstates the distance between humanity and God in the 
ability to relate to others in this way.  For McIntyre, “The command, ‘Love one another as I 
have loved you,’ must allow for- and indeed requires -a measure of imaginative penetration 
by human beings beyond the frontiers which they often set up to keep out not only God but 
one another.”19  Still he affirms along with Barth the idea that “it is in this process of 
indwelling through imaginative penetration, [that] God does not cease to be himself, nor 
does he turn into the other.”20  For McIntyre, this is very close to the concept of identification 
that he sees as the concluding and crowning aspect of God’s love; and it is this term that is 
key to understanding the love of God in terms of imagination. 
 The third point of contact that McIntyre claims for his own concept of imagination in 
Barth is his treatment of God’s mercy.  In speaking of the merciful heart of God, and in 
criticism of Schleiermacher, McIntyre quotes Barth:  “The source of the feeling of sheer 
dependence has no heart.  But the personal God has a heart.  He can feel, and be 
affected.”21  This claim, which stands in contrast to much of the historical tradition 
concerning the nature of God, opens up for Barth, McIntyre, and indeed all subsequent 
theological inquiry the possibility of speaking of God’s actions in terms of his feeling, his 
emotion, and his being affected.  Consequently, there is room for language that 
acknowledges a process of deliberation in God that is not the sign of weakness and 
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indecision but is instead a mark of God’s strength as a God of mercy.  As McIntyre 
concludes: 
My conclusion is that when we have reached the point of using such language about 
God… we have achieved the possibility, or even, have accepted the obligation, to 
include in our description of God in terms of his attributes, that of imagination, which 
carries all these notions of penetration into the distress of another, sympathising with 
that distress, and providing the motivation for the relief of that distress.  There is a 
sense in which it is imagination which initiates the several other activities and 
sustains them, through to the point where the relief of the distress is complete.22 
 
Here McIntyre is claiming further that imagination is not only compatible with Barth’s 
presentation of God’s mercy, but also initiates and governs the implementation of that 
mercy, as well as other functions of God’s work, in accomplishing the work of mercy. 
 Finally, McIntyre relates his concept of imagination to Barth’s presentation of God’s 
attributes and to Barth’s concept of ‘patience.’  This is by far the vaguest of the attributes 
that Barth includes, and McIntyre’s use of this attribute does not escape that opaqueness.  
In some ways it is eschatological expectation on the side of God.  Just as people wait 
expectantly for the realization of God’s work, so also God is waiting patiently for his work to 
be wrought in the lives of people.  In this way it is an extension of and an intensification of 
God’s mercy.  So McIntyre, relating this concept back to imagination, focuses on the point 
that “God’s mercy affirms the independence of the others, even in the moment of taking their 
plight to his own heart in patience.”23  This expression of God’s patience endows people 
renewed by it “with the fresh existence as objects of God’s patient mercy, living under God’s 
righteousness, and enjoying to the full the outworking of the encounter with God.”24 
 Using Barth’s treatment of the attributes of God as perfections, McIntyre seeks to 
interpolate the idea of imagination with more traditional attributes of God such as God’s 
Love, Freedom, Mercy and Patience.  For instance, McIntyre focuses on Barth’s unequivocal 
and vigorous defense of God’s freedom, and notes the close relation of Imagination to what 
Barth is defending when he defends God’s freedom.  It is in God’s absolute and 
unencumbered freedom that God is able and free to act in ways that are imaginative and 
unexpected.  The work of God is not required to be predictable, whether to those expecting 
the messiah in the first century, or to our own theological systems today.25 
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3. The Second Account: Imagination in Relation to Love 
 However, in the second account, McIntyre moves beyond associating imagination 
with these other attributes.  He takes up MacDonald’s claim that imagination is indeed an 
attribute of God and argues for this, acknowledging the fact that he is drawing “assistance 
[from] Barth’s examination of the perfections of God.”26  The proposal that McIntyre puts 
forward are more particularly related to what McIntyre himself envisions and proscribes for 
an account of imagination in a doctrine of God.   
 Part ‘a’ of this second account begins by relating imagination to the love of God.  
Consequently, imagination must be related to all contexts of theology in which God has been 
spoken of in terms of love and of his loving.  As McIntyre puts it: 
 a) The imagination of God is a direct derivative of the love of God, which  therefore 
 acts as a control upon all that we say concerning imagination. Equally, it gives 
 imagination access to the whole range of the actions of the God who is loving.27 
 
There are three points that are key to taking this prescription into account.  The first is the 
claim that imagination is derivative of God’s love.  The second is that the love of God acts as 
a controlling concept of and over imagination.  The third and most significant point is that 
God’s imagination can and ought to be related to all contexts that love have been related to 
and attributed to God, even in his own being. 
 In part ‘b’ McIntyre offers further context to this first claim by relating imagination to 
God’s actions towards sinners.  This takes the concept beyond being a static attribute of 
God and relates it outwards in God’s action. 
 b) Imagination is the medium of God’s loving penetration into the world of  the sinner.  
 It is the form which God’s awareness takes of the condition of the other who stands 
 over against him in rebellion and hatred.28 
 
The significant claim here is that imagination is both a medium and a form.  First, it is the 
medium by which God loves, and second it is the form that God’s awareness of the plight of 
people in relation to sin takes.  The first of these claims is related back to the first claim in 
regards to imagination is relation to God’s existence.  The second moves forward by relating 
imagination to what McIntyre calls identification, especially as he presents it in On the Love 
of God. 
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 Part ‘c’ moves the argument forward even further by clarifying the nature of this 
identification of God with humanity.  Here McIntyre addresses the nature of this identification 
in terms of the immanence of God with humanity and in it.  Here: 
 c) [Imagination] is the ground of God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, 
 immanence which nevertheless does not entail any loss on God’s part of his 
 transcendence of all created reality.29 
 
Thus the nature of God’s identification with people is such that God is immanent ‘in the plight 
of the sinner.’  However, there is still a degree of separation by which God does not cease to 
be transcendent of ‘all created reality.’  The key here is that God’s total identification with 
people in their sinfulness does not compromise God’s own transcendental nature.  There is 
a sense that God is both fully within and fully without the humanity he has created and 
identified with.  Thus McIntyre is able to maintain a high doctrine of God as wholly other, 
while still emphasizing the immediacy of God’s relation with humanity through his 
imaginative identification of himself with them, even in their sinfulness.   
 In this full identification of God with people and in his full encounter with them, even 
in the plight of their sin, God is stirred to act on the behalf of the humanity of which he has 
now become apart.  It is telling of McIntyre’s emphasis on this identification that the 
maintained transcendence of God does not inhibit God’s actions in any way and that his 
identification is so complete that action creates a stirring to an action of involvement from his 
place of transcendence that seeks to ‘make good’ the state of those with whom he has 
identified who are in the plight of sin.  McIntyre’s claim then is: 
d) From God’s heart imaginatively stirred to take the initiative toward making good 
the state of the distressed comes the effective action whereby that end is achieved.30 
 
What stands out in McIntyre’s claim here though is that this is an action that springs from the 
heart of God ‘imaginatively stirred.’  Here the Imagination of God has a central place and 
function in relation to the love of God.  This is not God’s love wrought in an imaginative 
identification.  Instead this is God’s Imagination stirring him to act in ways that are loving for 
the improvement of those with whom God has identified.  The end here of ‘making good the 
distressed’ has its beginning not in the heart of God but in God’s Imagination which sees 
them through the lens of who they are, and indeed have always been, in God’s image of 
them, namely in God’s own image. 
 However, McIntyre acknowledges a danger here that the freedom of people, here 
noted as sinners, is in danger of being limited by their subjection under the image that God 
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has of them, even if this image is expressed in divine love.  So McIntyre speaks of the 
nature of the process by which God acts in ‘making good’ the state of those distressed by 
the state of their plight under sin, when he writes: 
 e) But this process sensitively and imaginatively affirms and does not deny the 
 independence of sinners, but patiently waits for their return to the Lord.  The One 
 who has stood in the sinners’ place has given them time and space in which to come 
 to penitence, the One who has come out of the Father’s heart of love.31 
 
Here, the whole understanding of God’s Imagination from the human side is known, 
understood and experienced as a process.  Here, process is meant to take away from the 
notion of direct dictatorial causality in which people are forcibly and instantaneously 
conformed to the image that God has for them.  McIntyre describes this process as a patient 
process that waits for the return of the Lord.  The conclusion of this process then is an 
eschatological hope in which the work of God’s love, stirred up by God’s Imagination, finds 
final expression without inhibiting the freedom of the sinner to act in defiance against.  Here 
the victory of God’s love does not inhibit the freedom of people in their everyday actions.  
Instead, the love of God, informed by God in his full identification with humanity, creates 
“time and space in which to come to penitence.”  Thus this is not only an eschatologically 
hopeful process on the side of people, in which they hope for the completion of God’s work 
in them; but it is also an eschatologically hopeful process on the side of God who creates 
this time and space in which he hopes for the repentance of sinners. 
 
4. Inconsistencies of these Two Accounts 
 However, these two accounts pose two challenges.  The first is that of determining 
the locus and role that imagination plays in McIntyre’s theology as an attribute of God.  The 
second is that of determining the exact relation and function that imagination has in relation 
to the love of God, an attribute and indeed perfection that McIntyre strongly values.   
 In regards to the first of these challenges, it is not the particular content of either 
account; but instead in the consistency within and between the two accounts that poses the 
challenge.  The subsections of the second account are related thematically to the main 
points of the first account, with the fourth point of the first account being broken up into 
subsections d and e in the second account.  In each account God’s love, God’s freedom, 
God’s mercy, and God’s patience are presented in terms of Imagination.  However, the locus 
and function of imagination are actually described in rather different terms between these 
two accounts and even within each account.   
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 In the first account there are places in which McIntyre seems to treat imagination as 
a primary and secondary category of God’s existence.  In the first point of the first account in 
which McIntyre relates imagination to Barth’s idea of the being of the God who loves, the 
place of Imagination as primary or secondary is ambiguous.  Here, the being of God as the 
God who loves is expressed imaginatively.  There are two options.  Either imagination is 
expressed in terms of God’s love, or God’s love is expressed by God’s imagination.  
Whether one has any sort of precedence over the other is unclear.  Consequently the place 
imagination within a doctrine of God is something that is still up for discussion.   
 In the second point of the first account, there is a clearer emphasis on imagination as 
a category that deserves central place, role, and function among the other perfections within 
a doctrine of God.  McIntyre here is relating imagination to Barth’s concept of the freedom of 
God.  Here McIntyre seems to suggest that freedom in terms of imagination can be 
understood to be and be developed into an attribute of God in its own right.  As such it would 
function as a category of God’s freedom and as a category that affirms the freedom of 
people as created in God’s image.  In this way, imagination as a perfection becomes the 
way that McIntyre accounts for God’s freedom.  God, in his imagination and as imaginative 
must be free.  God’s freedom is derived from God’s imagination that is unencumbered by 
any further definition of specification.  In the same way then, the freedom of people in 
relation to God is derived from the imagination that is theirs by nature of their being created 
in the image of the God who is imaginative.   
 The third point of this first account, offers further and more explicit affirmation of the 
primary function of imagination in McIntyre’s employment of imagination in relation to God.  
The theme that McIntyre relates in terms of imagination is that of God’s mercy.  Here 
imagination is presented as being located in God’s ‘inmost being’ and the place from which 
God’s mercy springs.  Additionally, McIntyre goes on to make the telling claim that 
Imagination is not only the place from which God’s mercy springs, and is thus the prior 
category, but that imagination also “initiates several other activities and sustains them.”32  
While McIntyre does not specify what these other activities are, this is still a strong indication 
of the way that McIntyre sees imagination functioning.  Imagination is a primary category 
that has a place and function that is prior to the activities of God that spring from it.  The 
importance of this statement should not be underestimated, since it is one of the few places 
in which McIntyre makes a clear statement of his own position, which he does here by 
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emphasizing the ability of imagination to “initiate” these divine activities as his “firm 
conviction.”33 
 Thus when McIntyre moves on to the fourth and final point of this first account, he 
attributes this primacy to imagination again when relating Imagination to Barth’s concept of 
patience.  McIntyre interprets the attribute of patience in God as being accentuated by 
mercy, which affirms that God’s mercy is prior to God’s patience.  Since patience is affected 
by mercy in this way, patience is dependent upon the imagination from which this mercy that 
accentuates it springs.  While indirectly, this claim once again affirms the locus of 
Imagination in the ‘inmost being’ of God. 
 It would seem then, that given the consistent inference of the centrality that McIntyre 
gives to imagination in points two through four the ambiguity of the first point on the 
relationship between divine imagination and divine love becomes clear.  Imagination is 
presented in close proximity to love and in terms by which it is capable of “stirring” and 
“initiating” divine actions that we traditionally associate with and attribute to love.  However, 
in the second account, where McIntyre lays out his own prescribed implementation of 
imagination as an attribute, McIntyre has points that seem to stand in direct opposition to 
this notion.  The exact relationship between these two perfections is something that is not 
entirely clear at this juncture in McIntyre’s own work, and this is a relationship and function 
that needs clarification if McIntyre’s system is going to be developed further. 
 In part a) of the second account McIntyre begins by stating that “The Imagination of 
God is a direct derivative of the love of God, which therefore acts as a control upon all that 
we say concerning imagination.”34  This seems to stand in direct contradiction to the points 
and case that McIntyre seemed to making in the first account, where attributes and activities 
of God were springing out of God’s imagination.  Thus it would seem that McIntyre, in his 
own implementation of the concept, has love is functioning in ways that are more familiar in 
that love is the central and initiating theme.  Imagination, in turn, derives its form and 
function from the form and function of love.  However, this creates challenges to the internal 
logic of McIntyre’s broader claim that imagination, like love, is a divine perfection.  If both are 
indeed divine perfections, there should not be a first this then that relationship of initiation 
between the two of them.  This is point at which McIntyre does not seem to be consistent 
within his own argument and position. 
 In part b) of the second account McIntyre makes two claims relating to imagination.  
The first claim is that “Imagination is the medium of God’s loving penetration into the world of 
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the sinner.”35  Once again, one divine perfection is presented as the medium of expression 
for the other.  However, the second claim of this section is that “[Imagination] is the form of 
God’s awareness of the condition of the other who stands over against him in rebellion and 
hatred.”36  The particular use of the word ‘form’ here seems peculiar.  It is the medium of one 
thing, and the form of another.  There continues to be a back and forth.  Imagination is first 
the medium of God’s love, then it is the form of God’s knowledge of the state of sinners.  
The fact that this shift is occurring is not acknowledged, and there is no explanation of what 
the significance or relevance of these various expressions might be. 
 This shift seems to be confirmed in section c) where McIntyre suggests that 
imagination “is the ground of God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, immanence which 
nevertheless does not entail any loss on God’s part of his transcendence over all created 
reality.”37  The key statement here is: imagination is the ground of God’s immanence.  This 
immanence then has two distinct parts.  The first part of this immanence is the notion of 
immanence with the plight of the sinner.  In and of itself, this would be a strong statement of 
the primary aspects of imagination in relation to the being of God, since the immanence of 
God is so closely associated with God’s being.  However, imagination is not limited to having 
a function by which God is immanent.  Instead it is the ground of God’s immanence, both in 
God’s ability to be immanent with sinners and in the transcendence that the immanence of 
God maintains.  Imagination is presented here as a ground for both.  It is both the ground of 
God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, and it is the ground of that immanence in which 
the transcendence of God is also maintained. 
 Still further in section d) of the second account McIntyre proposes that “From God’s 
heart imaginatively stirred to take the initiative towards making good the state of the 
distressed comes the effective action whereby that end is achieved.”38  Here, more plainly 
put, salvation is achieved when the imagination of God stirs the heart of God to save those 
distressed by sin.  By this point, the shift in the second account that began in section b) 
seems to have led to a complete reversal from the claim that “The Imagination of God is a 
direct derivative of the love of God” to the claim: God’s imagination stirs God’s heart to 
action.    
 Finally, section e) of the second account appears to follow this line of reasoning; 
since this section is dependent upon section d).  Here McIntyre is writing on the process by 
which God makes good the plight of sinners in terms of God’s patience.  Here imagination 
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functions to affirm the independence of sinners, and this process (which once again begins 
with this imaginative stirring) “patiently awaits the return of the Lord.”39  However, this is 
obscured by the fact that McIntyre attributes this work to the Lord, whom he describes as 
“The One who has stood in the sinners place’ and the One who has come out of the Father’s 
heart of love.”40  It is this Lord who “has given them time and space in which to come to 
penitence.”41  This obfuscation is present because McIntyre swiftly switches the focus from 
speaking of God to speaking of Christ as the Lord.  Here the Son proceeds from the Father’s 
love and not from the Father’s imagination, which I think is an important distinction for him to 
make; but this does not cover the step in which imagination is present in this process in the 
same way that the other points preceding it would seem to suggest it is an outworking of 
God’s mercy.   
 Thus the question remains, where is the exact locus of Imagination in the being and 
nature of God.  Or it is simply a matter of ordering, “Which comes first conceptually?”  Or, 
less precisely “Which concept is McIntyre relying on primarily?” 
 The simple and straightforward way to answer this question is to look at the way that 
McIntyre continues to lay out his theological vision in relation to Creation, the Incarnation, 
Atonement, and the Holy Spirit.  In each of these imagination continues to be and operate as 
a theological category. 
 
5. Imagination and Creation   
 Here McIntyre expresses dissatisfaction with the standard ways in which the doctrine 
of creation is presented.  The three-fold presentation of the doctrine ex nihilo, per Verbum, 
and Creatio continua is fully loaded with “impeccable doctrinal propriety” and yet “a certain 
vacuity in its presentation.”42  McIntyre lays blame, within Protestant circles, on the suspicion 
directed towards natural theology and a doctrine of dominion of people over creation that 
has been used to exploitive ends.   
 The first steps in moving beyond these shortcomings it to develop a doctrine of 
nature that is not fraught with the fear that it will turn into some kind of pantheism and 
working towards a true “re-discovering of God’s involvement in nature.”43  Such an idea is 
then not a far leap from the conversation, if we focus on God as Creator and the nature of 
that creator being imaginative.  As McIntyre puts it “Somewhere in the middle of that 
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theology I want to find a place for the imagination of the Creator-God.”44  This in turn is a 
step towards providing a thoroughly Christian way of working for the preservation of this 
planet as the intertwined masterpieces into which God has woven together the resources for 
our life and living and as the “beauty of the world so imaginatively and profusely loaded with 
such splendour by God.”45 
 This requires a wide-spread response as an expression of the “whole of theology,” 
and this requires: 1) “a doctrine of nature” 2) a doctrine “of the God who so imaginatively 
created it.”46  Thus it is imagination that is the concept that McIntyre primarily relies on to 
make this argument. 
 
6. Imagination and the Incarnation   
 In turn, there are two reasons that McIntyre claims imagination as a category of the 
incarnation.  First, there is the singular and unique aspect of God sending his Son in the 
form that he does. God does not simply show himself as himself.  God shows himself as us 
so that we can see him.  As McIntyre puts it: 
 In a single act of what can with reverence be called daring imaginativeness, God 
 resolved to send his Son in the form of a servant, the Word made flesh, yet a man 
 among his fellows.  The message, the Word, which somehow they had been unable 
 to grasp when spoken to them was bodied forth, in flesh and blood, to be seen and 
 heard, touched and handled, in a medium and in terms unmistakable; now, they 
 would be without excuse.47 
 
History and tradition may obscure the fact that is a shocking move.  That the image, of all 
possible images, including God in all of his heavenly glory et al, is this image.  Second, it 
follows that this act of God is completely unpredicted and unpredictable.  For McIntyre: 
 There has to be a gap of discontinuity between prophecy and fulfillment; there is no 
 point-to-point correlation between the two, so that if you have the one you can predict 
 the other.  The unexpected, the unpredictable, stands in that gap; and it is there that 
 the imagination of God does that which far exceeds our aspirations or our deserts.  
 That imaginative creativity which God showed in forming the beauty of the world 
 about us, he demonstrated once again in the novel style of his intervention in human 
 history in the form of the Word made flesh, and event so unexpected, so 
 unpredictable, that those who might have done so because there were of his chosen 
 company, failed to grasp the full wonder of what was happening before their eyes; 
 while those who had read the signs and oracles, who knew their scriptures and were 
 daily expecting a Messiah, brought him out to Golgotha to ensure that their rejection 
 of him was total.  I know of no better argument for placing imagination at the heart of 
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 God’s dealings with us than the single, unique, unpredicted and unpredictable event 
 of the Incarnation.48 
 
Here, imagination is not some afterthought.  First, it is imagination rooted in the being of 
God.  Second, it is imagination at the heart of God’s dealings with us.  Finally, it is an 
imagination in which Christ himself is the image.  He is the one seen.  He is the medium.   
Thus it is the event of the incarnation that substantiates the fact that God is imaginative, 
because it is in the incarnation that we have tangible proof of his imagination. 
 As such, the incarnation is “a single act of… daring imaginativeness.”49  It is in this 
single act that “God resolved to send his Son in the form of a servant, the Word made flesh, 
yet a man among his fellows.”50  Here imagination is at the heart of the intra-Trinitarian 
relation between the Father and the Son, in which the Son is begotten and sent.  While 
McIntyre does not state this directly, what we end up with is the second person of the Trinity 
existing as the self-imagination of God.  The Son is the self-imagination of God as begotten, 
and the Son is the self-imagination of God fully human.  This pattern is repeated in relation 
to the Holy Spirit, as will be emphasized further below, McIntyre’s provocative phrase of 
“The Holy Spirit is God’s imagination let loose and working with all the freedom of God is the 
world” is functioning as McIntyre’s account of the procession of the Holy Spirit.51 
 
7. Imagination and Atonement  
 Atonement always holds a special place for McIntyre.  Going back to his study of 
Anselm, it is the place he is most knowledgeable, most comfortable, and sometimes boldest.  
Thus the place of imagination in Atonement is not a stretch for McIntyre.  It is easy to recast 
atonement theories as images, in turn to see these images as models, and in turn to see 
models as cumulatively insightful into what salvation really is. 
 It does not bother him that these images are ‘incomplete symbols.’  He knows better 
and more thoroughly than most that “they do not follow their own structures to their rigidly 
logical conclusions”52 Here the theories are not the outworking of a single image, they are 
various images that together “portraying to us, through these images, the way in which 
forgiveness works…, how forgiveness is appropriated…, the terms in which we proclaim the 
gospel…, [and] the media in and though which we present to others the story which will 
bring them to Christ.”53 
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 As such, McIntyre claims for the images of the atonement a kerygmatic and 
expository role that places them at the heart of Christianity.  As such they must remain as 
they are, as images; because as images “they represent the process initiated by God to give 
effect to forgiveness.”54 
 
8. Imagination and the Holy Spirit 
 There are two streams that McIntyre follows in his treatment of imagination and the 
Holy Spirit.  The first is the predictable, Barthian, theological route.  The second is a closer 
look at the Pentecostal and Charismatic movement.  These in turn provide complimentary 
accounts of the manner of the imagination that McIntyre attributes to God’s being and his 
activities. 
 In the first case, just as McIntyre relates imagination directly to the act of incarnation, 
he draws similar lines in what would traditionally be called the procession of the Spirit.  As 
such, McIntyre is in good company in basing the patterns of procession on the patterns of 
incarnation.  McIntyre does this by appropriating the role of Christ in Revelation (along 
Barthian lines) to the role of the Spirit in this same act of revelation, and in turn relates this 
work of the Spirit back to an outworking of the divine attributes (also along Barthian lines). 
 The convergence of these things for McIntyre lead to three conclusions.  That the 
modern account of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the economy of salvation preserves a role 
for God’s imagination in terms of 1) “the projection of God into the situation of sinners, 
removing the blindness which prevents them from perceiving the revelation” 2) “God’s 
involvement with all the minutiae of the condition of sinners, in a manner of high sensitivity 
and receptiveness” 3) “the transcendent becomes immanent, without thereby losing his 
transcendence or being transformed into the other.”55  For McIntyre each of these functions 
is particularly suited to the concept of imagination.  It is imagination that allows the Spirit to 
be in the situation of sinners.  It is imagination that allows God to be involved with them in 
their lives.  It is imagination that allows God to be present there immanently in his 
transcendence.  However, it is not just a mechanism for explaining how God is present.  It is 
also an explanation of why God is present, because his presence there is an expression of 
the imagination that is fundamental to who his. 
 In the second case, McIntyre offers a defense of the Charismatic movement as “yet 
another demonstration of the Spirit’s acting imaginatively”56 Drawing on its positive 
elements, McIntyre offers the ecumenical nature of the movement and the consistency of its 
                                                        
54 FTI, 60 
55 FTI, 62 
56 FTI, 64 
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proclamation of the gospel that Jesus is Lord as a firm basis for the widespread acceptance 
of the movement within the church.  For him it is truly reflective of the type of divine activity 
seen at Pentecost, which he describes as “the extravagant expression of God’s imaginative 
creative activity in the spiritual sphere, diverse, uncoordinated, and confusing to the tidy 
mind”57 
 In each case, McIntyre is led to conclude “that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination let 
loose and working with all the freedom of God in the world, and in the lives, the words, and 
actions of the men and women of our time.”58  I cannot think of a more unequivocal 
statement of the fact that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination and that the Holy Spirit as the 
imagination of God is a free outworking of God’s own imagination in God’s own being. 
 
9. Summary 
 The conclusion here is simple.  While in the initial presentation there may be some 
ambiguity in McIntyre’s account of the imagination, further examination of what it means for 
imagination to be a theological category removes that ambiguity.  In the broader 
presentation, it becomes clear that imagination is located in the very being of God; it is a 
divine perfection; it does come first conceptually; and it is the concept upon which McIntyre 
primarily relies to delineate the doctrines of Creation, Incarnation, Atonement, and the Holy 
Spirit.  In doing this, McIntyre replaces love with imagination as the primary concept within 
his system.  This is not to say that love is discarded.  It is simply to say that McIntyre is using 
the concept of imagination in Faith, Theology and Imagination in ways that he previously 
relied on the concept of love in On the Love of God.  Further, this is not merely a change in 
topic and verbiage.  It is a deliberate philosophical and theological decision. 
 The prime benefit of this move, is that imagination, as McIntyre employs it, is a highly 
integrated concept.  That means that it is able to function in such a way that it is capable of 
being an ontological category as an attribute and ultimately as a divine perfection.  It is able 
to function as a faculty of people.  This means in turn that it can be an aspect of our psyche, 
that is to say that imagination as an aspect of the imago Dei, and it epistemological function, 
which is ultimately expressed in the attempt to know God.59 For McIntyre, it is also a moral 
and ethical category.  The ability to imagine is what allows us, and God, to think and act by 
identifying ourselves with others and choosing to be involved with them, whether that is 
vicariously or actually.60   
                                                        
57 FTI, 64 
58 FTI, 64 
59 FTI, 157. 
60 FTI, 76. 
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 While love remains the obvious choice and is indeed preferable due to its 
prominence in the Biblical texts and the theological tradition, imagination provides McIntyre 
with a language to speak about the love of God and how it is operating.  In classical 
accounts of God, God is love, but God is also impassible and unaffected.  By relying on 
Barth’s notion that God is passible from within,61 rather than without, McIntyre is able to give 
an account of the ways in which God loves, rather than simply stating the essence of God’s 
love as a monolithic and opaque ontological category.  
 The fullest expression of this account of imagination by McIntyre is its reciprocity.  
God being imaginative opens up how the love of God is defined towards us, and it is that 
same imagination in us through the imago Dei that allows us to imaginatively penetrate the 
processes of God’s love that are given expression through an account of God’s loving in 
terms of imagination. 
 What remains is to demonstrate that this theological system has continued and 


















                                                        
61 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §30.2. 
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Chapter 3: The Shape of Soteriology 
 
1. Models in McIntyre 
 Before we can undertake any serious treatment of any of the “Shape of” books, or 
The Shape of Soteriology in particular, we must establish a consistent understanding of what 
McIntyre means by models and how he uses them.  In McIntyre’s thinking models are at 
once the basis of his theological method and merely a placeholder for imagination.  They are 
both merely a mechanism in which they are simply models as models, and they demonstrate 
the way that images, analogies, et al correspond to reality in that they are referential.  As 
such these are difficult waters to navigate. 
 The basics of McIntyre’s method are dominated, for better or worse, by the language 
of models.  The technicality of McIntyre’s presentation of models and their function is 
something that can be quite off-putting to anyone attempting to discern exactly what it is he 
is trying to do with them and what he means by them.  This is largely due to the fact that 
when McIntyre first employed the language of models they were very much in vogue.  Ian 
Ramsay was a notable, early proponent.  However, McIntyre also interacts with a range of 
authors like Max Black, the much later Ian Barbour and Colin Gunton, Janet Martin Soskice, 
and the Edinburgh Physicist Daniel Lamont.1  This was a fad not unique to theology.  The 
idea of models as structures for representing complex data is still not defunct in some fields. 
 The problem that faced any theological appropriation of the concept was the fraught 
way in which concerns about metaphor, analogy, parable, and representation were seen to 
be in conflict or to interact with each other in specific and complex ways.  This is where 
McIntyre diverged from the majority of his theological contemporaries.  First, there was his 
assertion that models were implicitly an expression of the fact that theological speculation 
was primarily a work of imagination.  The fact that models came into the conversation was 
secondary to that point.  Second, there was his assertion that imagination was a category of 
the content of theology itself.  While this was merely a methodological debate for some, this 
was a substantially theological debate for McIntyre.  Third, McIntyre favored the more 
technical language of models in their most abstract form.  It is this third assertion that needs 
more bearing out. 
                                                        
1 Ian Ramsay, Models and Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) was an early interlocuter.  
However, notable works that address the implementation of models include: Max Black, Models and 
Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); Ian Barbour, 
Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper, 1974); 
Colin Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988); Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987); and Daniel Lamont, Christ and the World of Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934). 
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 The fact is that McIntyre does address a wide swathe of concerns that are raised by 
the debate about models that he found himself in the midst of.  He makes bold assertions 
about the function of analogy in theology.  He debates what makes a model normative.  He 
talks about first order and second order models and how these might be related to each 
other in complex systems.  He discusses novelties like Lamont’s notions about the polarity of 
a particular model in a field.   
 The problem with getting caught up in the particularities of this debate is that 
McIntyre is either incredibly accepting of everything that is being said, or is in other words, 
dismissive of everything being said.  That is to say, that he is very willing to listen to the 
positions being presented, but he is very careful not to adopt any one position too fully.  The 
reason for this is that McIntyre intends to employ models with a particular theological 
inflection, and in order to do that he needs them to be free from the baggage with which 
these debates inevitably encumber them. 
The fact is that he is not particularly concerned with the specifics of this debate, 
because he is interested in making the larger point about theology being a work of 
imagination.  The fact that an invisible God needs to be given image follows quite well with 
the notion that abstracted data needs to be modeled and needs to be demonstrated.  This is 
something that cannot be accomplished if he continues to be preoccupied with the 
particularity of the debate over models.   
This is especially true when one realizes that at this juncture McIntyre is still talking 
about the nature of theology as the process and method of studying God, rather than any 
specific notion about knowing God himself.  Thus McIntyre engages with questions of image, 
metaphor, and analogy as a way to demonstrate the place that imagination has in 
functioning in tandem with these already well-established notions of theological praxis.   
 This is of course not to say that McIntyre rejects the idea of models altogether.  
Instead, returning to the earlier point, McIntyre adopts the language of models in their most 
abstract form, which is the form of a mathematical model.   Recurring language about ‘the 
given’ of a particular area of theology, ‘the problem’ posed within a particular area of 
theology, the idea of ‘the given as problem’ and ultimately the conclusions derived from that 
problem as falling within a ‘field of meaning’ all suggest this type of model as the foundation 
for McIntyre’s own understanding of models and his own association of them with his 
methodological concept of imagination.   
 As such, I would argue that McIntyre’s account of models “as models” is much more 
akin to the use of models in the realm of mathematics.  Here the models operate as models.  
Thus eliminating any particular way that the models themselves correspond to reality.  It is 
not that the models in McIntyre’s account of them do not correspond to reality.  It is simply a 
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matter of this coming later in the process.  It is only in examining all of the models in relation 
to each other in a broader field of meaning that we can begin the process of discerning the 
way or ways in which a model or series of models can be seen to correspond to reality in 
any particular way.  The benefit here is that the focus is on how the model or models 
correspond to actual reality rather than to a conceptualization of what is real.  In this way, it 
could be argued that McIntyre demonstrates an even stronger commitment to realism than 
many of his interlocutors by not assigning a particular relation of the models to reality and 
allowing the models to operate as such. 
 To be clear, McIntyre himself never makes this claim about mathematical models.  
But I am arguing that if we strip away the particular theories of the referential function of 
models, which is what McIntyre does, what we are left with is far more similar to a 
mathematical model than the scientific models upon which most of his contemporaries 
based their own conceptions of models.2 
 My aim here is to provide a basic overview of what models are in the context of 
Mathematics in order to demonstrate the way that the basic language of these mathematical 
models is present in McIntyre.  This is not to say that this is the type of model that McIntyre 
is using.  It is simply to say that this type of model has the greatest amount of overlap 
between what McIntyre is doing with models outside of a theological context.  As such an 
understanding of this type of model is helpful in that it 1) Provides a comparative framework 
that helps explain the basic structure of the concept that McIntyre is using 2) Provides a 
consistent vocabulary to talk about models 3) Provides a critical rubric for evaluating the way 
that McIntyre talks about models.  This is especially important at this juncture, because there 
is variation over the course of the “Shape of” books in the ways that McIntyre implements 
and refers to models.  All told, I am arguing that these are all consistent in their place-
holding function for the concept of imagination.  That said, drawing this connection allows 
me to talk about models themselves as themselves in a consistent manner. 
 
2. Mathematical Models 
 
 The basic idea of a model in this context is any visual representation of a 
mathematical expression.  The most basic example of this is simply the process of graphing 
a function or equation.   
                                                        
2 Further excurse necessary to be clear here.  The closest thing to an exception of this is Daniel Lamont, 
whose models are based in physics, which is by proxy closer to the mathematical ideal. Daniel Lamont, 
Christ and the World of Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934).  That said, his focus on polarities is much 
more meta-physical than McIntyre is willing to be, which is why I maintain the uniqueness of the way that 
McIntyre uses models within the realm of his theological and philosophical colleagues.   
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 For instance, in this first and most basic example, the equation or function that one 
starts with functions as the given.3  That is, it is the information that one has at the 
beginning.  Notably, this information is not an answer or a solution.  It is a problem.4  There 
is something about it that is incomplete or needs further working out.  For instance 5x5 is an 
arithmetic problem that has not been worked out.  In the case of a basic algebraic function, 
like the one being considered here, this is usually represented by the presence of a variable.  
The variable is simply an unknown value that is present at any point in the equation.   
 In a simple (or simplified) algebraic function more information can be ascertained 
about the given problem simply by substituting different values in place of the variable.  Thus 
3y becomes 3(5), 3(8), or 3(965).  However, this method is rarely used in mathematics, 
because there are no real values to assign to these variables.  Y in a hypothetical sense can 
be assigned any value, unless it is defined otherwise.  Thus it is primarily in the application 
of mathematics that such a substitution actually occurs, because the substitution can 
demonstrate something about the real values that variable might have.  This is true whether 
it is the area of a parallelogram (A=wl), the volume of a cube (A=lwh), or Einstein’s mass-
energy equivalence (E=mc2).  The practical application of these variables have an actual 
value, i.e. a real length, a real width, a real mass etc.   
 The exception to this rule is graphing equations in the abstract, which is the most 
basic form of modeling.  The idea here is that one is given a problem in the form of a 
function.  At the outset the information is incomplete, and one does not know what will 
happen when the function begins to be graphed.  This is especially true when there is more 
than one variable.  In the simple function 2x=y both x and y are unknown.  By substituting a 
value for either variable the hypothetical value of the other variable can be found.  If x 
becomes 5 the y becomes 10, on the other hand if y becomes 5 then x becomes 2.5.  With 
each substitution more is learned about the nature of the function.  In one direction there is a 
proportional increase, and in the other there is a proportional decrease.  If one were to graph 
this equation, one would simply create a table of values by consistently substituting a variety 
of values for one of the variables. 
 
                                                        
3 McIntyre talks about what the “given” is.  In theology this refers to revelation, but I would argue that in 
the context of models he is actually talking about the input data in general. SOS, 80.  While this would still 
be understood as things that have been given/revealed, McIntyre is not talking about the content of 
revelation in the same abstracted way as Barth etc.  This is not to say that the data of theology is not un-
interpreted, but instead that in function and method these givens still function as input data.  
4 This is further supported by the way that McIntyre writes about the ‘given as problem.’  SOS, 8-10.  It is 
in this exposition on the idea of the given as problem, which he learned under Kemp Smith, McIntyre 
refers to many of the terms that are being discussed here, for example: given, problem, solution, solved, 













These points would then be plotted on an x,y axis, and one would find that the subsequent 
points would transect the convergence of the x axis and y axis at a steep angle in a straight 
and proportional line at an angle of 67.5˚. 
 When faced with a problem that offered no further insight algebraically, providing 
substitute values for one variable provided hypothetical values for the other and 
consequently provided a visualization of what was previously an abstraction. 
 In reality, and practically speaking, only three points along the same trajectory are 
needed to establish this line and to know that the model of this function will always follow 
along this trajectory.  Whether the variables represent varying amounts of cement and lime 
in concrete or the population of poodles and pussycats, this is just how this function works, 
and it will always be modeled this way.   
 Now of course the more complicated the function the more complicated the model.5  
Even within the relatively basic realm of algebraic functions, a significant amount of 
complexity can be added to the process of modeling a function if the function requires being 
modeled as a curve.  On the one hand, little has changed.  There is the given, which is a 
problem, and that problem is a function with multiple variables or unknown values.  Since the 
values of the variables are hypothetical, values can simply be assigned to some variables in 
order to determine the hypothetical value of the remaining variables.  These sets of values 
can then be used to model the function by graphing the points on the graph correspondent 
to the values. 
                                                        
5 McIntyre follows this pattern by offering increasingly complicated models to account for increasingly 
complex theological problems.  While atonement is pretty straight-forward in that the ‘givens’ have 
already been simplified in the form of atonement theories, the models that McIntyre uses to reference the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit are extremely complex by comparison.  Whereas in The Shape of Christology 
McIntyre describes the increased complexity of Christology in comparison to soteriology in terms of the 
constraining influence of Chalcedon, SOC, 22-24, McIntyre refers to the “formidable problems which beset 
any attempt to integrate doctrinally the various views of the Holy Spirit” and the “immense variety” and 
“heterogeneity” that must be taken into account in order to generalize “models” of Pneumatology in the 
first place, SOP, 21-22. 
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 On the other hand, the added complexity of the problem requires more information 
and more input than the original example of the simple line graph.  Specifically, more than 
three points are required to determine the shape of this equation when it is modeled on the 
graph.  Three points on a curve, without the rest of the curve, is simply a triangle.  The fact is 
that in this instance the more points one can graph the better.  Each point that is added 
gives more clarity and shape to the corresponding curve.  At a certain point the shape of the 
curve can be determined by inference, but the fact is that there will never be enough points 
on the graph to fully represent that curve.  More and more points would be better and maybe 
even helpful, but each point from each inputted value remains separate from the rest.  This 
works in the same way that digital images, no matter how saturated, are always pixilated on 
closer inspection and do not fully coalesce.  Thus every point, no matter how insignificant, 
tangential, or seemingly superfluous is helpful in giving the fullest and most proper shape to 
the curve. 
 This is where the term ‘field of meaning’ comes into play.6  In mathematics, 
especially in regards to graphing or modeling, a field is the accepted range or possible range 
of solutions.  A simple way to think about this might be to think of the field as a blank piece 
of graphing paper.  Without any information, any point on any axis is possible.   
 However, with certain functions and with certain values input into those functions, a 
function may have limits.  These limits may be self-imposed through the terms of the 
function itself or determined externally through a predetermined set of intervals that are 
apropos to the function. 
 In the case of functions that have externally imposed limits there are few examples 
that prove helpful.  Here the primary area of concern would be an interval set.  In an interval 
set, the possible outcomes of inputting data into the function are limited by only accepting 
values within a certain range.  These limits can be imposed on either end of a function or in 
relation to both variables.  So, when a function is expressed in terms of a,b one could limit 
the set by placing a minimum or maximum value on either a or b or on both a and b.  For 
instance, one might only want the function to model positive values. Thus a and b must 
always be positive.  That said, such limits do not need to be quite so limiting.  For instance 
one could set the value of either a or b to ∞ or to -∞.  If a or b is set to the value of either 
positive or negative infinity, then the possibilities for that side of the set is infinite.  In 
particular instances, it might even be helpful to set a to ∞ and b to -∞.  By doing this, one 
                                                        
6 The field of meaning for McIntyre is simply the area of study that he is examining.  Thus Christology, 
soteriology, and Pneumatology could all be understood as being distinct fields of meaning.  This is a term 
that McIntyre uses consistently in the Shape of Books, Frontiers of Meaning etc., and it has a very specific 
meaning in mathematics when it comes to developing models. 
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can ensure that any result of the function will be a real number and that no imaginary 
numbers can be considered as an outcome of the function. 
 In the case of functions that have self-imposed limits there are certain types of 
functions that will always be modeled or graphed as a certain shape.  For instance, certain 
types of functions will always be graphed as a parabola.  Once one knows this and identifies 
this one knows that there are limits to this graph.  In this case there will be no points plotted 
beyond the vertex of the parabola.  The parabola is a curve that only moves in one direction 
and is symmetrical on each side.  At no point will anything loop around and surpass the 
value of the vertex.  The fact is that it just will not happen.  In a more technical example, 
these types of limits are more generally understood as asymptotes.  Asymptotes are in their 
basic form understood as limits as they relate to a curve.  A vertical asymptote is the vertical 
line across which the modeled curve of a function will not cross by virtue of the parameters 
of the function itself.  Similarly a horizontal asymptote is the horizontal line above or below 
which the modeled curve of a function will not cross by virtue of the perimeters of the 
function itself.  However, due to this basic function of asymptotes, the term has come to 
more generally to refer to the inherent limitations of a mathematical function, equation, 
algorithm, etc.   
 To the trained eye, a function can quickly be identified as being a linear function, a 
parabola, an asymptote, or being notated as an interval set.  Any point within the field that 
does not correspond to the type of function that is present can be immediately eliminated as 
a possible outcome of the function itself.  Any point that is not in line with three points plotted 
using a linear function will never be an outcome of the function that plotted those three 
points.  Any point in a field above the determined apex of a parabola will never be an 
outcome of the function that determined that apex.  No point on an axis will be the result of 
an asymptotic function.  These are things that are immediately evident, because they are not 
within the range of the field. 
 There are two other and final aspects of a field of meaning that must be understood 
before all of this can be applied back in the context of McIntyre’s theology.  Both of them are 
concerned with the way that a field of meaning helps evaluate data in situations of added 
complexity.   
 The first, and most basic way that a field of meaning can help evaluate complex data 
is when multiple functions are modeled within the same field and range.  In this situation, the 
field represents multiple functions of the same variable.  Some of the functions may be 
linear, some of the functions may be parabola, and some may be asymptotic.  The fact is 
that the result will be a sporadic assortment of points, of which, only some are related to 
each other.  Each point plotted of each function is related to the other points representing 
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that function, but no other relation will exist as a result of the functions themselves.  
However, linear functions will shoot off into distant and deviant directs from the points of the 
parabola, once they cross the value of its apex.  The parabola will have half over half of its 
value completely disassociated from the range of an asymptote.  That said, by overlaying 
the models of each function within the same field of meaning one is able to determine what 
values the functions have most in common and consequently what values of the variables 
are most relevant to each function.7  Here, a close cluster of plotted points or even points of 
convergence among the different models can indicate a certain significance to the values of 
the variables associated with those points beyond the perimeters of any individual function 
that contributed to the convergence.  Simply put, it is a way to get perspective on how the 
values of variables are related even when they are expressed in different relations to each 
other.  The complexity of multiple models and multiple functions is streamlined through the 
identification of significant points of convergence. 
 The second way that a field of meaning can help evaluate complex data is when the 
equation or function is too complex to predict.  This quickly happens when one moves 
beyond the realm of algebra and geometry into the realm of differential equations.  The point 
here is not to fully elucidate differential equations, but to help understand how they account 
for increased complexity.8  At their core, differential equations are like the above equations in 
that they are functions.  What makes them more complex is the fact that they are concerned 
with derivatives, or the impact that any derivation in the input data might have on the 
outcome.  Essentially, this adds a completely new dimension to the equation in that it can 
account for things like speed, time, or movement.  This focus on derivatives (the derivation, 
aka differential) is significant because these functions tend to be massively impacted by 
even a minute shift in input data.  This is especially true of dynamic systems, that is, 
systems that take movement into account.  The outcomes of these systems are notoriously 
difficult to predict due to the high number of variables that can influence the trajectory of 
movement within a given system.  While there are many reasons why such a system might 
prove to be complex, a common reason is that there are simply to many trajectories.  This 
sporadic and unpredictable behavior and the study of these equations that exhibit it is the 
                                                        
7 This is essentially what McIntyre does in The Shape of Soteriology when he examines each of the 
atonement theories first in isolation in his treatment of “The Models of Soteriology,” SOS, 26-52 and then 
in conjunction in “The Logic of the Models,” SOS, 53-87.   
8 This in turn is more reflective of the way that McIntyre approaches Pneumatology as a field of meaning.  
Given the complexity of the given as problem, McIntyre is content to focus on the extent of the data, in this 
case in two specific directions, rather than try to nail down any single point or idea.  This is exemplified 
when McIntyre makes references like “There is another group of phenomena,” SOP, 35.  Here McIntyre is 
not dealing with already established theories, models, etc.  Instead, McIntyre is trying to group 
phenomena into manageable and treatable topics. 
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basis of what has come to be known as chaos theory.  The point here is not that things 
devolve into chaos but that the scope of predictability is limited in a quantum universe. 
 The classical example of these equations and their erratic outputs is that of the 
double pendulum.  To start a pendulum is that ever-reliable device that moves back and 
forth and runs clocks and that sort of thing.  If one were to imagine that a pendulum were 
placed very near a wall with graph paper on it and a bit of pencil on the back, one would 
have a graph summing up the motion of a pendulum.  There would be a nice curve that did 
not go any higher on one side than the other upon which all points would be equidistant from 
a static pivot.   
 The double pendulum is simply another pendulum added to the end of a pendulum 
hanging from a static pivot.  This immediately implies that the pivot of the second pendulum 
is not static.  This introduces the dynamic derivative of the function corresponding to the 
motion of this new apparatus.  If one were to observe the movement of the two weighted 
ends (or bobs) of the two connected pendulums, one would immediately note the chaotic 
motion that immediately ensues.   
 Part of what is surprising is the immediacy with which the motion of the double 
pendulum falls into chaos.  Part of this is an exhibition of the fact that the function and the 
apparatus are particularly sensitive to the initial conditions.  The slightest change in the input 
data or in the maneuvering of the apparatus can change the outcomes drastically.  Thus the 
results not only appear sporadic, but they are sporadic in that a double pendulum would only 
under the most unlikely of circumstances ever repeat the same pattern again.  It is not just 
apparently sporadic; it is sporadic and unpredictable in fact. 
 Despite all of this talk about the sporadic, chaos, and unpredictability there are still 
limits to the possible motion of a double pendulum.  The range of motion is of course more 
expansive than the old-fashioned pendulum (for instance both bobs are capable of rising 
above the pivot of the first pendulum).  That said, it could never extend beyond the 
combined length of the two pendulums from the pivot of the first pendulum.  It is both a 
physical and mathematical impossibility.  In fact, if one were to repeat the practice of tracing 
the movement of a double pendulum one would get a very distinct shape.  This shape, while 
not necessarily creating a distinct pattern of convergences, would be recognizably consistent 
with the shape created by a previous experiment with a double pendulum of a similar size. 
 In a similar way to multiple functions of the same variables being overlaid in the 
same field of meaning, a repetition of this experiment would readily offer insightful and 
significant insight into the limits of the equation.  That is even with all of its sporadic, chaotic, 
and unpredictable aspects.  This is concurrent with the fact that equations of this sort are 
frequently being addressed through the lens of probability.  Here, probability boxes (or p-
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boxes) serve as the parameters for a solution in a similar way to intervals in less complex 
equations.  The size and shape of these boxes is determined by either the limits of all 
possibly outcomes or as a frame marking the limits of all actual outcomes.  Either way, this 
probabilistic approach functions in much the same way that an overview of multiple functions 
with the same variables can be observed and compared within the same field of meaning. 
 
3. Models in the ‘Shape of’ Books 
 Now, the language of models is almost completely confined to the text of the ‘Shape 
of’ books.  The degree to which McIntyre refers to and relies on this language varies and in 
some instances adapts from book to book, but the basics of this method hold true.  These 
examples will prove invaluable in understanding exactly what McIntyre means and the 
underlying concepts that he is referring to when he uses the language of models.   
 Broadly speaking McIntyre spends less time on the language of models as time goes 
on.  The most clinical presentation of models is found in The Shape of Christology.  This is 
where McIntyre focuses his attentions on the whole process from start to finish, from the 
‘given’ to the end.  That said, in The Shape of Soteriology models play prominently, 
especially in regards to the ways that different models relate to each other.  In The Shape of 
Pneumatology McIntyre seems to largely abandon any large-scale treatment of models at 
all.  Part of this is a matter of familiarity, but there is also a sense that many of the notions of 
the Holy Spirit that McIntyre wishes to discuss are too loosely defined to be anything so 
sophisticated as a model.9  He instead uses terms like ‘pattern’ and ‘mould.’  The free radical 
in this broad generalization is the 2nd edition of The Shape of Christology.  Published in 
1998, 32 years after its first publication in 1962, the 2nd edition features significant revision 
that both takes into account additional models and seems to offer a certain amount of 
reluctant and qualified deference to the Chalcedonian model. 
 
4. Models and Imagination in The Shape of Soteriology 
 Much of this can be accounted for with the internal logic of the method.  While 
aspects of this method in reference to Christology are particularly necessary to making this 
point, the area of soteriology provides an accessible entrée into the application of the 
material above in McIntyre’s theology. 
 Unlike the realm of Christology, which is bogged down with labored language and 
dogmatic definitions, the study of soteriology is largely unencumbered.  This is not to say 
                                                        
9 SOP, 21-22. 
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that the field is a blank slate, but those models that are present have not been codified, 
stratified, or dogmatized in any determinative way. 
 The traditional nomenclature for this field would be the doctrine of the atonement.  
McIntyre’s interest in the field is not surprising.  The atonement is the major theme of 
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo which was the subject of McIntyre’s dissertation, which roundly 
rejected the notion that Anselm’s reflections on the atonement could or should be 
categorized as an ‘atonement theory.’  Plus it follows on quite well from a doctrine of who 
Christ is to a doctrine of how God saves.  The fact is that atonement is relegated to a small 
selection of models concerned with blood sacrifice, whereas McIntyre’s book seeks to 
highlight a wide variety of models that do not necessarily highlight that aspect. 
 In The Shape of Soteriology, the given is not as clearly defined as it is in the book on 
Christology.  It might be what one might call a complex given.  That is that the given is not 
simplified or codified into simple expression.  The given of soteriology in this context is the 
scriptures.  The scriptures are full of imagery used to articulate the work of salvation.  The 
models of soteriology latch on to these images and seek to formulate them into more 
systematic and comprehensive forms.   
 The models as that McIntyre classifies and addresses are: ransom, redemption, 
salvation, sacrifice, propitiation, expiation, atonement, reconciliation, Christus Victor, 
punishment/penalty, satisfaction, example, and liberation.  The basic premise for addressing 
each of these models in turn is that “they are all germane” and that they should not be read 
in competition as an ‘either or’ dichotomy but rather as a ‘both-and’ heterogeneity.10 
 The suggestion that is made by this arrangement, when coupled with an 
understanding of the building blocks of McIntyre’s method, is that each of these models 
represents a different function that operates independently of the others.  For instance, 
Jesus does not need to be a moral example in order for the inner machinations of the 
ransom action to take place.  Each model is presented in its own terms, with its own 
variables, and with its own values. 
 What they have in common is that they are related to each other in that they address 
the same field of meaning.  That is, they are all concerned with the same question of “the 
nature of the death of Christ, and by implication to the mediation of the forgiveness which 
that death has secured for God’s people.”11 Any theory, formula, function, or model that 
addresses that question will all correspond to each other simply by nature of being directed 
in the same direction. 
                                                        
10 SOS, 28. Emphasis original to the text. 
11 SOS, 28. 
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 Imagine that the field is an x,y axis.  In this axis the top right quadrant represents the 
positive involvement of Christ’s death and the positive mediation of forgiveness.  These two 
conditions can be said, in this example, to constitute the necessary requirements for a 
functioning soteriological model.  If that model is not concerned with Christ and his suffering, 
then it is not a model of Christian salvation.  If it is not concerned with God’s forgiveness 
being given to people, then it is not a model of Christian salvation.  These limits are limits 
that are self-imposed, in the same way that set intervals are used to limit the results shown; 
but these limits are not arbitrary in that they are directly related to the values assigned to the 
x,y axis, or the field of meaning.  This is how that field is defined. 
 Now, the fact is that since each of these models is formulated and functions 
independently, one could in this example, take each theory and model it on the graph 
independently.  If one did this, each model would have its own shape, form, etc.  Some 
could be strictly linear, some could be parabola, and some could be asymptotic, veering very 
near the perimeters without ever crossing them.  The point that McIntyre would want to 
make is that each of these models, so represented, would indicate things that are true and 
helpful in understanding the work of God for our salvation within this field of meaning. 
 On the one hand, the model of Christus Victor is very straight-forward.  In it Christ 
has conquered sin, hell, and death.  These have all been defeated, thus people are free 
from them.  In being free from sin, they are forgiven.  In being forgiven, they are free from 
hell.  In being free from hell, they are free to live in Christ, by the Spirit, to the glory of God.  
On the other hand, the model of moral example is sometimes less clear and requires more 
nuance.  It is often presented without the specifics of Christ’s death and sacrifice and thus 
seems tangential to the concern of God’s work of salvation.  The fact remains that Christ’s 
moral purity before God is absolutely necessary to any understanding of Christ overcoming 
sin, or of being a suitable sacrifice for human sin, especially in regards to taking the place of 
humanity in judgment, or indeed in satisfying the wrath of a righteous God. Each model, 
either in its most direct or circuitous form stands to offer significant insight into an 
understanding of this field. 
 However, this carries with it the implication that each model is somehow lacking or 
incomplete and that indeed the existence of multiple models could prove helpful in 
elucidating the truths found within this field.  In the examples of McIntyre’s models provided 
above, there were two ways that added complexity of this sort comes to light and is taken 
into account.  This is the first of those two approaches, in which each of the functions are 
graphed independently and then observed in conjunction. 
 Following along with the hypothetical of being able to graph these soteriological 
models, imagine that each of the models can be graphed, once again in the same field of 
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meaning.  This time, imagine that all of the graphs (models of the functions) and the 
correlating points of each are overlaid.  What should appear are: 1) Points that are either the 
same or very similar in their value, orientation, and placement 2) Places where the lines, 
curves, and shapes of the graph overlap and cross 3) Points, lines, curves, and shapes that 
veer off into distinctly separate areas or directions.  The challenge that is left is making 
sense of the jumble of shapes and points that have now been plotted. 
 This is why, in The Shape of Soteriology, McIntyre spends nearly as much time 
addressing the question of “How are the models related to one another?” as he does any 
other question.12  The basic options that McIntyre proposes are: pluralism, historical 
relativism, complementarity, dimensionality, and to a lesser extent perspectivism, centripetal 
axial reference, and horizons.  Each of these might be seen as an attempt at developing a 
second-order model that gives an account of all of the data provided by the first-order 
models already discussed.   
 It should first be pointed out that these models of internal logic and relatedness are 
valuable in illuminating certain ways that the soteriological models interact.  For instance, 
any attempt to relate these models would require some form of pluralism by the mere fact 
that these are all meant to be accepted as germane.  That said, pluralism does little to 
integrate any of the models together.  It gives an account of the different models, but does 
little to explain any points of connection and correlation as significant or meaningful.13  In a 
similar way, it is true that the relevance of these different models is conditioned by historical 
context.  Anselm’s model is indisputably conditioned by the feudal context in which he wrote 
and the honor culture that was its foundation.  That said, this does not mean that Anselm’s 
theory might not find relevance in honor based societies that continue to exist or might not 
have apologetic value in a culture where surprisingly cognizant understandings of feudal 
governance structures are just a binge-watch away. 
 With the exception of the centripetal axial reference account, which McIntyre is 
particularly dismissive of, the rest (complementarity, dimensionality, perspectivism, and 
horizons) do seem to point in the same general direction that McIntyre seems to go.  
Complementarity is the first to address the problem posed by pluralism in that it gives an 
account of how these different models do in fact converge at certain points and in doing so 
can function in ways that are mutually supportive.14  Dimensionality, especially as it is 
expressed by Daniel Lamont in Christ and the World of Thought, provides McIntyre an 
account of how the models can be both independent, in that they have been formulated and 
                                                        
12 SOS, 53. 
13 SOS, 54-57. 
14 SOS, 60-62. 
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be seen to function separately from the others, and yet still connected to each other through 
Lamont’s concept of polarity.  That is, that one independent thing can infer another, the 
prime example being N and S poles. 15  Ultimately, McIntyre concludes that this account 
lacks familiarity.  The fact is that these models have by and large been developed in plain 
view and knowledge of at least one of the others, if not in direct response to one of them.  It 
is this familiarity that represents for McIntyre a notion of them each being a contribution to 
“the richness of the whole.”16 
 Perspectivism and horizons are the most closely related in that they are each 
concerned with point of view.  The only substantive difference being that perspectivism is a 
more static account than horizons.  Perspectivism, while possibly enriched with 
understandings of cultural and psychological perspectives, is largely concerned with seeing 
things from one direction, for instance seeing a cut diamond from below.17  Some facets of 
the diamond will be visible, while others will be obscured.  The various accounts of salvation 
represented by the models are offered explication as the same work seen from a variety of 
perspectives.  Horizons takes this one step further by combining this idea with the idea that 
as one moves in relation to a horizon line, the horizon is in constant flux.  To move toward 
the horizon provides new perspective and brings into view things previously unseen.  In 
relation to soteriological models, the idea is that the models function as visible points of 
reference that, when approached, are capable of bringing the work of salvation ‘into view.’18 
 Each of these is in turn rejected as providing a grand unifying theory, and McIntyre 
moves on to how these models might be related to the death of Christ, rather than to the 
particular points of the other models.  It is here that McIntyre, in a move that could be easily 
overlooked, makes the case that the soteriological models are “imaginative constructs.”19  
They are thus differentiated from being strictly a matter of analogy, metaphor or parable, 
though they share more in common with analogy than the rest.20  That said, further 
discussion of the correlation between notions of analogy and McIntyre’s particular view of 
models might be more appropriate to the subject of Christology.  What is most important at 
                                                        
15 Daniel Lamont, Christ and the World of Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934), 65. 
16 SOS, 64. 
17 SOS, 65. 
18 SOS, 65-67. 
19 SOS, 68. 
20 It should be noted hear that McIntyre makes a caveat in the following argument regarding his own 
position on the analogia entis and the analogia fidei.  In regards to the first, McIntyre offers a statement 
defending the analogia entis, because he sees it as being a safeguard against the models (and by 
implication any notion of analogy being applied in the realm of theology) being dismissed as “mental 
fictions or heuristic devices,” SOS, 69.  The condition being that it is accepted in tandem with the latter, 
that is the analogia fidei “which contains the truth that it belongs to faith, inspired by the Spirit, to see the 
ordinary usages of language to be applicable analogically to what we say about the activities of God and 
his work in Christ,”SOS, 69.   
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this juncture is to say that models, like analogy, should not be understood to be literal 
language or dismissed as figurative language.  Instead, they are meant to be indirect 
language only insofar as indirect language is possible, a notion wholly congruent with any 
theology circumspect enough to cede an apophatic space.  The word that McIntyre chooses 
to describe the models is ‘interpretations.’  They in fact must be that, because the given data 
is not raw.  It is filtered, modified, and formulated through the given of the phenomenological 
occurrence, the process of interpretation, and finally in interaction with the other interpretive 
models into a tapestry of ‘constellational richness’ and ‘nuclear profusion.’21   
 In the end, the crux of McIntyre’s argument is that models are “a combination of 
given and interpretation” and that “both of which become modified through their interaction 
with each other”22 In the case of the atonement there are the events themselves.  There are 
the events of arrest, trial, flogging, and crucifixion.  These are indeed givens.  But Christ 
himself incarnate is also a given of Soteriology.  So we must at once make sense of the fact 
that Christ died, that he died for us, that this death had purpose and efficacy.  This is 
interpreted widely in the various models.  Some are interpreted through understandings of 
the old covenant notions of sacrifice.  Some are interpreted into culturally and historically 
relevant analogies.  Some are more speculative, while still others are pedagogical. 
 The point is that in this interplay between the two, we can see how God’s own 
imagination is active in the revelation of what is given.  As such, “The models of salvation 
share in the reality of that which they, in a very real sense, embody.”23  As such the models 
are the embodiment of the reality of what God has done.  In turn, what God has done is 
encapsulated in the “multidimensional event” that is 1) “the root and ground of our salvation” 
and 2) “all the things that we have been saying about it in the models.”24  For McIntyre, any 
explanation of the atonement that does not account for this event, or offers anything less, 
falls into the realms of ‘abstraction’ and ‘falsification.’  It is a striking reminder of the fact that 
it is God’s imaginative activity in that ‘multidimensional act’ that makes this more than a 
method for McIntyre.  It is God’s imagination that gives the given and initiates.  Our 
interpretation of that given is an imaginative act and process, but it is only that in 




                                                        
21 SOS, 81-82. 
22 SOS, 81. 
23 SOS, 83. 





 In this chapter there are a few things that have been covered that help move this 
argument forward.  First, we have delineated what exactly models are in McIntyre’s 
theology.  It has been argued that these models are two things.  One, they have been 
stripped down to their most basic form.  This allows for McIntyre to employ them within his 
theological system without the connotational encumberment of concepts like ‘picturing’ or 
‘disclosure.’  Two, they are a placeholder for imagination.  Whenever McIntyre is using 
models he is indicating that these concepts as models are the products of the type of 
imagination that he is advocating and part of the overall methodology that he is employing. 
 The idea of mathematical models is mine.  However, I think it helps illustrate how 
McIntyre is employing the models in their most basic form.  While the focus on models in 
McIntyre’s context was on the employment of models in the context of science, I am arguing 
that this account of models is more analogous to what McIntyre is doing with models in 
particular.  While the idea of mathematical models is alien to McIntyre conceptually in the 
‘Shape of” books, they do provide a much clearer illustration of how McIntyre understands, 
develops, and employs models in his own works.  However, it is my hope that I have 
indicated that there is language in McIntyre that would suggest that such a change in 
framework is not a complete stretch.  The ideas of problem, solving, solution, field, etc. all 
indicate that such an interpretation is germane if not original to McIntyre. 
 This in turn informs how models are understood to function throughout the ‘Shape of’ 
books in ways that show both consistency and adaptability.  In The Shape of Soteriology in 
particular, there is a clear picture of how these models are acting in the place of imagination 
and that this function is consistent with the function of imagination that McIntyre advocated 
in Faith, Theology and Imagination.   
It is with this clear picture in mind, that we are able to explore McIntyre’s more 
nuanced and complex treatments in the other ‘Shape of’ books.  Already, there are 
indications that such complications might arise, namely the question of whether or not any 
one model can have precedence over another.   
In The Shape of Soteriology that is a question that is not particularly complex, 
because each model has, at least at this point, had its own life as an independent and 
contained account of salvation.  Consequently, it is not controversial to say that one account 
covers more ground, or has enjoyed more longevity, or been more fully integrated into the 
worship practices of the church.  Additionally, McIntyre makes a very good case that any 
model that can bring in other accounts, encompass them, or hold any number of models 
together can and should be given preference.  This is not to say that they should be 
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neglected.  In fact, they should still be a part of that ‘nuclear profusion’ that McIntyre refers 
to.  That said, McIntyre has no qualms saying that any account of salvation must give an 
account of forgiveness if it wants to be a model at all.  Thus, if we understand forgiveness to 
be a sort of model unto itself, all other models are consequently rendered subservient.  This 
is a move that might not be well received by those who have a significant stake in any one of 
the models, and we can see that such an approach might have more significant fallout in the 



























Chapter 4: The Shape of Christology 
 
1. Imagination in The Shape of Christology 
 The method that emerges in the area of Christology functions in broadly similar 
ways, and it also shares its roots in a basic understanding of models.  That said, there are 
key differences in the understanding of the given, the way that models relate to each other, 
and the degree to which a model can be said to be normative.  These differences are further 
complicated by the differences between the first and second editions of The Shape of 
Christology.  Thus an understanding of these two texts and their differences must be 
delineated at this point.  The main question that emerges is whether Chalcedon either 
functions as a model among many, even if it is dominant among those models, or it 
distinguishes itself by being normative for the study of Christology, regardless of the model 
framework that one is using.   
 What I will be arguing here is that McIntyre does in fact choose to give a place of 
prominence to Chalcedon as a normative model for all Christological inquiry.  However, I will 
also be arguing that this only happens in his development of that concept in the second 
edition.  This is a significant departure from the framework of the first edition of The Shape of 
Christology and is distinct from the framework of The Shape of Soteriology that has already 
been discussed.  This initially seems to suggest a departure from the project laid out in 
Faith, Theology and Imagination and the “Shape of” books that he had written up to this 
point. 
 My argument is that this is not the case, specifically that this is not a departure from 
the structure of imagination that McIntyre lays out in Faith, Theology and Imagination and it 
is not a departure from the methodological standard established, particularly in The Shape of 
Soteriology. 
 The way that McIntyre does this is by elevating the content of Chalcedon as an 
account of Christ’s divinity and humanity by demoting the dogmatic nature of Chalcedon in 
order to preserve its function as part of the given of Christology.  Rather than being definitive 
of who Christ is, Chalcedon becomes the problem which all Christology must encounter, the 
fact of the God-Man.  This is turn is normative to all Christological formulation, not as an 
answer but as the question.  As such the incarnation is not a matter of God giving himself to 
humanity in Christ, but instead a matter of giving Christ to humanity as the God-Man.  As 
such Christ is the image/model.  He is just the image/model of God’s imagination and not 
our own.  This is why our thoughts and answers are always subject to the problem of 
himself.  It is the problem of himself that is the ‘daring imaginativeness’ of the incarnation 
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that McIntyre refers to in Faith, Theology and Imagination; and that is the idea that McIntyre 
is trying to preserve here. 
 
2. Distinguishing the Two Editions 
 As was just said, the first step in drawing out these arguments is an understanding of 
these two texts and two editions.  The two editions of The Shape of Christology are basically 
similar in the content that they share in common. The first edition was originally organized 
into seven chapters. In the second edition the first six chapters from the first edition are 
grouped into two parts. The first three chapters are grouped into a section on “Christological 
Method.” The fourth through sixth chapters are grouped into a section on “Chalcedon-Based 
Models” of Christology. The seventh chapter from the first edition served as a conclusion to 
that edition, but it is used only as a conclusion to the first part of the second edition. As such, 
the first three chapters of the first edition and the conclusion to the first edition form the core 
of the common material between these two editions.  
 The distinctive content of McIntyre’s Christology is rooted in the method that he lays 
out in the first section.  McIntyre presents this method by first rejecting the idea that the 
Historical Jesus, God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, or an existential encounter of Christ in 
the here and now could independently or exclusively serve as the given of Christology.1  
Instead, McIntyre argues for “a conclusion which somehow integrates them all.”2 
 McIntyre continues along this line of argument by claiming that literary-critical 
methods, historical methods, geographical-cultural methods, liturgical methods, and ethical 
methods can easily “usurp authority and at once present a radically distorted or gravely 
diminished account of the Christological subject-matter” when used in exclusion.3  He goes 
on to write, “At one time or another in the history of doctrine or culture, this is exactly what 
happened.”4 With this rejection of these methods of Christology used in an exclusive 
capacity, McIntyre is arguing for the use of a variety of methods that can contribute to a 
more balanced method of Christology.  
 McIntyre’s view of what models are and how they can function in theology is heavily 
dependent on the work of Ian T. Ramsey’s Models and Mystery.5 Ramsay argues for the use 
of what he calls ‘disclosure models’ of which McIntyre summarizes as having three 
elements:  
                                                        
1 SOC, 2nd ed., 22. 
2 SOC, 2nd ed., 22 
3 SOC, 2nd ed., 45. 
4 SOC, 2nd ed., 45. 
5 Ian Ramsay, Models and Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
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 First, the phenomena which have constituted a problem for the scientist and defy 
 either explanation of description in terms of known laws, principles or hypotheses; 
 secondly, the model which displays some structural similarity to the phenomena; and 
 thirdly, a theory or deductive system of a very complex nature associated with the 
 phenomena, from which certain fundamental notions are selected in the model for 
 simplified treatment.6 
 
The conclusion then is that these models are not merely descriptive of the phenomena, but 
they also help disclose the truth hidden in the complexity of the phenomena itself. However, 
it should be noted that McIntyre is developing the ideas of Ramsey in new ways. He accepts 
Ramsey’s position in regards to the way that models disclose information in a 
complementary fashion with what they actually model. For McIntyre, models move beyond 
disclosure and go on to offer analogy, to apprehend reality, are normative, and can be 
integrated. All of these are key functions of a model in McIntyre’s evaluation of the use of 
models in theology.  
 McIntyre highlights what role each of these functions plays in his conception of the 
use of models in theology. He begins by offering his own perspective on what models as 
“Media of Disclosure” are. In this section, the primary emphasis of models as disclosure is 
“that they exist to serve God himself, to be the media by which he is to be known, 
worshipped and obeyed.”7 This is the way that McIntyre sees a discussion of models move 
beyond a discussion of abstract methodology. He writes that:  
 Far too often the question of models is seen as a logical question, of how  human 
 language can penetrate to the heart of the divine mystery, of how a linguistic 
 extrapolation is achieved so that, with human grammar and syntax, we are able to 
 speak of God himself.8 
 
This continues to fit into McIntyre’s reading of Ramsey in which two points of context are 
allowed to have a synergistic effect pointing to some point beyond either one of them. 
McIntyre recognizes that the abstraction of this pointing has the potential danger of pointing 
in a variety of non-related directions, so he roots the direction of this pointing by placing it in 
a specific theological context. Thus these theological models are always pointing to the 
same subject, namely Jesus Christ. McIntyre concludes, “It is this uniform reference which 
saves (the models) from being a kaleidoscopic series of prettily poetic pictures.”9  McIntyre’s 
conclusion reflects the fact that the use of models must be used as a rigorous method that is 
seeking a theological reality. It must not degenerate into a convenient way to compose a 
cumulative mosaic of who God is perceived to be.  
                                                        
6 SOC, 2nd ed., 51. 
7 SOC, 2nd ed., 53. 
8 SOC, 2nd ed., 53. 
9 SOC, 2nd ed., 56. 
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 In his section on models and analogy, McIntyre recounts J.M. Keynes distinction 
between negative and positive analogy as it is presented in Susan Stebbing’s book, A 
Modern Introduction to Logic.10  In this account, the more positive analogies used, the closer 
one is to strictly describing something; the more negative analogies used, the closer one is 
to offering a fanciful description. Overall, “Proper analogy occurs in the middle range of this 
spectrum.”11 
 This understanding of what analogy is leads McIntyre to make three major 
conclusions. One, arguments cannot be dismissed because they are analogical. Two, 
analogical arguments are refined by the combinative definition added by complementary 
analogies. Three, we never can grasp the mystery of the Word made flesh in the immediacy 
of non-analogical language. He even goes so far to agree with Paul Tillich’s line “that with 
the exception of the statement of Being Itself, all language about God is analogical.”12 
 His section on Models as Media of Apprehension follows up by delving into the 
philosophy of his former teacher Professor Kemp Smith. In this section, McIntyre uses Kemp 
Smith’s theory about the ontological status of secondary qualities to illustrate the way in 
which models in theology aid in the apprehension of who Christ actually is. Kemp Smith’s 
theory is presented as a middle ground between the naïve realists, who argue for the reality 
of things in and of themselves, and the subjective idealists, who hold that secondary 
properties exist only in the mind.  
 For Kemp Smith, secondary properties do have an existence that is their own, but 
only insofar as they are appropriated through the sensory perception of people.13 In relation 
to Christology, McIntyre claims that there is not a necessary distinction between “talking 
about Christ, and [when] we are describing him in terms of the models.”14 Thus he concludes 
that “our models are controlled and indeed authenticated by the reality, Christ, whom we 
have come to know albeit through [the models].”15 
 For McIntyre, it is important to note that his use of Kemp Smith is used only to 
illustrate the utility of models in apprehending a reality. While there can indeed be a disparity 
between reality and a sensory perception of that reality, he does not want to suggest that 
there is a disparity between the reality of Christ and the models through which Christ is 
perceived. It is this qualification of his use of Kemp Smith that leads McIntyre to return to 
Tillich’s exemption to the idea that “all language about God is analogical.” That is the 
                                                        
10 Susan A. Stebbing, Modern Elementary Logic (London: Muethen, 1961). 
11 SOC, 2nd ed., 60. 
12 SOC, 2nd ed., 62. 
13 Norman Kemp Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge (London: MacMillan, 1924). 
14 SOC, 2nd ed., 63. 
15 SOC, 2nd ed., 63. 
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exception of when one is speaking of “Being Itself” in relation to God. McIntyre’s own 
position in this respect is that the theological language of analogy is grounded in the person 
of Jesus Christ. Thus “the terms in which we understand Christ’s character are the ways in 
which in fact he exists.”16 
 McIntyre goes on to make the case that models of Christology have garnered a 
normative function that was previously unknown as they have been employed to fill the 
vacuum left by the abandonment of creeds and confessions as subordinate standards within 
particular traditions. This proves, in McIntyre’s evaluation, to be a double-edged sword in 
which an inter-traditional basis for ecumenical dialogue is opened by the use of common 
models and in which intra-traditional conflicts are established when a divergent set of 
models is used to formulate doctrine within the same tradition.  
 The normative function of models becomes closely linked with McIntyre’s 
presentation of the Integrative Function of the Models, which he sees as providing a unity of 
Christological formulation that did not previously exist. McIntyre describes this by writing 
that:  
 At one time, the contents of theology were presented as if they constituted the 
 several atomic items of a series, a longer version of the Apostles’ Creed, with no 
 internal coherence and no genuinely systematic structure. The fashion nowadays is 
 the reverse: theology is highly integrated and carefully structured, and the medium of 
 articulation is the theological model.17 
 
McIntyre goes on to illustrate how this unity is achieved in different areas of theological 
scholarship. In this, McIntyre argues that the unifying effect of models provides the basis for 
a contemporary theological acceptance of the Bible as a unified theological text, as providing 
a unified devotional purpose, offering a unified center to which all scripture can be orientated 
to, and by providing a unified presentation of scripture as a record of God’s mighty acts.  
 McIntyre concludes his presentation of Christological methodology and the place of 
models in this method with two complementary sections that summarize his prescriptive 
vision for what ought to be done in the systematic formulation of Christology. This 
prescriptive vision offers a series of four criteria that provides certain perimeters for the ways 
in which models ought to be used and introduces McIntyre’s own understanding of the role 
that imagination should play in the selection and employment of models in Christology.  
 “The first is that the model which correlates a higher proportion of the biblical material 
concerning Christ and the Church’s witness to Christ and obedience to him, than its fellows 
is more likely to gain allegiance.”18  The focus of this criterion is that for a model to function 
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in the normative and unifying ways that it would need to offer a comprehensive Christology it 
must be a model that is found frequently in Scripture. For McIntyre, it would be inappropriate 
to develop a Christology and to interpret the entire corpus of scripture using the obscure 
imagery of a limited model. To truly function as a normative and unifying model, the model 
would need to be frequently employed to illuminate the variety of dynamics necessary to 
fully develop a Christology and offer an interpretive lens for offering a unifying function to the 
Scriptures as a whole.  
 The second criterion is that, “The model which sets the phenomena of Scripture and 
of the life of faith in the Church based upon Scripture within the deepest perspective tends to 
gain ascendancy.”19  This criterion is centered on the setting or locus of the model. His use 
of the “deepest perspective” is meant to denote that the model cannot be superficial. It 
should be deeply set in the content being explored, namely rooted in God’s ultimate nature 
and in God’s work throughout history.  
 The third criterion is, “That model which is preferable which throws light on those 
areas of our religious thought and action to which we should have felt it to be immediately 
relevant.”20 This is not to say that the gospel is made relevant by the model. Instead it is the 
assertion that the model should demonstrate the inherent relevance of the gospel. An 
appropriate model should confront people with both its truth and with its application.  
 Thus the final criterion is that “The models which finally establish themselves in the 
Church’s understanding of the Scriptures and in its proclamation of the Gospel, are those 
which mediate Christ, his love, his forgiveness, his power and his truth; which sustain faith 
and renew it with the very life of Christ; which lead to fresh commitment to him for work to be 
done in his name and for his kingdom’s sake; and which issue in sincere obedience to Christ 
and to his will.”21  In this McIntyre demands that a Christological model must offer insight into 
who Christ is and offer means of a fit and proper response to the proclamation of the gospel.  
 This is where there begins to be significant divergence between the two editions. The 
conclusion of the first edition is moved to the end of the first section of the second edition.  
Thus it ceases to be the primary aim of The Shape of Christology, and it serves as the 
transition from McIntyre’s section on method to his constructive claims. In the second edition 
this becomes McIntyre’s argument for the adoption of the Chalcedonian definition as the 
model of Christology.  
 In the conclusion of the first edition, he writes, “It would be wrong to attach a 
compulsive character to any one of the models (or to try to offer some brand new model to 
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lord it over those we have examined).”22  In the second edition, he qualifies this by writing 
“that no compulsive character can be readily attached to the models unless they are thought 
of as the given.”23  This is the first indication that McIntyre is no longer simply arguing for the 
use of models; he is instead arguing that there is a model that is the given, namely the 
Chalcedonian definition. In this way, he is still echoing the conclusion from the first edition 
that “A self-critical examination of the models we employ in Christology ought of itself to put 
us on our guard against too facile switching from one model to another.”24  And he is 
explicitly restating and maintaining his conclusion that “The creation of models is part of the 
function which imagination fulfills in theological activity.”25 
 This difference between the two editions is one that is key to understanding what 
McIntyre’s claims about imagination actually are.  In many ways, it demonstrates the same 
hesitance that McIntyre has in Faith, Theology and Imagination to fully implement the 
concept of imagination.  While McIntyre does, in Faith, Theology and Imagination, present a 
method that is dependent upon the full implementation of imagination as an attribute and 
divine perfection of God, there are still junctures at which there tends to be a certain amount 
of ambiguity.  This ambiguity demonstrates McIntyre’s own hesitance to fully implement the 
concept across the spectrum of theological themes.  Additionally, I would suggest that, at 
this juncture in the second edition of The Shape of Christology, McIntyre is seeking 
something more permanent and foundational to which to attach this concept. 
 Since there are few places to which one can ground a concept so primary to his 
method, McIntyre seeks to ground imagination at the beginning point of the given.  Here, 
McIntyre offers Chalcedon as a given of Christology in what he would term, the problem as 
given.  Thus Chalcedon for McIntyre is not a definitive creedal statement of doctrinal 
definition to which one must adhere.  Instead, Chalcedon represents the agreed upon 
elements upon which any Christology must be built.  These basic elements, namely the 
affirmed humanity and divinity of Christ, must always be part of any formulation of 
Christology.   
 That said, McIntyre is quick to offer his own defense of his method despite his 
hesitations.  There are two concerns about his method, especially in regards to the role of 
imagination that McIntyre is keen to address. The first is that the Holy Spirit is removed from 
having a role in the work of theology and that by introducing the notion of imagination into 
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76 
 
the process of formulating theology too much credit is given to human faculties. He begins 
by addressing the concerns about the role of the Holy Spirit in this process.  
 The reality that McIntyre seeks to acknowledge is that for such models to act as a 
given, they must be perceived through a careful reading of scripture and must be illuminated 
by providing insight as they are systematically developed. McIntyre sees these requisites as 
work that requires effort and requires imagination. Paramount in this process, and in his 
argument for the use of imagination, is McIntyre’s firm assertion that theologians must 
“recognize that our theology, our Christology, is human thinking about God, human thinking 
about Christ.”26  This is explicitly not meant to diminish the work of the Holy Spirit; but it is 
simply affirming that the Holy Spirit is working in people as people, not by “dictating a series 
of propositions which man could faithfully repeat, but as working creatively, as it were, from 
man’s side.”27  
 In regards to the concern about raising the status of human faculties in relation to 
knowing God, McIntyre, surprisingly, turns to Karl Barth’s observation that “The creaturely 
form which God’s revealing act comes to take in dogmatics is therefore not that of 
knowledge attained in a flash, which it would have to be to correspond to the divine gift, but 
a laborious advance from one partial human insight to another.”28  McIntyre offers his own 
evaluation of this statement where:  
 God in Jesus Christ [as opposed to ‘God in his revelation’] is the subject that 
 dogmatics deals with; but it deals with this subject not by writing down as  series of 
 divinely communicated propositions, but by humanly and fallibly and painfully slowly 
 thinking about them. Such thinking is a process involving perception and insight, both 
 of which are, I should say, functions of imagination.29  
 
For McIntyre, this position of honest disclosure about the task of theology undercuts the 
ability of the theologian to level accusations against fellow Christians and theologians. It 
returns the focus of the Christian faith to Christ as its subject. Without the service to faith by 
the models, there is no place for them in theology. Thus it should be remembered that, “The 
only genuine purpose of a Christological model is to make possible the service and love of 
Christ, through a true understanding of him.” 30 
 In this vein, McIntyre sees models as a reconciling of the ‘theological schizophrenia’, 
which oscillates between maintaining a simple faith and embracing all of the complexities of 
theological method and formulation. For him: “Christological models, therefore, which are not 
derived from faith, will finally if they be true models find their place and their home in faith’s 
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worship of and prayer to its Saviour and Master.”31  It is a part of McIntyre’s methodological 
posture to seek the fulfillment of theological inquiry through acceptance by and expression in 
the church, rather than in the self-assertion of the author. He is very direct in addressing his 
conviction that theologians ought to be honest about the limited scope and authority of their 
work.  
 This reshapes the second edition in two significant ways. First, it offers a new 
function to the sections on Chalcedon-based models, process Christology, and 
neo‐ Chalcedonian Christology. It accomplishes this by arguing for the use of the 
Chalcedonian as a meta-model that functions as the given, rather than just presenting a 
variety of models. However, it also refocuses what role the model plays in McIntyre’s 
thinking. Models cease to be only things that theologians formulate, and the meta-model of 
Chalcedon becomes a non-prescriptive norm that frames and shapes the formulation of 
subsequent models.  
 Thus in the first edition the two-nature model, the psychological model, and the 
revelation model are presented as examples of models that can be chosen and developed in 
a constructive theological project. They are presented with both the benefits and with the 
flaws of using them in exclusion. They are presented as helpful, but insufficient. This leaves 
a place for imagination in theology to reconcile variegated models and to, possibly, formulate 
new models. In the second edition, all of these models are presented as models that are 
firmly placed within a Chalcedonian context due to its normative function.32 
                                                        
31 SOC, 2nd ed., 80.  
32 This question of how Chalcedon can function in this way, allows McIntyre to entertain other responses 
to the classical problem of Chalcedon.  Interestingly, this is one of very few junctures at where McIntyre 
allows himself to put forward a significantly different version of his own to address this problem, rather 
than simply evaluating and synthesizing other views and models already in existence.  While McIntyre 
has a tremendous respect for Chalcedon and the normative role that it has provided throughout the 
history of the church and in Christological formulation, he draws from some unlikely sources to offer an 
alternative to the traditional formula, Ephraim of Antioch. Rather than simply affirming the two natures 
of Christ as existing in one unified hypostasis, McIntyre argues that the concept of a single composite 
hypostasis should be reevaluated.  McIntyre first suggests this in the first edition in The Shape of 
Christology.  McIntyre draws primarily on the presentation of this idea of a composite hypostasis as 
presented by Ephraim of Antioch and preserved in the writings of Photius of Tyre.  This is a point 
highlighted in D.W.D. Shaw, “John McIntyre,” Theology in Scotland, vol. XIV, no. 2 (2007): 5-17.  Shaw 
notes that while McIntyre “elucidates the patristic concensus… He [also] made a highly original 
contribution by his quotation of Ephraim of Antioch, via the writings of Photius of Tyre” with a “no-
nonsense approach…to the widely discarded concept of ‘substantiality.’” Ibid., 8.  McIntyre’s proposal for 
the acceptance of this concept takes place within his wider discussion of the Chalcedonian model of 
Christology and more specifically within his discussion of enhypostasia and anhypostaisa in both his 
contemporary context and in historical iterations.  The basic notion of this argument is that Christ does 
not have two natures, a human nature and a human nature, in one single hypostasis.  Instead, the human 
hypostasis and the divine hypostasis are fused into one composite hypostasis.  In this way, there is no 
question as to whether or not the fullness of the human, including the human hypostasis, was assumed by 
the unification of God with humanity, especially in this particular man.  Additionally, it helps defend 
against the claim that Chalcedon presents an impersonal (a person lacking a human hypostasis) Christ, as 
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 The second section of the second edition presents a variety of process Christologies 
from David R. Griffin, John B. Cobb Jr., and Norman Pittenger.  McIntyre presents these 
theologies in light of their attempt to move beyond the language and constructs of 
Chalcedonian theology, but he is also making the argument that with all of their striving to 
this end the process theologians are ultimately unsuccessful. They are unable to escape the 
inherent problem of Christology that is rooted in the Chalcedonian definition.  
 The general point here is that the cadres of process theologians were and are odd 
allies for McIntyre to engage with.  If anything, what these theologians represent is the type 
of theology that would have been on the fringe for someone like McIntyre.  This is not to say 
that we could not point to theologians who might be considered more extreme, or even 
extreme theologians McIntyre would have been more comfortable with.  The point here is 
that the motivation is antithetical to McIntyre’s approach to theology.  Yet he holds them and 
their thought up as exemplary of imaginative theology that is capable of raising questions, 
creating unlikely juxtapositions, and ultimately providing unexpected insights that would have 
otherwise remained unseen.  In order to demonstrate that his acceptance of process 
Christology is complete, McIntyre devotes an entire section of the re-written second edition 
to the school of thought.   
 One chapter is dedicated to the treatment of John B Cobb Junior’s Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age.33   One chapter is dedicated to the treatment of David A Griffin’s A Process 
                                                                                                                                                                            
well as the contemporary connotations that are carried with notions of Christ being impersonal.  It 
eliminates the bifurcated ways in which people tend to speculate on in what circumstances Jesus was 
acting out of his divine nature or out of his human nature, for the simple reason that Jesus is no longer 
imagined as having a human nature and a divine nature.  Instead, Jesus has one nature.  And from this one 
nature Jesus lives out his entire life.  All of his preaching, teaching, healing, working, dying, and raising are 
lived out by this one man out of his one embodied nature.  There is no question of kenoticism, where 
somehow the divine is diminished to make way for Jesus’ base human nature.  There is no divine 
absenteeism that allows Jesus to be more human and to live more like the people he is around.  Instead, 
each action and word is lived and spoken in the singular nature of a man in whom the divine and human 
are indistinguishable, even in his own nature.  However, this distinct and basic union of the divine 
hypostasis and the human hypostasis also draw the divinity of Christ into a realm of immediate 
knowableness on the part of people who encountered Jesus Christ of Nazareth.  As McIntyre states: “after 
the incarnation it is the God-man who is the subject of what subsequently happens” and also, “The God-
man may ‘have access’ to certain experiences because he is divine, and to others because he is human; but 
ultimately it is he himself, and not either of his natures, who has the experience and is the subject of 
them.” SOC, 101.  It is then equally true that in all of the actions and works of Christ there is this same 
unified subject who is acting and working.  Thus when the Christ acts, speaks, and works it is also God 
who is acting, speaking, and working.  It is not possession, co-opting, or superseding the life of a human 
person; but it is instead God imagined as a human and knowable form.  This is, of course, a minority 
reading of Chalcedon; and it is not something that McIntyre fully endorses or subscribes to.  What this 
does illustrate is the way that McIntyre is willing and able to entertain other possible readings, given an 
emphasis on understanding Chalcedon as a problem rather than a solution.  McIntyre again is following 
the governing intention of Chalcedon to force a real encounter with the divinity and humanity of Christ, 
rather than strictly adhering to Chalcedon as a specific conclusion. 
33 John B. Cobb Jr., Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975). 
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Christology.34  Then the final chapter is devoted to a treatment of Norman Pittenger’s version 
of process Christology.  McIntyre focuses this treatment on two of his monographs 
Christology Reconsidered and The Word Incarnate: A Study of the Doctrine of the Person of 
Christ.3536  In each chapter McIntyre works to demonstrate the pervasive and inescapable 
influence of Chalcedon on these theologians developing a principally un-Chalcedonian 
theology. 
 The third section of the second edition begins with a presentation of John 
Macquarrie37 and Gerald O’Collins38 as formulating Christologies from a “Neo-Chalcedonian” 
perspective.  While McIntyre still reads these presentations with his typical analytical focus, 
he does use these presentations to make the suggestion that these models do have 
something to offer. In fact, he makes a convincing case that they have made Chalcedon 
relevant again.   
 It is in light of this cumulative case argument in which traditional Christology is done 
in a Chalcedonian context, modern theologies have not been able to escape the 
Chalcedonian definition, and that Chalcedon has been demonstrated to be relevant that 
McIntyre makes his own argument for Chalcedon as the given meta-model that shapes 
Christology. It is this argument that serves as the conclusion to the second edition.  
 McIntyre argues for this full and real Identification of God with people in the 
incarnation with Jesus Christ as the unified God-man on several bases. First, it is normative. 
This is the argument that he makes through much of the second edition. It is normative for 
those that acknowledge Chalcedon, but it is also normative for those who do not. It is truly a 
given as a normative problem. Though it is normative, McIntyre also argues that it is not 
prescriptive in that it does not “outlaw...all variants of the canonical terminology and cultural 
changes intended to clarify meanings.”39  That said, for McIntyre that does not mean that 
Chalcedon is lacking in theological definition. It still has definition, but it is a definition with 
latitude for interpretation, presentation, further definition, and further formulation.  
 McIntyre complies with the expectations that he had of models by relating the 
functionality of Chalcedon as a model to the edification of the church. He supports the idea 
that “the divine component [of the church] is Jesus Christ the incarnate Lord, and that the 
humanity which is the human members of the Church is related to Christ analogically to the 
                                                        
34 David A. Griffin, A Process Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973). 
35 Norman Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered (London: SCM, 1970). 
36 Norman Pittenger, The Word Incarnate (London: Nisbet, 1959). 
37 John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990). 
38 Gerald O’Collins, Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
39 SOC, 2nd ed., 316.  
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relationship of the human nature to the Word in the original Chalcedonian model.”40  
McIntyre continues in a similar vein in arguing that the Chalcedonian model does much to 
reconcile the “human element as well as the divine element in the Scriptures.”41  It also does 
much to aid the church’s understanding of the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper as a 
communication idiomatum informed by the “hypostasis of both natures to be conjoined.”42  
He continues, adding that Chalcedon serves as “the substance of Christian devotion, 
dedication and commitment.”43  He continues this line of reasoning by saying that Chalcedon 
is the “core of the Christian tradition” and that it “has been the major force in sustaining the 
integrity of the Christian faith.”44  However, McIntyre also notes that it has still allowed an 
incredible breadth of pluralism within the Christian tradition; and he is convinced that this 
pluralism can serve as an apologetic basis for Christianity in a pluralistic society. For 
McIntyre, this is because “there remains at the heart of the faith the reconciling love which 
was the essence and prime motivation of Jesus Christ.”45  
 The conclusion of this line of reasoning for McIntyre is that Chalcedon is “still a live 
option.” It is something that has demonstrated its function as a model, as given and problem, 
and has demonstrated its usefulness in the life of the church. He argues in his closing 
remarks that Chalcedon can be maintained, because of the inherent relation between words 
and things. He uses the logicians William and Martha Kneale to demonstrate this logical 
relation, especially in relation to a linguistic understanding of logic.46 This linguistic 
understanding of Chalcedon as relating the words of Chalcedon to the God they represent, 
for McIntyre, replaces the Metaphysical claims of Chalcedon. The divine claims are still 
relevant, but they are made because of what is being said, not because of some abstraction 
that exists. As McIntyre puts it:  
 It seems as if there is an inescapable link between the way we speak of things and 
 the way they exist. Therefore, though we develop metaphysical theories which reject 
 Aristotelianism, there comes a point in their development when we find ourselves ‐  
 perhaps even involuntarily – using the logical/grammatical structures initially so 
 closely associated with it. That would in itself account for the normative and 
 prescriptive role which it, almost hauntingly, continues to play in the other 
 christologies which we have been considering.47  
 
This language of Chalcedon being “inescapable,” “involuntary,” and “haunting” seems to 
become what McIntyre comes to understand of a true model, or in the terms used here, 
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43 SOC, 2nd ed., 327.  
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46 William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). 
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meta-model. A proper model is truly normative and shaping at a meta-level that is beyond 
reformulation. Thus, “when we find that in our reference to the person whom the Gospels are 
‘about’ we speak of him as Jesus Christ or the God-man or even the Word incarnate, we can 
conclude that the person so spoken of is not only possessed of two natures but is in his own 
person both human and divine.”48  
 As such we see that McIntyre is accepting that authority and normative influence of 
Chalcedon.  There is no attempt to escape the prominence of one hypostasis and two 
natures.  The question is more one of what that authority means.  Rather than viewing this 
definition as the conclusion to the argument, to which all people must adhere, McIntyre 
insists on affirming the governing intention of Chalcdeon over all subsequent formulations.  
Such leeway is not new and can be seen even in some of the very earliest receptors of 
Chalcedon.  From the very beginning Chalcedon suffered from questions surrounding what 
Alloys Grillmeier called “the binding character” of the decision.  For Grillmeier this question is 
a question both of reception and hermeneutics.49  In order to make the case for a full 
acceptance of the Chalcedonian decision it must be adequately broadcast in order to fulfill 
both “legal and kerygmatic” preconditions,50 received and represented in the theological 
literature, and taken up into widespread spiritual practice.  This is all before, the hermeneutic 
question is raised.   
 Part of the reason this challenge is so pervasive is the Chalcedonian formula itself.  
He writes that “the Chalcedonian Definition looks symmetrical and undynamic because of 
the juxtaposition of the divine and the human natures”51 and later “The Chalcedonian 
Defininition may seem to have a static-ontic ring, but it is not meant to do away with the 
salvation-historical aspect of biblical Christology, for which, in fact, it provides a foundation 
and deeper insights.”52  The point in reference to McIntyre is that Chalcedon is intended to 
govern subsequent theological formulation, not quash it.  The question that Grillmeier so 
excellently raises is whether Chalcedon is an end or a beginning.53  It is a fair question and a 
live question.  The resounding answer from McIntyre is that it is the latter. 
                                                        
48 SOC, 2nd ed., 336.  
49 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 2, part 1(Atlanta: John Knox, 1975). 
50 Historically speaking, it is failures at this juncture to fulfill the legal obligation that the council had to 
share their findings throughout the empire.  Failure to communicate these decisions (and prior to 
incorporate full participation) mark the beginning of the isolation of the Oriental Orthodox Churches and 
other contemporary, non-Chalcedonian traditions.  Despite enduring long-term dismissal as Monophysite 
(a term they reject as inapplicable) sects, these churches have persisted with alternative Christological 
formulations based on their own historical development.  Recent history, as early as 1970, has resulted in 
resumed efforts at ecumenical relations with these churches. Ibid., 9.  This is a purpose that McIntyre’s 
Christology could serve, given the way that he treats Chalcedon within his work. 
51 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1 (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 552. 
52 Ibid., 553-54. 
53 Ibid., 555-57. 
82 
 
3. Summary: A Middle Way 
 With this in mind, we return to the question of the method of imagination in The 
Shape of Christology, how it differs from that in The Shape of Soteriology, and how it is 
caught up in the scuffle between these two competing editions.  The real question here is: 
what is Chalcedon in the field of Christological meaning?  Is it a problem?  Is it a given?  Is it 
a model?  Is it a definition?  Is it dogma?  Is it just an annoying nuisance? 
 First, it should be noted that Christology is substantially different from the realm of 
soteriology in regards to the strictures and parameters of the field of meaning in question.  
Here, there are rules.  There are dogmas.  There are creeds.  There are controversies.  
There are heretics.  All of these things add a different dynamic to the question, and the 
language of ‘both-and’ is not frequently a part of the vocabulary.   
 In order to navigate this minefield, I am going to permit myself some generalizations 
to help categorize the two editions and make a clear distinction between them.  The first 
edition, in this sense, is similar to The Shape of Soteriology.   Here, the field of meaning is 
occupied by different models that are all overlaid and have points of contact and 
convergence with one another.  Thus there is an emphasis on those things that are most 
closely associated with one another.  It is all about the connection, complementarity etc. that 
are present in the constellational richness of all points illumined by the various models. 
 The second edition, deviates from this narrative.  In general terms, it plays with the 
role and function that Chalcedon has.  It recognizes the fact that Chalcedon will always take 
a certain amount of precedence over other models.  This is not to say that other models 
have not proven themselves extremely influential and successful.  It is simply to say that 
none of them, regardless of their success, brilliance, or persuasiveness has ever fully 
escaped the long shadow that Chalcedon casts.  The question becomes something along 
the lines of: What does that influence mean?  Does it mean that this model stands above the 
rest in a hierarchy?  Does that mean it has risen above the level of mere model?  
 The simplest way to answer this question is to simply say that Chalcedon is a model 
in the sense that it is an imaginative construct and can never be elevated to transcend that 
fact.  However, it does appear to have a normative influence on the other models that goes 
beyond the simple interconnectedness of the constellation.  To put McIntyre’s conclusion in 
his own terms, Chalcedon succeeds in that it was able to accurately and succinctly state the 
perennial problem of Christology. 
 In this way, the given of Christology must be understood differently than it was in the 
case of Soteriology, and the mechanism for taking the complexity of information into account 
must adapt to this change.   
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 To go back to the mathematical analogy, to think of Chalcedon as the given changes 
the dynamic of the given.  Here the given is not the raw data, nor is the given complex, in the 
sense that the given is coming from multiple directions.  Here, the given is simple or at least 
simplified.  It is distilled into the “formula” of two “natures” and one “person.”  That is not to 
say that the given, in the sense of raw data, is not incredibly complex.   
 Christology is in fact marked by the complexity of the raw material that is present, 
and it is this raw data that leads McIntyre to first discuss the given of Christology as 
complex.  This is true of both the first and second editions.  What this does not account for 
though is the influence that Chalcedon has in McIntyre’s account of Christology as a field of 
meaning.  The only thing that would account for this influence would be if it could be 
demonstrated that Chalcedon was somehow a part of the given. 
 This presents a challenge for McIntyre that he does not fully reconcile.  He sees the 
influence.  In fact, he spends much of the second edition pointing out the inescapability of 
Christological formulations from its verbiage and structure.  Even alternative expressions of 
Christology, like the process Christology of Griffin, Cobb, and Pittenger fall into this category.  
However, McIntyre refuses to accept the notion that the place that Chalcedon has in the 
tradition of the church is enough to secure that same influence.   
 He instead relies on the logician Martha Kneale to maintain a connection between 
‘words and things’ to suggest that the internal logic of the formulation of Chalcedon must be 
so closely representative of the reality that it cannot be discarded.54   
 The problem is that to one degree or another this represents an abandonment of 
McIntyre’s strict adherence to his method and the terms and structures that he already has 
in place.  I would argue then that there is another option that is more consistent and does 
not pull back from his initial instinct. 
 In this account, imagine that the raw data is not the given, or perhaps more properly, 
that the raw data is an overly complex given.  In mathematics, if one is given too much data 
or data that is too complex, the problem that data poses must be simplified.  By simplifying 
the problem, one is able to determine what the key variables are and their most direct 
relationship to each other.  In the best cases, incredibly complex data can be simplified into 
the most elegant expressions of direct relation.  Think: e=mc2.  Five characters express the 
energy of an atom of any element.  What must be an enormous amount of data collected 
about the potential energy of numerous elements in exponential correlation to each other is 
summed up in that simple expression. 
                                                        
54 SOC, 2nd ed., 336. 
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 In a similar way, Chalcedon takes an incredible amount of data about the life of 
Jesus, multiple gospel accounts, concerns about authenticity and canonicity, the kingdom of 
heaven, messianic expectation, logos philosophy, etc., and says the real question is how it is 
that Jesus Christ of Nazareth was both human and divine in a singular human existence.  
What must be understood, in this context, is that this formula is not the answer to a complex 
problem, it is the simplification and formulization of that problem.55  This is not the definition 
of who Jesus is and was; it is the problem that Jesus’ existence poses to normal human 
experience.  This is not the final dogmatic statement of belief, but it is instead the problem 
that begs the question and has begged answering through the centuries. 
 As such, Chalcedon is the given.  It is the starting point.  This is the source of its 
influence.  Because no Christology, no matter how nuanced, qualified, imaginative, 
progressive, off-beat, traditional, or fundamental can ever escape the problem of knowing 
and understanding that Jesus is, was, and ever will be God and Man. 
 Either, way this does seem to solve McIntyre’s particular problem with Chalcedon.  
That is, how it can both function as a model and influence other models like a given.  This is, 
of course, not to say that theology can or even should be expressed formulaically.  It is 
simply a matter of saying that the method that McIntyre is proposing is analogous to 
processes used in mathematics.  It creates the conditions of the entire process.  The 
conditions of Chalcedon are the full humanity and full divinity of in the incarnation, and those 
conditions are stated in terms that are intended to make those conditions unavoidably 
integral to the problem.   
 Thus, if we are truly speaking of an incarnation of God, both the full humanity and full 
divinity demanded by Chalcedon are necessary in order to constrain our subsequent 
theological formulation.  As such, Chalcedon, even as problem, which is not intended to be 
any kind of diminishment of its place or importance, continues to offer a safeguard against 
our Christology from devolving into some form or Docetism or Adoptionism, or as McIntyre 
might put it, Christology that is either ahistorical or atheological.56 
                                                        
55 The fact that the Chalcedonian definition of who Jesus is in terms of person and natures has been 
problematic for theology and theologians is not new nor should it be surprising.  Schleiermacher presents 
one of the most complete rebuttals to the specific notions of the personhood of Jesus and its relation to a 
divine and human nature, The Christian Faith, II.§96.1.  If this formula of natures and persons is to be 
accepted as dogmatic, it should be noted that it poses severe problems of internal consistency, especially 
when put in conversation with similar formulae of the Trinity.  However, if these terms of natures and 
person are understood to be placeholders or variables in the formulization of the Christological problem, 
then we can perhaps say, as Augustine did with Nicaea, “two what” and “one who” or in our mathematical 
model 2n=p, De Trinitate, VII.3.7.   
56 I think that it is an important point to make that McIntyre and his system in no way are intended to, or 
in effect, diminish the role of Chalcedon.  If anything, McIntyre’s positing of Chalcedon as problem, or 




 The reason that this is so important goes back to Faith, Theology and Imagination.  
There it is the act of the incarnation that is an act of God’s own imagination.  In most 
accounts of theological imagination, imagination is part of the attempt to know God from the 
human side.  In the case of McIntyre’s presentation here, it is a convergence of the two.  
God reveals himself as the God-man, which is itself problematic and challenging to our 
understanding of him.  In the case of Chalcedon the divine and human natures are affirmed 
in such a way that neither can be denied.  This forces any and all of our models of 
Christology to encounter directly the problem that the God-man himself imposes on us in the 
incarnation. 
 This Christology is primarily an outworking of divine imagination.  For instance, the 
incarnation is ultimately an imaginative act of God, in which God gives image to himself as 
human.57  The human imagination is only involved secondarily.  Here human imagination is 
necessary from the very beginning as the basis of human/ethical interaction in which 
imagination is necessary to identify with an other.  Thus we could say, that imagination was 
required of the disciples in order to know him, and be involved with him.  This would be true 
whether Jesus was divine or not, but the primary aspect of Christ’s divinity requires that 
much more in terms of the exercising of their imaginations. 
 In turn, imagination is required of us to know Christ in the same way.  It is required at 
a basic, historical level; but there is an additional onus created by the fact that God is giving 
image to himself in Christ.  This process is, of course, a fraught one.  This is part of the 
reason that McIntyre maintains that part of the role of the Holy Spirit is “God’s making sure 
of us.”58  As such, the role of imagination in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit functions in much 
the same way.  First, it is primarily the divine imagination at work in the sending of the Holy 
Spirit.  It is only secondarily our imagination responding to God’s imagination in the person 
of the Holy Spirit who works first from above, as God’s self-imagination, and from below, as 
guiding the human appropriation of the divine self-imagination.
                                                        
57 FTI, 54. 
58 FTI, 62. 
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Chapter 5: The Shape of Pneumatology 
 
 The Shape of Pneumatology is the least consistent among the other “Shape of” 
books, but it is also the most consistent with the theological vision outlined in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination.  In the first instance, The Shape of Pneumatology demonstrates 
the willingness of McIntyre to engage the non-formulaic aspects of his method.  My 
argument is that this is largely due to the different nature of the subject of Pneumatology in 
relation to Christology and Soteriology respectively.1  In the second instance, Pneumatology 
is a field within theology that does not have the same rigidity, tradition, or in fact 
systematized formulation as Christology and Soteriology.  While in the first instance, this 
provides unique challenges for McIntyre in engaging with the widespread and free-ranging 
ideas about the Holy Spirit; in the second instance, it allows McIntyre a tremendous amount 
of freedom and leeway to express his doctrine of the Holy Spirit in exactly the terms that he 
means to.  Namely, that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination set loose in the world.  This is a 
claim that 1) Is in complete continuity with Faith, Theology and Imagination 2) Is an 
outworking of the place of Imagination as a divine perfection 3) Shows a high level of 
integration in his ideas.  While there may be any number factors that contribute to this, The 
Shape of Pneumatology is an example of McIntyre’s least encumbered and most mature 
theology.   
 
1. Models in The Shape of Pneumatology 
 The non-formulaic aspect of McIntyre’s method is most aptly recognized in its 
application to the field of Pneumatology.  This field poses a situation unique to the three 
areas examined in the ‘Shape of books.’  On the one hand, the area of Pneumatology is 
similar to the field of Christology in that the raw, un-simplified data is incredibly complex and 
diverse.  One the other hand, it shares more in common with the field of soteriology in that it 
does not have the same dogmatic restrictions that are present in the realm of Christology.  In 
                                                        
1 This may also be related to the compiled nature of this work, coming from different papers, lectures etc.  
The source material for this book is less homogenous than the other ‘Shape of’ books.  Whereas The Shape 
of Christology and The Shape of Soteriology were at least initially that product of lecture series, which 
served as the core material and framework for their development, The Shape of Pneumatology is largely 
derived from lecture notes.  At least one of these lectures was developed into a publication: John 
McIntyre, “The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought,” Scottish Journal of Theology 7 (1954): 353-75.  We 
know that this was originally a lecture from a manuscript in The McIntyre Papers AA.4.13.12.  The 
published version of this lecture was included in nearly identical form in The Shape of Pneumatology.  
This fragmentary documentation in the special collections is atypical compared to the record left by the 




fact, it is unlike either Christology or soteriology in that little can be said definitively or 
systematically about the doctrine of the Holy Spirit across the church as a whole. 
 This lack of definition in either direction results in there being an incredible amount of 
data that needs accounting for.  First there is the raw data that is expansive, as is the case 
in both of the fields already discussed.  However, this data has not been simplified either 
through a series of theoretical, interpretive models as was the case in The Shape of 
Soteriology; nor in the simplified, definitive formula as was the case in The Shape of 
Christology.  Consequently, even the results of looking at the data are heavy with data that 
must be sorted through.  This can be seen in the wide variety and sheer unpredictability of 
what can and has been said about the Holy Spirit. 
 In the realm of mathematics, such a situation would leave no option but to simply run 
as many calculations as possible, using as many variables as possible in order to track as 
many results as possible.  These results, incapable of being simplified in the ways seen 
above, must then be evaluated through the lens of probability.  In the context of differential 
equations, this would be done through the p-boxes, or probability boxes, mentioned earlier.  
Essentially, what these boxes do is identify clusters of significant data by defining fields of 
consistent, similar results as being probabilistically significant to the original problem. 
 For example, imagine that one was given a set of differential equations that are 
related to each other in the same field of meaning.  Each equation is by definition complex 
and will consequently have sporadic and unpredictable results (like the double-pendulum).  
In order to have any idea what a model of each equation will be like, a large number of 
calculations will need to be made, in the same way more points are needed to graph a curve 
but in the context of a problem that is exponentially more complex.  The challenge is that this 
only gives an indication of how that one equation would be modeled.  Consequently, each 
result of the relevant equations must be plotted together within the same field.  However, 
unlike the method of overlaying multiple models, one simply models all of the relevant points 
that are being indicated within the field.   
 The result is a single field with a mess of points plotted all over it, except that in this 
mess of plotted points there are clusters.  It is still possible that these clusters do not mean 
anything, but with each added point in any given cluster the probability of that particular area 
sharing something that significantly links these equations becomes more and more likely.  
Probability boxes are simply drawn as a perimeter around these clusters as a way of 
identifying the range of these significant sets of data. 
 In a similar way, McIntyre approaches the complex field that is the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit.  Because of the ‘heterogeneity’ of expression that the field of Pneumatology has 
within it, McIntyre does exert extra effort to schematize what he in other contexts simply 
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developed as independent models by sub-setting what he calls ‘patterns’ within broader 
categories that he terms models.  This is especially helpful as he discusses the models in 
his own conclusions in that it allows him to make broader connections and more direct links 
between the heterogeneous expressions of Pneumatology.   
 
2. Models of Pneumatology 
 One, there is the Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model: Multiple Mutually Compatible 
Patterns.  This model concentrates on the normative function of the biblical texts in providing 
definition to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  This model both acknowledges the variety of 
representations of the Holy Spirit in the biblical texts while affirming their basic compatibility 
within the biblical witness as a whole. 
 Two, there is the Trinitarian Hypostatic Model, within which are the Traditional 
Pattern and the Christological Pattern.  This model is characterized by a focus on the 
internal logic of Trinitarian thought, which is then informed by the scriptural accounts of the 
Spirit.  The Traditional Pattern finds its source in the presentation of the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit in the Cappadocian Fathers and focuses on the internal Trinitarian logic of hypostasis.  
The Christological Pattern, on the other hand, finds its source in Jean Calvin and the 
Reformed tradition in which “The Spirit appears as completing and fulfilling the work of God 
in Christ, supplying the faith to accept the Gospel and the will to embrace the benefits of the 
Redeemer.”2 
 Three, there is the Trinitarian Model, within which are the Revelation-soteriological 
Pattern, and the Emperichoretic Pattern.  In some ways this model and the subsequent two 
patterns are closely related to the last model and its constituent parts.  The Revelation-
soteriological Pattern is really a development within the Reformed tradition by Karl Barth, 
and it focuses on offering an “account of the role which the Spirit plays in the atonement and 
revelation process.”3  McIntyre sources a contemporary form of the Emperichoretic Pattern 
from John V. Taylor and his book The Go-Between God.  Taylor develops the concept of 
emperichoresis and the interpenetration of the triune persons and share in each other’s 
being.  
 Four, there is the Dynamic Model, within which are the Definitional Dynamic 
Model/Relational or Operational Patterns, the Ecclesial Polarities Pattern, the Charismatic 
Pattern, and the Liberation Pattern.  The focus of this model and the subsequent patterns 
within it is on the operations of the Holy Spirit ad extra.  The Definitional Dynamic 
Model/Relational or Operational Patterns focuses on the Holy Spirit operating as God 
                                                        
2 SOP, 24-25. 
3 SOP, 25. 
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himself in relation to and with people in various forms.  This is closely related to the Ecclesial 
Polarities Pattern, which focuses on the relationship between the Spirit and the Church. 
 Perhaps one of the more surprising inclusions is the Charismatic Pattern, since 
McIntyre is providing one of the first academic treatments of the Charismatic Movement from 
the Reformed tradition. McIntyre focuses on the way that the Charismatic movement has 
moved beyond the Definitional/Biblical Model.  In a similar way, McIntyre acknowledges the 
development of Liberation Theology as creating its own unique perspective, since the Holy 
Spirit is often closely related to the concept of liberation and freedom. 
 Five, there is the Social-Trinitarian Model/Substantival-personal Pattern.  The focus 
here is on Social-Trinitarianism.  While McIntyre does include it as a model, he is highly 
critical of it as a system.  For McIntyre the focus on the Holy Spirit being substantive veers 
very near tri-theism and “depends entirely on a revision of the notion of ‘person’ as used in 
the trinitarian context and therefore in relation to the Holy Spirit.”4   
 Six, there is the Trinitarian Model/Attribute or Predicate Pattern.  This model focuses 
on the relation of the Spirit to particular attributes of God within a Trinitarian context.  The 
classic example is that of the Spirit as “The power and wisdom of God.5”  Here attributes like 
power and wisdom are both central to the existence of the Spirit, but more particularly of the 
Spirit’s existence in relation to God.  It is both about the attributes themselves and the way 
they locate the Spirit within the Trinity.  McIntyre also suggests an exploration of imagination 
as a pattern of describing the Spirit in this same way.6  
 Seven, there is the Dynamic Model/Secular Pattern.  While McIntyre does express 
some reticence about this model, it is obviously one that is very important to him and to his 
thinking.  This model focuses on the work of the Spirit outside the context of the church and 
theology in the secular sphere.  It is both an affirmation of the freedom of God to work 
beyond our understanding of him, and it is an affirmation of the “truth, beauty, goodness, 
justice, mercy, and love” of God wherever they are found.7   
 These models, briefly outlined at the outset of McIntyre’s presentation of the field of 
Pneumatology are interesting in that they do not serve as direct outline of his treatment of 
the subject.  As such, these summaries here do not provide an outline of the following 
summaries of McIntyre’s presentation of the field of Pneumatology.  While some do have 
specific parallels later in McIntyre’s exposition of the subject, others do not.  Part of this is to 
demonstrate that McIntyre is consistently trying to distill the subject of Pneumatology down 
                                                        
4 SOP, 27. 
5 1 Cor. 1:24. This is something that has been taken up by Augustine and in the Augustinian tradition. 
6 SOP, 27. 
7 SOP, 28. 
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over the course of his treatment to specific polarities that can be reconciled into an informed 
understanding of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. 
 
i. The Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model 
 When McIntyre begins with the Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model, he tries to offer a 
thorough overview of common images of the Holy Spirit in the Old and New Testaments.  
The Old Testament section focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in ordaining leadership, in 
inspiring and directing prophecy, in the role of Creation, as a motif of Messianic and 
Apocalyptic expectation, and as having an inspiring and instructing role in the arts and in 
work crafts. 
 The role of the spirit in ordaining leadership contains instances where the Spirit 
provides strength and power to warriors in battle as they take on leadership of the people of 
Israel in battle.  It also includes the anointing of judges and kings to their position of 
authority, and it includes special works that highlight the anointing of the prophets to their 
prophetic roles. 
 This is distinguished from the role of the Spirit in prophecy itself, in which the role of 
the Spirit is more directly related to the act of revelation on the part of the Spirit.  This 
includes the interpretation of dreams in cases like Joseph and Daniel, and it includes the 
giving of visions to prophets like Balaam. 
 These are distinguished from types of prophecy that are more closely connected to 
the idea of prophecy.  These include instances like the anointing of Saul to prophesy that 
McIntyre identifies as being closely related to the prophecy of ‘oriental dervishes.’8  Then 
there is prophecy as foretelling and prophecy that is specifically religious.  This religious 
prophecy is more like proclamation in delivering a word of the LORD. 
 It is at this juncture that McIntyre moves to a more specific argument in relating the 
work of the Spirit to the realms of creativity and creation.  McIntyre focuses his discussion on 
the role of the Spirit in inspiring creativity in the passages concerned with the construction of 
the Tabernacle and Temple.9  For McIntyre any defensible position affirming this creative 
                                                        
8 SOP, 33. 
9 I do not think that McIntyre takes this far enough.  To affirm the role of the Spirit in creative work also 
affirms the role of the Spirit in areas of work and labor that are not traditionally (or at least 
contemporarily) associated with creativity.  To limit the inspiration of the Spirit to the arts is to bar the 
Spirit from the sciences.  This would seem to be not only a lapse in judgment, but also a lapse in exegesis.  
What may be described as craftsmanship today (masonry, metallurgy, etc.) would have been deemed 
quite technical fields in their day.  What we must acknowledge is that the work of building the tabernacle 
and the temple respectively were both creative and technologically challenging endeavors and that the 
Spirit was involved in both.  For McIntyre to be consistent with his own views on imagination and to 
account for this in the exegesis of these passages, the Spirit must be involved in both.  It is the Spirit who 
inspires creativity and who reveals the secrets within the creation which was wrought by him. 
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and inspiring role of the Holy Spirit in the realm of human work is dependent on the 
questions of whether creatio ex nihilo is a concept present in the Old Testament and 
whether or not the Holy Spirit can be properly understood to participate in the work of 
creation in the Old Testament. 
 In response to the first question, McIntyre makes the argument that the concept of 
creatio ex nihilo is implicitly present in the Old Testament.  McIntyre chooses to make this 
argument from a variety of texts in Isaiah, rather than resorting to the more readily available 
passage of 2 Maccabees 7.28, presumably due to his place within the reformed tradition and 
his own audience of primarily protestant readers.   
 In response to the second question, McIntyre does argue for the work of the Spirit in 
the work of creation.  Here he cites the assessment of Alaisdair Heron in relation to Genesis 
1 and 2 that “If God’s ruach is God himself in action, and if his activity includes creation, the 
doctrine of the Spirit as creator must follow, unless the Spirit is to be detached from God 
himself in a fashion running counter to the thrust of the New Testament.”10  For McIntyre the 
position is not simply about the particular interpretation of particular texts, but is instead 
about the general ideas that seem to be conveyed by the biblical texts as a whole.  He 
concludes:  
 My own judgment then is that even if we allow that a full-blown Trinitarian 
 interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis amounts to unwarranted eisegesis, we 
 are not thereby obliged to reject the reference to the Spirit of God as present and 
 operative in creation.11 
 
If for no other reason, McIntyre argued, there would be no other place to locate the creative 
work of the Spirit than in God’s work of creation. 
 This led to the final realm in which McIntyre examines the Spirit in the Old 
Testament, namely in regards to messianic and apocalyptic expectation.  This begins with a 
focus on the ‘religio-moral’ quality of the influence of the Spirit in passages like Isaiah 1.11 
and Isaiah 61.1, the latter of which Jesus is quoted as reading in the synagogue in Luke 
4.18.  These focus on things like wisdom, understanding counsel, knowledge, the binding up 
of the broken-hearted, the proclamation of liberty to the captives, and the opening of the 
prison to those who are bound. 
 The apocalyptic aspect is concerned with the sending of the messiah as an 
outpouring of the Spirit of God.  For example, Joel 2.28 talks about the outpouring of the 
Spirit as precipitating a time of prophecy, visions, and dreams; and Ezekiel 36.26 talks about 
the gift of the indwelling Spirit.  This outpouring of the Spirit, while having an apocalyptic 
                                                        
10 SOP, 40 
11 SOP, 40 
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focus, is presented within the context of messianic expectation of which this expectation of 
the work of the Spirit was a part. 
 The New Testament section covers the role of the Spirit in the life of Christ according 
to the synoptic gospels, the acts of the Spirit in the church in the book of Acts, the teachings 
related to the roles of the Spirit in the letters of Paul, and the teachings of Jesus on the Spirit 
in the Gospel of John.   
 McIntyre’s focus on the synoptic account (including Luke-Acts) looks at the role of 
the Holy Spirit in the birth, baptism, and resurrection of Jesus.  McIntyre continues this 
historical focus in examining the role of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost and in the spread of the 
church in the account of Acts.  McIntyre then switches his focus to teachings on the Holy 
Spirit in Paul’s letters.  Here McIntyre briefly identifies themes and a pattern in which, “the 
Holy Spirit is: the guarantee, foundation, unity, medium, structure, morality, content, diversity 
and devotion of the Christian life of the person and the community redeemed by Jesus 
Christ.”12   
 This view of the Spirit as being and having specific roles in the life of the church is 
complemented by the account of the Holy Spirit in the Gospel of John.  While McIntyre does 
highlight the place of the Spirit in driving Jesus into the wilderness, Jesus’ focus on the Spirit 
in his conversation with Nicodemus, and in the commissioning of the disciples most of 
McIntyre’s treatment focuses on different aspects of the ‘upper-room discourse.’  Here the 
focus is less about these substantive roles of the Spirit and more about the relationship of 
believers to the Holy Spirit as the Paraclete who comes along-side them.  For McIntyre this 
highlights the real, personal, and independent existence of the Holy Spirit as the “whole 
power of God operating in a third way, completing the work of the Son as the Son had 
perfected the work of creation.”13 
 What McIntyre tries to draw out through this brief survey are points of disconnect 
between the role and function of the Holy Spirit in the biblical texts and general notions of 
the Holy Spirit today.  McIntyre draws most of his conclusions on this point from the notion 
that the New Testament Church had “a sense of the widespread presence of the Holy Spirit 
throughout the Church, as if, almost in physical terms, he were the ambience in which they 
lived.”14 
 For McIntyre there were three distinct functions of personal and definite roles of the 
Holy Spirit that were integral to the understanding of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament 
Church.  The first is an ‘epistemological role’ in bringing people to knowledge of and belief in 
                                                        
12 SOP, 61. 
13 SOP, 71. 
14 SOP, 71. 
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God.  The second is a soteriological role in “opening the hearts of men and women to the 
Good News and in fulfillment in them the redemptive work of Christ.”15  The third is an ethical 
role in which the Spirit enables Christians to “live out their faith in the moral arena.”16  It was 
these beliefs combined with the expectation of the early church that the Spirit would act in 
these ways and the ubiquitous presence of the Holy Spirit that McIntyre found in the early 
church and finds lacking in his contemporary church.   
 While McIntyre still avoids calling this a ‘betrayal,’ he does see this as a major 
departure; and he questions what consequences the church has suffered from the vacuum 
left by the church’s “vacating of the realm of the Spirit.”17  It is here that I think the impetus 
for and the argument of the book become more clear, namely that McIntyre is gleaning the 
tradition of the church and new expressions of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit for ways to re-
imbue the contemporary church with this permeation of the holy and the faithful expectancy 
that God will work in our midst. 
 
ii. The Trinitarian Hypostatic Model  
 In this task, McIntyre turns next to the Trinitarian Hypostatic Model with its two 
patterns, the Traditional Pattern and the Christological Pattern.  McIntyre begins with the 
traditional pattern as a way of providing both an account of the first theological model and 
pattern and as a way of providing the historical background and grammar for understanding 
and evaluating later developments in the field. 
 For McIntyre there are two main impetuses in the development of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit historically.  The first is the effect that the development of Trinitarian theology had 
on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit by implication, and the second was the later attempt to offer 
distinctions of the person of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. 
 In the first of these two discussions, McIntyre is concerned with how the idea of the 
Holy Spirit developed within the context of the church’s formulation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity.  For McIntyre, the verbiage of Trinitarian formulation itself offers insight into who the 
church has understood the Holy Spirit to be.  This is especially true, not in relation to 
essentia or substantia of the Holy Spirit in the being of the Godhead, but in regards to the 
understanding of the Holy Spirit as ‘person.’  This challenge of speaking of the Holy Spirit as 
‘person,’ persona, prosopon, and hypostasis is something that continue to affect the 
challenges developing a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
                                                        
15 SOP, 72. 
16 SOP, 72. 
17 SOP, 73. 
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 These challenges are delineated in the way that the concept of person, in relation to 
the Holy Spirit, has effects on: 
 (i) the relations between the Godhead and the persons; 
 
 (ii) the relations which obtain among the persons; and  
 
 (iii) the relations between the Trinity as a whole and the world of nature and 
 persons.18 
 
For McIntyre the relations between the Godhead and the persons can be developed in two 
directions.  The first starts with the threefold nature of God and the subsistence of the three 
persons in the Godhead.  The second starts with the existence of the three persons and 
works to the unity of the Godhead through the relations of the persons.   
 The relation among the persons are understood through both the equality of the 
persons, in which the persons are co-equal and co-eternal, and the distinctness of the 
persons, in which each person has a distinct identity.  This includes the concept of distinct 
roles of each person, as in the concept of procession and the concept of emperichoresis in 
which the persons maintain their identity while dwelling within and interpenetrating each 
other.   
 The relation of the Trinity to the world is described in terms of the opera Dei ad extra.  
These works are understood to be indivisible, even when any particular work of God is 
understood to be the work of one person of the Trinity.  Thus the work of one person of the 
Trinity is not a work of that person personaliter but is instead a work of that person 
essentialiter, which is in that person’s essence as God.  For McIntyre, the challenges of 
making and maintaining this distinction in theological formulation are addressed in three 
main ways. 
 In the first, the Father as unbegotten and uncreated is associated with those things 
that generate ex nihilo.  In the second, the person of the Trinity whose work is terminative or 
final determines the association of a particular person to a particular work of the Godhead.  
In the third, the entire Godhead is at work as threefold in each and every relation between 
God and the world around him. 
 For McIntyre, these ideas as they have developed in relation to the Trinity and the 
Holy Spirit have both a positive and negative legacy.  The positive legacy is marked by two 
positive consequences.  One, it records “the securing of the deity of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit as inalienable items of the Christian Faith;” and two, it marks “the securing of the Spirit, 
as far as he is essentially God, as equal with and to the other two persons.”19  The negative 
                                                        
18 SOP, 77. 
19 SOP, 83. 
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legacy though is that of controversy, which requires a broader approach to the doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit that moves beyond simply understanding the Holy Spirit within the context of 
Trinitarian formulation. 
 This is what leads McIntyre to the second part of this Traditional Pattern of the 
Trinitarian Hypostatic Model that focuses on pneumatological rather than Trinitarian 
formulation.  Here McIntyre is primarily interested in the patterns set forth by the Greek 
Fathers and the influence that it has had in subsequent formulations of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit by answering five questions: 
 (i) What is the evidence for the claim that the premise of the whole deduction is the 
 unity of the Godhead? 
 
 (ii) What is the nature of the Divine Activity or energia(i) which plays so important a 
 part in the second stage of the deduction? 
 
 (iii) What is the nature of the unity of this Divine Activity? 
 
 (iv) What is the nature of the inference from the unity of operation of the Divine 
 Activity to the affirmation of what later generations were to call the  ‘deity’ of the Holy 
 Spirit? 
 
(v) What is the validity of this inference as a means of establishing what the Greek 
Fathers were aiming at, in seeking to refute the Tropici, the Pneumatomachoi and 
the Macedonians?20 
 
In regards to the question of the unity of the Godhead, the primary principle for the Fathers 
and for McIntyre is the indivisibility of the Triad.  The distinction of the persons is something 
that can be found in the scriptures, but this distinction only serves to offer clarification of the 
unified Triad.   
 The subsequent question of the nature of Divine Activity is primarily focused on the 
works of God ad extra involving the whole Godhead.  The Fathers focus on the work of all of 
the persons in each Divine work.  This begins with Athanasius, but it is in Basil that McIntyre 
finds explicit reference to the work of the Spirit in the work of creation.  So, the simple 
answer to McIntyre’s question is that “it consists of the whole Godhead acting in relation to 
the created order, in the several opera of the Three, which are nevertheless indivisa, that is, 
inseparable from one another.”21 
 This is followed by the answer to the unity of Divine Activity.  The interesting thing 
here is that in regards to Divine Operations is that they are distinguishable but not 
separable.  Consequently, one can recognize the work of the Father, Son, or Spirit without 
                                                        
20 SOP, 86. 
21 SOP, 88. 
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denying the inseparable involvement of the other two persons in that operation, even if those 
other persons are involved in ways that are different and can be differentiated.   
 This leads to the answer to the fourth question, which addresses the implications that 
the unity of operations has on the development of the deity of the Holy Spirit.  The first part 
of this inference is that the Holy Spirit does things that only God can do and possesses the 
same attributes assigned to God.  As such there is no room for the idea that the Holy Spirit 
is creature and not creator, and the deity of the Spirit must be affirmed along with the 
essential unity of the Spirit with the Father and the Son. 
 This leads to the final question of the validity and value of this inference.  McIntyre 
argues that the position of the Fathers was based not upon, 
 …Metaphysical principles or logical concepts, but [on] the Christian understanding of 
 baptism and liturgy, creation, incarnation, salvation, sanctification and eschatology.  
 It draws out the fullest implications of the situations in which Christians find 
 themselves in relation to God; and it finds the interpretation of these situations in 
 Scripture, as the completion in their lives of the mighty working of God from before 
 the foundation of the world.22 
 
Within this presentation, there is still the ambiguity of what necessitates the deity of the Holy 
Spirit.  While McIntyre notes that the fathers asserted that this could be derived from both 
the work of the Spirit in concert with the work of the Father and the Son and from the unique 
operations of the Spirit, McIntyre projects that the former has a greater consequence for 
subsequent theological formulation that treats the subject of the deity of the Holy Spirit. 
 
iii. The Classic Trinitarian Model 
 From here McIntyre goes on to examine three principles of the classic Trinitarian 
mould.  The first is the ontological, the second is the analogical, and the third is the question 
of filioque.  The ontological principle is simply the principle that ‘knowledge of any one of the 
persons of the Triad is at the same time knowledge of the other two.’23  This is not to say 
that the whole knowledge of the Trinity can be derived from the knowledge of the Father, 
Son, or Spirit; but instead that knowledge of God and what God has done for people leads 
us to a more complete understanding of God in human relation to him.  There is a sense in 
which the Son is made known by the Spirit and the Father is made known by the Son in 
which knowledge of one is the beginning of our knowledge of the others.  This is for McIntyre 
the beginning of emperichoresis by which people are able to come to a knowledge of the 
Son and subsequently the Father by the work of regeneration begun in the hearts and lives 
of people by the work of the Holy Spirit.   
                                                        
22 SOP, 94. 
23 SOP, 97. 
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 The analogical principle is simply put the principle that the relation of the Spirit to the 
Son is analogous to the relation of the Son to the Father.  There is of course a point of 
incompatibility with this principle and the idea that differentiation of the persons is only 
possible when these two relationships are unique.  The fathers themselves were aware of 
this incompatibility and sought to address it by offering an account in which the Spirit was 
coordinate with the Father as well as the Son, but in which it was the distinctiveness of this 
coordination that provided the basis for differentiation among the persons.  For McIntyre the 
purpose of this principle was apologetic in that it supports the deity of the Holy Spirit as 
being in special relation to the Son.  The doctrinal implication then is nothing short of 
affirming the role of the Holy Spirit in perfecting the work of God in creation. 
 Finally, the principle of filioque is a principle that should not be attributed to the 
fathers despite the fact that there are points at which they show sympathy with it.  In 
McIntyre’s interpretation, the position of the fathers is one that finds a middle ground 
between the subordinationism inherent in Cyril’s position in which the Spirit ‘proceeds from 
the Father through the Son’ and the wording of the doctrine of filioque in which the Spirit 
‘proceeds from the Father and the Son.’  For McIntyre theirs is an account that avoids the 
oversimplification of these relations in terms of procession and embraces a more complex 
and rich account in which the scriptural affirmation of the close relation of the Son and Spirit, 
as well as the more nuanced scriptural concept of ‘sending,’ is preserved. 
 As a whole it is an account in which the Holy Spirit is bound up in all the works of 
God from creation to redemption and sanctification.  It affirms the integral nature of the work 
of the Spirit with the work and person of the Son in redemption, while still maintaining the 
uniqueness of the person and work of the Spirit as a member of the Godhead in his own 
right. 
 
iv. The Christological Pattern 
 It is here that McIntyre shifts his focus to the Christological Pattern that he first 
follows in the works and writing of John Calvin.  Calvin himself does not attempt to stray 
from the teaching of the fathers, but he does draw on other sources, notably Augustine, and 
offers his own insights and develops new ideas, approaches, and emphases.  While Calvin 
affirms the scriptural truth of a Trinitarian God, he faces the challenges of the heavy reliance 
on extra-Biblical language to speak of God as Trinity.  For Calvin the use of these foreign 
terms must always subordinate themselves to the authority of scripture and must be 
understood as a necessity in articulating the faith in response to the challenges of heresy. 
 In keeping with this position, before expositing his own Christological pattern for 
understanding the Trinity, Calvin addresses the problem of the nature of ‘persons’ in 
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understanding the Trinity.  Calvin affirms, in the same vein as the fathers, the divinity of the 
Spirit.  The challenge comes in understanding how the Spirit and indeed all of the persons 
relate to one another.  Here, Calvin affirms an ordo subsistendi, as opposed to an ordo 
essendi, in which ‘The Father, who is the Father of the Son, obviously has priority within that 
relationship and, since the Spirit is the Spirit of both and ‘from both’, he is the third in the 
order of subsistence.’24 
 The danger here is the accusation of subordinationism, which has been leveled 
against Calvin.  McIntyre defends Calvin against this critique by giving an account of the 
critique by Leonard Hodgson.25  For McIntyre, there are three rebuttals for this charge.  First, 
there is the rigor with which Calvin defends the divine unity within which there is no room for 
subordination.26  Second, since Calvin makes this an order of subsistence there is no sense 
in his account in which the Father deifies or gives divine essence to the Son and the Spirit, 
which is one of the key objections to subordinationism in its earliest form.27  Third, McIntyre 
draws on A.E. Taylor’s notions of ‘a short way’ to say that Calvin’s notion of principium which 
is inherent in his view is not derived from the theological categories of the heresy of 
subordinationism but is instead rooted in the Scriptures in which there is clear language that 
shows an ordering of sorts in which the Father is primary.   
 Here, McIntyre moves on to focus on where he sees constructive development in 
Calvin.  This focuses on the oft-quoted section from Augustine’s De Trinitate, where he 
noted the ambiguity of the term hypostasis where he writes ‘by those names [sc. Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit] is meant the relation by which they mutually bear to each other, and not the 
very substance by which they are one.’28  McIntyre observes that while Calvin quotes this, 
this is a point at which Calvin significantly diverts from Augustine’s position.  That is because 
Augustine is affirming that the persons are defined by their relations, while Calvin affirms 
that they are distinguishable because of the unique self-existence of each.  For McIntyre this 
avoids the logical fallacy, noted by John Anderson, ‘that an entity is not definable solely in 
terms of the relations in which it stands to other entities.’29 
 It is here that McIntyre turns his focus to the explicitly Christological pattern that 
Calvin’s pneumatology follows within the context of having this unique self-existence.  
Basically, this follows the analogical pattern put forward by the fathers in which the Spirit 
                                                        
24 SOP, 112. 
25 Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944).  This book was 
first presented as the Croall lLectures in 1942-1943.The primary texts that McIntyre relies on in 
responding to these attacks are in John Calvin, (Institutio I.13).  
26 SOP, 114. 
27 SOP, 114. 
28 SOP, 117.   
29 SOP, 117.   
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follows a similar pattern of relation to Christology within the Trinitarian model.  However, 
Calvin’s emphasis on the special relation of the Son and the Spirit creates a pattern in which 
the Spirit is integral in relating the efficacy of Christ’s work to people.   
 Thus the Holy Spirit is, according to Calvin, ‘the bond by which Christ effectually 
binds us to himself.’30  Calvin then goes on to use a variety of images to illustrate various 
aspects of this work.  The Spirit is the Spirit of adoption, because it is through the Spirit that 
people are made children of God.  The Spirit is the water who nourishes people, so that they 
can bear the fruit of righteousness.  The Spirit is the oil and unction, by which God heals 
people of their sin.  The Spirit is a fire that kindles the burning of the love of God in people.  
The Spirit is the fountain and the hand of God from which the gifts of God’s grace and the 
divine life well up and are poured into the lives of people. 
 These roles and images are then related to three areas in which the work of the Holy 
Spirit is integral in communicating the work of Christ to the lives of believers.  They are faith, 
the sacraments, and the scriptures.   
 First, it is the Spirit who gives people faith by which they can receive the work of the 
gospel.  Within this there are two perspectives relating faith and the Holy Spirit that McIntyre 
focuses on.  The first is that all faith is within the embrace of the Holy Spirit, and there is no 
other theological context within which faith can be spoken of.  Thus it is the Holy Spirit who 
offers an assurance to faith, and transfers faith from the mind to the heart.  McIntyre 
observes that sometimes in this respect people limit the work of the Holy Spirit by believing 
to easily and not allowing the Holy Spirit to offer assurance in the face of the hard teachings 
of the Gospel.  The second perspective is that faith is the principal work of the Holy Spirit, 
especially in relation to justification.  In justification it is Christ who imparts to people a 
righteousness that is not their own.  While faith is an act, on the human side, by which 
people lay hold of the benefits that Christ offers, faith stands as a gift of the Spirit and stands 
‘not in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God.’31 
 The first principle of the sacraments is that the substance of the sacraments is first 
and foremost Christ, but it is the Holy Spirit who allows people to receive Christ into their 
hearts and “energises the faith that receives Christ and of the benefits of salvation” thus, 
“The sacrament has no inherent efficacy to confer the gifts of the Holy Spirit upon us; rather 
is it the function of the Holy Spirit to prepare our hearts for the entry of the redeeming, 
renewing Saviour.”32   
                                                        
30 SOP, 119. 
31 SOP, 122. 
32 SOP, 123. 
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This implies that the sacraments are not necessary for salvation.  For McIntyre this 
has two consequences.  The first is that unbaptized infants are saved from the ambiguous 
state of Limbo, which was a happy consequence for the reformers.  The challenge in 
McIntyre’s own context is the 1995 decision of the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland to admit unbaptized children to communion.33  For McIntyre, if the sacraments are 
not necessary for salvation there was no necessity to admit children to communion; and 
there was no reason that they should be put forward to receive communion when they had 
not first bound themselves to the Christian community in baptism.34  Without the necessity of 
taking communion and the lack of commitment on the part of the children or their parents, he 
saw no reason to open up communion in this way. 
The second consequence is that without this necessity of the sacraments for 
salvation, essentially the same thing was being offered to people in the receiving of the 
sacraments and in the hearing of the word.  This accords with the ideas of Calvin and their 
subsequent result in the Church of Scotland of uniting the ministry of word and sacrament.  
However, as early as 1591 there is record of disagreement on this point, notably from Robert 
Bruce who was the minister of St. Giles in Edinburgh.35  For Bruce, the very tangibility of the 
sacraments, especially communion, communicated the real presence in a way that the 
hearing of the word never could.  For McIntyre, this was not a choice of either or.  Instead it 
was an affirmation that each of these ministries offered a unique and complementary 
function in the receiving of all that Christ has to offer in the ministry of his church.  In his own 
account not only does communion offer a tangible expression of Christ that a sermon never 
could but also the proclamation of the word offers a meaning to the sacraments that they 
can never have on their own.  Word without sacrament is in danger of abstraction, and 
sacrament without word is in danger of meaningless ritualism.  However, McIntyre is quick to 
qualify the certitude with which he makes this claim.  He writes:  
We are speaking of the mercies of the living God, the benefits of our Saviour, and the 
limitless action of the Spirit and we dare not forget that these mercies and benefits 
are in his hand, and that the Saviour is not to be restrained even by the command he 
has given in the words of institution or by the mouth of prophet or evangelist.  There 
is a place in the heart and the purposes of God for the uncovenanted mercies, which 
are but part of his unbounded love for all creatures.36 
 
                                                        
33 The Church of Scotland General Assembly (Edinburgh, 1995). 
34 SOP, 125.   
35 SOP, 126.  It is unclear what McIntyre is referring to here.  McIntyre refers to sermons preached on the 
sacraments in St. Giles in 1591.  There is a collection of sermons preached on that subject from 1589.  
Even then there is the question of whether he chose to access the original publication, which he would 
have had access to in Edinburgh, or if he was referring to the edition edited by T.F. Torrance, The Mystery 
of the Lord’s Supper (London: James Clarke and Co. Limited, 1958). 
36 SOP, 126. 
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 For the role of the Spirit in relation to the scriptures, McIntyre makes an analogous 
argument from the role of the Spirit in the sacraments.  He starts his presentation of Calvin’s 
position by noting that the basis for the authority of scripture is two-fold.  One, it is 
dependent upon the idea that this is the word of God and that the scriptures should be heard 
“as if God had been uttering them.”37  Two, it is the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit that 
affirms this authority in the reader.  
 While there is no contradiction between these two ideas directly, it does raise the 
issue of primacy when the formation of the canon is brought into question.  Since the 
discussion and disagreement present in the formation of the canon is well documented, the 
role of the Spirit must take some precedence in offering an answer here.  McIntyre notes 
that Calvin’s concept of ‘the instrumentality of men’ in the hands of God could offer an easy 
answer for Calvin on this point.  Which suggests that the Spirit offered inspiration in forming 
the canon as well as in the writing of the texts. 
 What McIntyre wants to avoid is the idea within ‘Calvinism’ of verbal inspiration and 
the idea of infallibility.38  While Calvin did say, as noted before, that the scriptures should be 
listened to ‘as if God had been uttering them,’ verbal inspiration would say that God has 
uttered them and thus they are inerrant and infallible.  For McIntyre this ignores the sense of 
what Calvin is arguing for, a sense of the immediacy of God’s speaking to us that is 
mediated by the text of the scriptures.  Instead, it affirms the idea that the scriptures 
themselves are of some value in themselves and are capable of offering something to 
believers on their own. 
 McIntyre argues that this is very akin to “unreformed’ notions of the sacraments, 
which Calvin vehemently opposes, and that a proper understanding of Calvin would 
understand the role of the Spirit in interpreting the scriptures in a way analogous to the role 
of the Spirit in the sacraments.  Thus it is not the Holy Spirit testifying to the authority of 
scripture.  Instead the Spirit is working through the scriptures to lead people to ‘the living 
Christ.”39  For McIntyre, it is only in the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the scriptures as the 
Word of God ‘that Scriptures are ‘authenticated’, and their true authority is recognised only in 
the part that they play within the circle created by the Holy Spirit.’40 
 
 
                                                        
37 SOP, 127. 
38 It should be noted that in this context McIntyre is contrasting Calvinism as it developed as a system 
from the writings of Calvin himself.  Additionally, his targeting of the concept of infallibility focuses on the 
original notion of the word which is more akin to the more contemporary word inerrancy, which 
McIntyre uses interchangeably with infallibility. 
39 SOP, 130. 
40 SOP, 133. 
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v. The Revelation-soteriological Pattern  
 It is here that McIntyre turns his focus to the Revelation-soteriological Pattern as 
presented in the theology of Karl Barth. For McIntyre there are two main aspects of Barth’s 
position that are relevant to the topic of the Holy Spirit.  The first is Barth’s understanding of 
the Trinity and his focus on the role of the Holy Spirit in revelation.  The second is Barth’s 
focus on the role of God as Redeemer.  McIntyre then follows the implications of Barth’s 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit as it relates to the church, Christian love, and a variety of 
devotional aspects that McIntyre puts under the umbrella ‘baptism with the Holy Spirit.’  
McIntyre is especially keen to highlight the influence of Augustine on Barth’s pneumatology 
throughout this process, which is especially important to his conclusions concerning the 
procession of the Holy Spirit.  
 One of the idiosyncratic elements of Barth’s treatment of the Trinity is his desire to 
use the language of ‘modes of being’ rather than that of persons.  However, Barth is actually 
quite emphatic on his maintenance of the concept of the Father, Son, and Spirit having a 
personal, as opposed to impersonal, and unique existence.  Thus Barth strongly defends the 
unique deity and personage of the Holy Spirit. 
 Here the Holy Spirit is the manifestation of God’s revelation of himself as the 
Redeemer.  Barth describes the Holy Spirit as: 
God Himself, in so far as he is able, in an inconceivably real way, without being less 
God, to be present to the creature and in virtue of this presence to realise the relation 
of the creature towards Himself, and in virtue of this relation to Himself to vouchsafe 
life to the creature.41 
 
Thus it is all of the Godhead that is present with people.  This is not some estranged part, 
appendage, or spark of the divine.  This is God from above meeting God from below in the 
present reality of the Holy Spirit within the hearts of people. 
 It is the work of the Spirit in this integral nearness that allows people the freedom to 
receive the revelation of God, makes them capable of communion with the divine despite 
their falleness, equips them to bear witness to the truth of the Gospel, and call them into 
relationship with God as his children.  The totality of this work, for Barth “Could only be 
achieved by one who was in himself, and not by adoption or by any process of emergence, 
truly God, in unity of being with the Father and the Son.”42  For it is only by the work of the 
Spirit in the revelation of the Son that the church is able to confess that Jesus is Lord.  This 
work of manifestation of this revelation works in such a personal and inward way that any 
                                                        
41 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, §12.1. 
42 SOP, 141. 
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notion of independent work or agency on the human side is relegated to irrelevance by the 
completeness of the Spirit’s work in completing this work of revelation. 
 Before moving on to the realm of the Spirit, beyond its place within Barth’s Trinitarian 
doctrine, there are two things that McIntyre addresses as key to understanding Barth’s 
position as a whole.  The first is about method and focuses on the relationship between the 
immanent and the economic Trinity.  The second is about the influence of Augustine on 
Barth’s theology of the Spirit, especially in relation to what is called the mutual love theory 
and the concept of filioque. 
 Barth directly relates the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity by arguing that 
the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity.  What Barth specifically wants to argue against 
with this claim is the notion that the God we know is nothing like the God who exists in 
relation to himself.  There is not a different God hiding behind the curtain pulling the strings.  
He also indirectly indicates a right understanding of the economic Trinity has direct 
consequence on any understanding of the immanent Trinity. 
 All of this is not to say that the two are identical.  One is by nature eternal and 
timeless, and is not bound by the constraints of space and time.  The other is bound up in all 
of the conditions necessary for relating and being real to people.  McIntyre observes that this 
is not unlike Kant’s notion of ‘transcendental deduction’ in which things that are transcendent 
are always marked by the conditioned thought of people who live in a world constrained by 
certain factors.  So, even an understanding of the mystery of the transcendent, immanent 
Trinity is conditioned by these things that shape human perception. 
 The influence of Augustine in Barth at this juncture is significant.  Barth takes up two 
ideas from Augustine’s De Trinitate, the ‘mutual love theory’ and his affirmation of the 
creedal ‘filioque’ and integrates them that move beyond Augustine’s initial formulation of 
them.  The ‘mutual love theory’ is that the Holy Spirit is the ultimate expression of the love 
between the Father and the Son.  For McIntyre, and for Barth, this notion moves beyond the 
psychological and analogical context within which Augustine originally formulated it; and the 
idea that the Spirit is integral here to the communion between the Father and the Son moves 
it beyond some vague notion that the Spirit is ‘hypostaticized’ in their relation.43 
It is this focus on the Spirit as integral to the communion between the Father and the 
Son that leads into the question of filioque.  This phrase originates in the western churches 
                                                        
43 In Bruce McCormack, “Grace and Being,” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge, 2000), 
McCormack argues against this interpretation of Barth which he traces back to Balthasar.  For Balthasar, 
there is an inherent social aspect of the relations of the divine persons within the immanent trinity, thus 
when Barth speaks of a covenant ontology this would seem an inclusion of humanity into this set of 
relations.  McCormack rejects this directly as expressions of an analogy of being “which remained 
throughout Barth’s life utterly foreign to his thinking.” Ibid., 109. 
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modification of the Nicene Creed and affirms that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and 
the Son.  Augustine’s defence of the Nicene position stems from the assertion that the Spirit 
is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, and attempts to bridge this affirmation with the 
language of Nicaea by pointing to scriptural references in which Jesus speaks of sending the 
Spirit.44   
In taking up Augustine’s defence of the phrase filioque, Barth closely relates this with 
Augustine’s conception of the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.  For him 
they are interconnected and indeed inseparable, reinforcing his own argument for the 
identification of the immanent and economic Trinity.  Additionally, by relating the work of the 
Spirit to properly divine operations ad extra argues for the true divinity of the Spirit in relation 
ad intra.  Here the Spirit is the commonality and the communion of the distinct modes of 
existence of the Father and the Son.  Thus Barth, following his premise of the unity of the 
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity argues for the divinity of the Spirit and the role of 
the Spirit as the communion of the Father and the Son, works from the work of the Spirit ad 
extra to the mode of existence of the Spirit ad intra.   
 Where Barth moves the position of filioque even further is when he talks of the 
double procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.  Drawing on the mutual 
relationship of the Father and the Son he argues that this double procession is not merely 
two processions from two sources, but instead as a single procession from one unified 
source.  Thus the two ideas of the Spirit as proceeding from both the Father and the Son 
and existing in the mutual love of the Father and the Son are brought together.  For Barth, 
both are necessary so that the communion of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit 
provide a sufficient basis and model for the communion between God and people. 
 
vi. McIntyre’s Barthian Synthesis  
It is with this view in mind, that McIntyre begins to explore the influence of Barth’s 
Pneumatology on the Christian church, in Christian love, and a catchall he calls ‘Baptism 
with the Holy Spirit.’ 
The starting point for Barth in relation to the church is that the church is a human and 
historical institution.  It is then only in its role as the Christian church, or the church of Christ, 
because God is at work in the church and the work of the church is shaped by God.  First, 
God is at work in the church by the Spirit, who is in this context, “the quickening power of the 




risen Lord Jesus Christ.”45  Second, it is the human work of the church that God sees fit to 
occasion and shape. 
This is followed by the affirmation that the church is both a communio sanctorum and 
a communio peccatorum.  That is the visible church has a dual placement as the 
communion of saints within the salvific work of God by communion with the Holy Spirit and 
among those who are within the church and in fellowship with all of humanity through their 
sinful and fallen nature which persists despite the totality of forgiveness. 
Despite the fact that Barth does focus on the Holy Spirit and develops a distinct 
pneumatology, it never completely escapes the Christocentric framework of Barth’s 
theology.  However, this is not merely a decision of methodological consistency in which the 
Spirit must be developed in a Christocentric manner.  It also reflects the closeness of 
relation and association that Barth consistently highlights between the Son and the Spirit.  
Here is Spirit is “the self-attestation of Christ” in making himself immanent with the church 
and in the building up of the Church by the Spirit.46  While the Spirit shares in the dual locus 
of being God on high and the immanent God, it is only by the Spirit that Christ is able to 
impart himself to the community of faith.  It is this link that constitutes Barth’s view of the 
Spirit in the church.  
When examining the relation of the Holy Spirit to the realm of Christian love, it should 
be understood that Christian love begins with the love of God that is essential to his being.  
For Barth, this love begins in the being of God, as has been shown before, is begun by the 
communion of the Father and the Son in the Spirit.  It is then this divine communion upon 
which the communion of saints and their own love for God and others is based. 
The love of God is completely self-giving.  For God to love it must be a complete gift 
of himself as love.  It encompasses all of the electing, purifying, and creative aspects of 
God’s relationship with people.  God’s love is electing, because it is a free gift of himself by 
the Holy Spirit to sinful humanity and thus calls them to himself.  It is a purifying love in that 
grace and judgment work together in it by the Holy Spirit in the lives of people.  Finally, it is a 
creative work of love because God does not love simply to be loved in return.  There is an 
expectation that his love will precipitate a new act of loving on the part of those who have 
received it that is freely generated by them but models God’s love to them all the same.  It is 
the Holy Spirit who is the power through which human action reflects God’s love, and it is at 
once God’s love and the work of the Holy Spirit that are present in these acts. 
In this way, Christians are bound by God’s forgiveness as the form of their 
sanctification to obedience, work, and service through the enlivening power of the Spirit who 
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calls people into the reality of conversion and discipleship.  The first act in this process is the 
sanctification of people in Christ.  The second act is the total self-giving of God that in turn 
requires the total receiving of him on the human side.  McIntyre sums this up by noting that 
for Barth, “in the Christian life justification and sanctification are but two distinguishable 
though simultaneous components of one single divine action effected by Christ through the 
Spirit.”47  This single divine action is the act of love. 
McIntyre concludes by making two caveats at this point to affirm the freedom of 
these acts.  First, there is the caveat that in this process humans are not merely instruments 
of God’s love.  It is God who liberates them to engage in acts of love that are completely 
their own.  Second, there is the caveat that this is not merely a love of emotion and 
sentiment and is instead a love of action and self-giving.  For Barth, “The Holy Spirit is the 
quickening power undergirding, energising, directing and realising, the whole scope of the 
Christian life as devoted to loving both God and its neighbour, so he commensurately equips 
the Christian with the freedom, the ability and the motivation to achieve its God-given 
goals.”48  In this way love is able to both reflect the love of God as a love of action and self-
giving and still maintain the freedom of a love that requires their own action and will.  
This leads into the question of Baptism with the Holy Spirit, which simply put, is the 
question of how a person becomes a Christian.  McIntyre notes that there are two 
presuppositions that are caught up in Barth’s response to this question.  The first is that the 
power of the resurrection is the same as the power of salvation and that this power is 
universally available.  The second is that the individual salvation history of one person is 
enfolded in the salvation history of Christ, who has been elected by God, by the power of the 
Holy Spirit.  Thus McIntyre notes that for Barth: 
Baptism with the Holy Spirit is the forgiving, cleansing and reorienting of those who 
are called to be Christians through the inward working of the Holy Spirit, who thus 
makes them free, willing, able, and equipped and ready for the entire scope of their 
transformed existence.49 
 
Additionally, he notes that this baptism is characterized by: a call to Jesus, the actualizing of 
salvation, gratitude and obedience, fellowship, growth and renewal. 
 In Barthian terms, this call to Jesus is the call of the word that is directed to Jesus 
and into direct and real relationship with him.  This call to Jesus is the invitation to participate 
in the history of Christ’s life, death, burial, and resurrection in the salvation history of the 
individual that includes the entire scope of what is encapsulated in the work of salvation.  
This is a key component of the baptism with the Holy Spirit in that this is the beginning of the 
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Spirit’s work in the life of an individual.  Despite the language of baptism, this should not be 
confused with baptism by water by which one is admitted into an ecclesial community.  
Instead, this is the work of the Spirit in building a real relationship with people. 
 Thus the baptism with the Holy Spirit is the means by which the Spirit actualizes the 
work of God for salvation universally in the life of the individual.  Unlike water baptism, where 
everything must be described in terms of sign and symbol, this work of the Spirit is an actual 
work of God in the lives of individuals.  It is described by Barth as being divinely effective, 
divinely causative, and divinely creative as this work is brought about in the lives of people. 
 The actualization of the work of salvation in the life of the individual elicits a two-fold 
response that is itself a part of this baptism.  This is the response of gratitude and 
obedience.  Gratitude for Barth is an immediate and obvious response, but obedience 
requires what McIntyre calls the “invasive grace of Jesus Christ.”50  While Barth continues to 
maintain the freedom of the individual in the process, there is an aspect of this grace and its 
irresistible nature in that the freedom of salvation brings the individual to a point where the 
only decision is to choose obedience.  This is in keeping with Luther’s notion of people 
having a will, but it by no means being free. 
 It is here that Barth notes that this baptism with the Holy Spirit is not an entirely 
individualized process.  It is also an introduction into the fellowship of the whole of the 
church.  It is this idea that requires the most explicit distinction of the baptism with the Holy 
Spirit from water baptism.  Whereas water baptism is characterized as admittance into a 
ecclesial community “the baptism with the Spirit may express itself in the pouring down upon 
these changed people of charismata which, when variously distributed among them, will 
enable them either to serve the community is a specific way or to share in its total 
ministry.”51  Here McIntyre agrees but also offers criticism, since he sees Barth’s view as 
limited in the scope of the baptism of the Holy Spirit as an event that transcends 
individuality.  He is especially critical of the lack of what he terms the ‘evangelical obligation’ 
of sharing the good news of Christ.  While this may be assumed by some in Barth’s notion of 
what it means to grow in faith and in Christ, there is no explicit mention of it. 
 What Barth does cover, is the idea that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is also 
characterized by the growth and renewal of the believer.  For Barth, there are two 
components of this aspect of the baptism with the Holy Spirit.  The first is the component in 
which what is intended in this baptism is eternally accomplished by God once and for all.  
The second aspect is what has been described already, the experience of this in the life of 
the believer.  While the other characteristics have lent themselves to being understood as 
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event, the characteristics of growth and renewal point more to a process of continuation and 
repetition.  While there may seem to be some contradiction between this idea of event and 
process, McIntyre argues for a more cohesive understanding of Barth on this point and 
draws attention to Barth’s idea that ‘those who receive [the baptism with the Spirit] live in a 
daily renewal to which the can never grow tired of subjecting themselves.’52  Thus this 
baptism is both once and for all and ongoing. 
 What Barth accomplishes by this approach is a real question.  What McIntyre argues 
is that there are six implication of Barth’s approach that are helpful in moving forward toward 
a more comprehensive Pneumatology.  In summary, they are: 
1. The relations of the persons cease to be merely logical relations. 
2. Love is made the central theme of all of these relations. 
3. God’s existence as love ceases to be merely an attribute and becomes the 
essence of the relations of all three of the persons. 
4. God is freed from the need of external objects of his love, since the persons of 
the Trinity are in themselves objects of their mutual love. 
5. The intra-Trinitarian love among the persons is the same love reflected in the 
loving works of God ad extra. 
6. The works of the Spirit ad extra then are also the basis for human understanding 
of the love that God has within himself. 
 
It is this ability to recapitulate a limited understanding of the works of the Spirit back into our 
understanding of God as he is, that is central for McIntyre in giving shape to his own 
Pneumatology.  
 Up to this point, McIntyre’s primary aim has been to locate his own thought within the 
context of the tradition and to glean what he can from it.  The Barthian notion of the 
relationship between the works of God, and particularly the Spirit, ad extra and ad intra 
operates as a function into which McIntyre can explore and propose other notions of who the 
Spirit is.  He begins this process by exploring what he terms ‘relational patterns’ within a 
‘dynamic model.’ 
 In addition to this general mechanism of correspondence between God ad extra and 
ad intra, McIntyre notes two ideas from Barth and Calvin respectively that serve as a point of 
departure for this exploration.  The first is Barth’s assertion that ‘The Holy Spirit… is God 
himself, in so far as he is able, in an inconceivably real way, without being less God, to be 
present to the creature, and in virtue of this presence, to vouchsafe life to the creature.’53  
The second is from Calvin’s Institutes where ‘in each hypostasis the whole of the nature of 
God is understood’ to which McIntyre adds ‘whether in opera ad intra or opera ad extra.’54 
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3. Relating the Patterns 
 With this framework in place, McIntyre identifies and addresses eight ‘relational 
patterns’ within this ‘dynamic model.’  The first three affirm that the Holy Spirit is God himself 
relating himself to, involving himself with, and identifying himself with various aspects of 
human life and existence.  The next three are concerned with the role of the Holy Spirit 
preparing the lives of his people for right relationship with one another in fellowship, right 
relationship with him, and right relationship with the whole created order.  The last of these 
patterns focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in making the categories of human existence 
relatable and relevant to God and relationship with him. 
 These six initial patterns are complimented by two additional patterns that he sets 
apart as functioning in unique and different ways.  The first is that of the ‘Go-between God’ 
proposed John V. Taylor, which McIntyre sees as including a variety of patterns previously 
mentioned in unique and valuable ways.  The second is what McIntyre calls ‘the definitional 
substantive model’ which he sees as the product of a cumulative examination of relational 
patterns, including that of Taylor. 
 
i. Relating to Personal Human Existence 
 The first pattern focuses on the way that God the Holy Spirit relates himself to the 
particularities of particular human existence.  Drawing on the distinct, though 
interdependent, aspects of God’s actions in the universal and particular realms, this pattern 
relates the role of the Holy Spirit to the particularity of God’s work.  Thus it is God the Holy 
Spirit who is at work in the lives of people within history and the created order. 
 
ii. Relating to the Interior Lives of People 
 The second pattern focuses on the way that God the Holy Spirit is involved in the 
inner lives of people, that is their mind, will, and emotions.  This radically advances from the 
first point, because it is here that the relationship of God with people becomes an internal 
relation.  As McIntyre writes: 
If [God] is afflicted in all their afflictions, he is afflicted from within their lives and not 
just from the outside.  If he nerves the human will to greater effort, he does so from 
within the complexity of human motivation, and not as an intrusive, quasi-mechanical 
impulse, or even as gratia infusa given to top up the human endeavor.  If he leads 
the human mind to deeper insights and wider vision, he acts in and through the 
process of human ratiocination.  When he works miracles, he does so not as an alien 
irrupting into an order which forms a totally enclosed system and breaking laws that 
hold therein; but in accordance with fundamental principles of the universe which he 
has himself created and is still creating.55 
                                                        




It is this radical internalization by which God not only involves himself with and within people, 
but implicates himself in the basest elements of human existence.  Here God is again 
exposed to misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and ultimately rejection by those whom God 
supremely loves. 
 Drawing on George Hendry, McIntyre seeks to use this to affirm notions of the 
human spirit and the image of God as positive aspects of human existence on philosophical, 
hermeneutical, and theological grounds.56  Here the aim is not to claim the primacy of any 
philosophical notion of the human spirit, but instead to demonstrate that this notion is 
integral to philosophical enquiry as a whole.  Thus Scheler, G.F. Thomas, and Reinhold 
Niebuhr are all cited as proponents of this concept.57  On exegetical grounds McIntyre draws 
on the language of Bultmann to say that the human spirit “is the index of human self-
transcendence… which relates to God when it receives the Spirit of God.”58  Finally on 
theological grounds, McIntyre focuses on the spirit of man as the subject of the address of 
God to people in Jesus Christ.   
 Perhaps the reason that McIntyre spends so much on this point is that an affirmation 
of human capacity for spiritual encounter and as bearers of the image of God is critical to 
McIntyre’s entire theological framework.  It is not only important for McIntyre’s affirmation 
here of God’s involvement within humanity by the Spirit but also for his assertion that the 
imagination is a fundamental aspect of the image of God and the primary means by which 
people are capable of knowing him. 
 
iii. Loving Identification 
 The third pattern is an even stronger statement on this point, wherein McIntyre 
focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in God’s loving identification of himself with people.  
McIntyre uses this term identification in very specific ways dating back to his original 
employment of the concept in his book On the Love of God.  Here McIntyre places himself 
within the tradition of John McLeod Campbell and includes the more recent adoption of the 
term within liberation theology, particularly that of J.G. Davies.59   
                                                        
56 George S. Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965). 
57 There are three works of philosophy that McIntyre cites at this juncture to demonstrate particularly the 
ways this relates to human nature, especially in transcendent terms.  They are: Max Scheler, On the 
Eternal in Man (London: SCM, 1960); G.F. Thomas, Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1955); and Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner’s, 
1964). 
58 SOP, 179. 
59 The primary source for McIntyre’s concept of identification comes from John McLeod Campbell and his 
presentation of the atonement in The Nature of the Atonement (Cambridge: MacMillan, 1856); but 
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 For McIntyre identification is a ‘process of self-exteriorisation in which the agents 
involved project themselves into the condition or situation of other persons.’60  The agent 
does not become the object but instead inserts themselves into that situation of the other 
and thus identifies with them.  However, for McIntyre this always remains a theological 
concept.  It is not simply a matter of ethical consideration for those in need or crisis, but 
instead must always be understood first in the context of the incarnation in which Christ 
identifies himself fully with the humanity he has come to save.  It is subsequently the spirit 
who is the medium of this continued identification with humanity, which McIntyre sees as the 
basic introduction of the concept of emperichoresis to the work of God ad extra. It is thus the 
Spirit’s work of identification that is the perfection of that identification of God with humanity 
that begins uniquely in the incarnation. 
 It is at this juncture that McIntyre shifts focus to the role of the Spirit in preparing the 
lives of his people for a series of right relations, the first pattern being concerned with right 
relationship with one another in fellowship and communion.  Here McIntyre focuses on the 
the communion of the Holy Spirit.  For McIntyre this has three senses.  The first is simply the 
idea that people have with the Holy Spirit.  The second is a communion that people have 
together that is enabled by the Holy Spirit.  The third, is the idea that the Holy Spirit is the 
communion of those people together in a way that reflects the Spirit being the communion of 
the Father and the Son.  Thus, in this patterns, “the Holy Spirit is to be seen as the condition 
of the existence of the institution [of the church], the means of its continuance and the 
ultimate goal of its fulfillment.”61  This is expressed in every aspect of the churches existence 
and life. 
 
iv. Preparing People for God 
 The next pattern in turn highlights the role of the Spirit in preparing people for right 
relationship with God.  On the whole, McIntyre is skeptical of this pattern.  While he accepts 
it as a general notion, the implications of this pattern quickly lead to the analogy of 
‘preparation’ to fall apart.  It implies the work of the Holy Spirit in religions other than 
Christianity, which McIntyre sees as patronizing and paternalistic.  It implies that this work is 
either limited or universal, which in turn implies that this work is either selective or resistible.  
In short it reintroduces themes of problematic forms of predestination that McIntyre clearly 
was trying to move beyond in a Scottish context that still bore the scars of certain Calvinistic 
                                                                                                                                                                            
McIntyre also acknowledges the important aspects highlighted by the liberation theology of J.G. Davies in 
Christians, Politics, and Violent Revolution (London: SCM, 1975). 
60 SOP, 181. 
61 SOP, 185. 
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expressions.  Thus McIntyre says little positive or constructive on this point, other than 
advocating a certain form of agnosticism in accepting paradox.  For McIntyre, the problem of 
grace and freedom, or responsibility and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is a series of half-
truths that must be taken together as an incomplete, perhaps even incoherent whole. 
 
v. Ordering Human Relations 
 This is followed by the pattern in which the Holy Spirit works to put people “in a right 
and responsible relation to the animal and natural order.”62  Here the notion of stewardship 
of creation is moved beyond the realm of Christian ethics and indeed beyond a doctrine of 
stewardship.  McIntyre identifies three theological ideas that have limited theological 
consideration for the role of the Spirit in this work.   
The first is that the close association of the Holy Spirit with the Son has led to a focus 
on the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit in the cosmic salvation of a cosmic Christ but that this 
has not led to any notion of the Holy Spirit’s role in bringing about a cosmic consummation.   
The second follows that this close association of the Holy Spirit with the Son and the work of 
the Son has led to a neglect of the relationship between the Spirit and the Father.  Thus the 
third is that the Holy Spirit has consequently not been regularly associated with the work of 
creatio continua, despite the fact that the Spirit is understood to have a role in creation. 
For McIntyre, relating the Holy Spirit to a cosmic consummation within a cosmic 
salvation, to the Father as Creator God, and to the work of continuing creation provides a 
basis for examining the role of the Holy Spirit in placing people in right relationship with 
creation and within the process of continued creation.  Thus the Holy Spirit makes people 
aware of the injustice of environmental and ecological sin, and convicts people to right and 
restorative action for the created order in the same way that the Spirit convicts and directs 
people in establishing, maintaining, and developing right relationship in communion with 
other people.   
 
vi. Personality and Spirit 
 The final pattern that fits firmly within this model argues that it is the Holy Spirit who 
makes “the categories of personality and spirit… applicable to God.”63  While McIntyre 
acknowledges the fact that there has been significant development in the understanding of 
God having personality and being understood in personal terms outside of reference to any 
one person of the Trinity, especially in Paley and the implementation of Buber, it must be 
understood that it is the Holy Spirit who makes this possible.  For McIntyre this is analogical 
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to the idea that God is understood as being the Redeemer, despite the fact that it is 
acknowledged as the work of Christ on the cross that accomplishes this.  In a similar way, 
while it may be understood that God relates to people and can be understood in personal 
terms, it is the Spirit who accomplishes this work.  
 In a similar way, when God is spoken of as Spirit it is by the Holy Spirit that God is 
known to people as spirit and engages in that transcending work of the Spirit that transcends 
the boundaries that are constantly present in relations between one entity and another.  
Perhaps in a nod to certain expositions of Buber, McIntyre argues that it is this transcendent 
relationship that moves the relationship of the Ich und du into a real relationship, not simply 
with an other, but with ‘the personality’64 that is God. 
 This is the last of the individual patterns that McIntyre examines in relation to this 
dynamic model.  The final two are set apart in that they move beyond following one simple 
pattern.  The first is that of the ‘Go-between God’ that incorporates a number of the patterns 
already mentioned.  The second is even more comprehensive and represents McIntyre’s 
own synthesis of this vein. 
 
vii. Emperichoretic Function 
 The source of the Go-between God is the book of the same name by John V. Taylor.  
What Taylor does is to develop the idea of emperichoresis into a broader concept that is 
more centrally located to a theological understanding of the Spirit and the relation of God to 
humanity by the Spirit.65  This takes up Barth’s innovation on the similarity of the being and 
works of God ad intra and ad extra.  Just as the Holy Spirit is the communion between the 
Father and the Son, so too is the Spirit the communion between God and people.   
 However, this has interesting implications for the way that the Holy Spirit is 
understood.  First, the presence of the Holy Spirit is not something that is felt, experienced, 
or known.  Instead, the presence of the Holy Spirit is constant and allows people to hear and 
know the will of God.  Thus the nature of our knowledge of God is not about how that 
knowledge is understood, since this has been explained in a number of ways.  Instead, it is 
about the fact that no matter how this is understood it is the Holy Spirit who makes people 
aware of God’s presence and makes this awareness possible. 
                                                        
64 Emphasis McIntyre’s. McIntyre offers consistent critique of Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1970).  The primary concern of McIntyre’s critique is that the Ich und Du relation is a reduction 
of the relationship with God.  God is not simply an other, with whom this type of relationship is possible.  
Instead, God stands apart and unique and any relationship with him must reflect the true distinctiveness 
of this relation. 
65 John V. Taylor, The Go-Between God: The Holy Spirit and Christian Mission (London: SCM, 1972). 
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 For Taylor a key piece in understanding the Spirit this way is the idea of ‘bisociation.’  
That is the idea that there is an immediate temporal, earthly thing associated with some 
eternal, heavenly thing that is inherent in the way that God does reveal himself.  For 
instance, the parables have earthly stories that convey some other spiritual reality.  The 
example par excellence is that of the words of institution, when Jesus says that this bread is 
my flesh and this cup is my blood.  In a similar way, it is the presence of the Holy Spirit that 
mediates our earthly and temporal understanding of things to the things that God continues 
to reveal.66 
 
viii. Absolute Freedom 
 Following Berkhof, McIntyre acknowledges that to speak of the Spirit being and 
acting in these various ways attributes a greater degree of autonomy than is usually 
associated with the Spirit.  The threefold nature of God as it is understood in the language of 
the three persons does not denote this level of autonomy, and Berkhof suggests the revised 
language of ‘an autonomous substance.’67  While there are difficulties of adopting such 
language, the aversion should not, as McIntyre argues, be based on the question of 
autonomy. 
 Returning to his method of finding analogous ideas in Christology, McIntyre argues 
that the autonomy of the Son has always been maintained as a defense against Docetism.  
Without an autonomous existence the Son could never have been more than an apparatus 
by which God sought to appear as a person.  Thus the autonomy of the Son is maintained 
with the understanding that Son operates “within a constant devotion to doing the will of God 
the Father.”68  Thus the Spirit can be understood to operate in unique and dynamic ways, 
such as those other patterns already mentioned, which move beyond limited understandings 
of the Spirit as merely an extension of the Father, Son, or the perfection of the work of 
salvation.  Here the Spirit takes on that full role of agency and activity with which he is 
described in the Scriptures and yet operates, just as Christ did, within the will of God the 
Father. 
 McIntyre acknowledges then, that the implications of this defense of autonomy leads 
to a type of social theory of the Trinity which requires a re-working of the Trinity.  McIntyre 
proposes two such options.  The first, is to suggest that persona be translated as personality 
and be understood in the more modern context as being autonomous and substantive.  Thus 
                                                        
66 It should be noted that there is also an extensive treatment of Taylor’s examination of the reflection of 
certain ideas about mediated relations in nature and science.  While there are certainly points worth 
exploring here, it does not serve in offering further explanation of this pattern. 
67  Hendrikus Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964). 
68 SOP, 205. 
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the relations of the three is that of societas or fellowship.  The second would be to say that 
the traditional notion holds ad intra, but in the works of God ad extra there is a change that 
occurs within the Godhead.  Thus the Son in being incarnate takes on a human nature that 
he never loses.  Neither is given immediate preference over the other. 
 Here McIntyre takes on the challenge of the inevitable charge of tri-theism in a way 
that I think demonstrates something much more fundamental to McIntyre’s method and the 
way that it plays out.  For him, a Christian doctrine of the trinity would never be tri-theistic.  
Thus this theory could never be tri-theistic, because it is a given within the parameters of the 
formulation that there are not three Gods but one.  It is only in ‘unravelling that unity’ that the 
three-foldness of God is discovered in the works of Father, Son, and Spirit; and this can in 
no way diminish the unity which these three have in the mutual and interpenetrating 
communion, which is far more than an human society or fellowship that can be imagined. 
 
4. The Resulting Polarities 
 However, this is not a complete account for McIntyre.  Thus he moves forward from 
here to an exploration of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the church.  This is itself an 
expression of the dynamic model, but takes into account four of what McIntyre terms 
‘Ecclesial Polarities.’  The basic idea here is that different ecclesiologies offer different 
accounts of the relation between the Spirit and the church.  The most extreme of these 
positions form ‘poles’ and other points that fall between these poles are located within the 
field of meaning these two poles creates. 
 
 
i. Over or In the Church 
 For instance the first polarity that McIntyre examines addresses the question of 
whether the Holy Spirit is ‘indigenous’ to or gegenüber, over and against, the church.  While 
McIntyre notes that the distinction is blurred by the diversity of each tradition, the pole of the 
Spirit being indigenous to the church is generally associated with the Roman Catholic 
tradition and the idea that the Holy Spirit is over and against the church is generally 
associated with the Reformed tradition.   
 In the first pole the Holy Spirit is indigenous to the church.  The analogy for this that 
originates with Augustine is that the Holy Spirit is to the church like the soul is to the body.  It 
is this position of the Holy Spirit within the church that is used to legitimate the church, her 
hierarchy, and her role in administering the sacraments.  It is the Holy Spirit who makes the 
human membership of the institution of the church into the body of Christ and legitimates 
that body as the church.  This subsequently is used to validate the church and her actions as 
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the will of God, since it is the Holy Spirit who has established this authority and is present in 
it. 
 The second pole by contrast focuses on maintaining the lordship of the Holy Spirit 
over the church, her hierarchy, and her administration of the sacraments.  As the Lord is 
maintained as without and above, the church functions as an instrument of the Holy Spirit 
and operates in the triadic relation of the church, Christ, and the Spirit that he sent.  As such, 
there is place for the Holy Spirit to be indigenous to the church in the same sense as that of 
the first pole. 
 While there are other polarities that McIntyre would seek to offer some conciliar 
position between the two poles, this is not one of them.  McIntyre sees these two ideas as 
different at very fundamental levels that are not in need of integration but instead of mutual 
understanding and respect. 
 
ii. Community or Institution 
The second polarity in turn responds to the question of whether the Holy Spirit is 
expressed through a community (event) or an institution.  In this polarity, McIntyre argues 
that the extreme affirmation of the expression of the Holy Spirit in an institution is 
unacceptable and largely non-existent.  That said, it is characterized by major gaps between 
the laity and the clergy and a specific shape and internal structure of the institution 
established by the Holy Spirit.  Conversely, even the most community focused communities 
operate with some hierarchy and structure. 
 
Either way, the Holy Spirit must be seen as active and present in the institution of 
baptism, the laying on of hands, in conversion, communion, the proclamation of the gospel, 
the discipline and authority of the church, the ministry, and the gifts of the Spirit.  As such, 
there is an implicit affirmation of these institutional aspects of the life of the church.  Thus for 
McIntyre, hierarchies must not be viewed merely as necessary evils in a fallen world, as 
having a demonic nature, or as merely being sociological developments.  Instead, they must 
always be understood as integral expressions of the theology, sacraments, and ministry of 
the church. 
 
iii. Group or Individual 
The third polarity in turn addresses the question of whether the Holy Spirit is present 
in the group or the individual.  It is the question of within or among.  The fact that McIntyre 
draws attention to is that there are strong cases for both of these positions.  For McIntyre the 
answer to this question is best answered when there is a balance between the two.  If there 
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is an overemphasis on the presence of the Holy Spirit within the individual there is the 
danger of neglecting the external and ethical responsibilities of the community.  Conversely, 
McIntyre asserts that any focus on the ethical and communal responsibilities of the 
community must never deny the promise of the Holy Spirit to work in the lives of individuals.   
The temptation here is to treat these two poles as separate concerns.  However, for 
McIntyre these are two poles of the same field and thus the tension between the two must 
be maintained.  For McIntyre, “If denominational loyalty or some other theological 
persuasion inclines us to one pole rather than the other, we must always acknowledge and 
react to the draw of the other.  Both are necessary…” and either way “we still have to create 
within the group as a whole the expectation of possession by the Spirit and the empowering 
to do his will as individuals.”69 
The central point here is demonstrated by two questions.  The first is reconciling the 
formulae and structure of the church with the freedom inherent in the being and work of the 
Holy Spirit.  For example, how can the Holy Spirit be understood as present in either the 
individual or the group; since he is free to be present by any means that he pleases.  The 
second question is that of making what is obviously true of the group, namely the presence 
of the Holy Spirit among them, into something meaningful for individual people.  As McIntyre 
puts it, “the real problem is how the Holy Spirit can be the life-giver, the power of our own 
congregations and hardest of all the sanctifier of our own lives.”70 
 
iv. Charismatic Phenomena  
The fourth polarity is one that is more specific than the others and addresses a 
phenomena that is not frequently addressed in the circles of academic theology.  That is the 
polarity of speaking in tongues and being baptized by the Holy Spirit.  McIntyre divides his 
treatment of this polarity into two polarities.  The first is a first order polarity and deals with 
the treatment of the subject within the biblical texts; the second is a second order polarity 
and examines the poles present in contemporary discussions within Pentecostalism and 
between contemporary Pentecostals and mainline churches. 
The first order polarity is concerned with two accounts of the process of conversion in 
Luke and Paul.  Broadly speaking, in Luke there is the possibility of a person becoming a 
Christian without the Holy Spirit.  The indwelling of the Holy Spirit is something that happens 
subsequently and can be separated from the ‘event’ in which one converts.  The argument 
here is that the evidence of this subsequent event is that of a sign, usually speaking in 
tongues or some closely associated phenomenon.  In Paul’s account, the order is reversed.  
                                                        
69 SOP, 219. 
70 SOP, 219. 
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The Spirit is sent first and it is this indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the process of conversion 
that leads to faith and a life of prayer.  McIntyre draws on the analysis of Walter Hollenweger 
to maintain these two positions as a polarity, since the two seem to be offering irreconcilable 
accounts.71 
This then leads to the second order polarity of this discussion, which McIntyre 
locates within the contemporary ecclesiologies of churches in the Pentecostal tradition and 
the mainline tradition.  The reason for this polarity is the resurgence of a two-stage (i.e. 
Lukan) view of salvation within the Pentecostal movement.   
The Pentecostal movement however is not a homogenous entity, and there is a wide 
variety of positions that take some form of this view.  The basic tenets of which are: a 
conversion experience, and a subsequent work of sanctification accompanied by signs.  
While different groups use different language and have different practices within this view, 
the emphasis is on the continued work of the Holy Spirit for the regeneration of the believer 
that manifests itself beyond a moment of conversion. 
Rather than trying to trace this debate, McIntyre chooses to focus on a standard 
example in which there is a first event of conversion in which the converted person has 
received Christ as savior.  There is then a second event when that person receives the 
baptism of the Holy Spirit, which is accompanied by speaking in tongues.72   
For McIntyre, there are two objections that are immediately raised by mainstream 
churches.  First, there is the rejection of the idea that the gift of speaking in tongues does, or 
especially must, accompany or indicate baptism with the Holy Spirit.  Second, there is the 
rejection of the idea that being baptized with the Holy Spirit is part of some added second 
blessing that is only given to some people. 
On the other hand, McIntyre notes that there are things that the mainstream 
churches can learn from this understanding of the Holy Spirit and salvation.  The first is that 
the language of being baptized by the Spirit is actually helpful in describing conversion and 
the role of the Holy Spirit in bringing about salvation in the lives of people.  Second, it is 
helpful in indicating the ongoing process of salvation that is facilitated by the presence of the 
Holy Spirit.  Finally, it offers a cautionary warning that speaking in tongues, as a biblical 
phenomenon, should not be dismissed or ridiculed as impossible today in the church or for 
the Spirit. 
However, McIntyre considers this as more than a phenomenon that can inform and 
shape what he calls the mainstream churches.  Drawing on the work of J.D.G. Dunn, 
McIntyre entertains the possibility that the Pentecostal movement has actually created a 
                                                        




third pole within this field of meaning that is held in tension with Protestant and Catholic 
understandings of the Holy Spirit.73  The specific argument is that the Pentecostal position 
places emphasis on and gives authority to, if not in some cases precedence to, personal 
experience.  This stands in contrast to and as a rejection of the sacramental and Biblicist 
views of the Holy Spirit that relegate the role of the Holy Spirit to the realm of the sacraments 
or the scriptures.   
While this may be something of a caricature of the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
positions, there are several points that suggest that the Pentecostal movement represents a 
major shift from these two traditional notions.  For instance, McIntyre points to the pre-
eminent place of tongues in the life of the believer, the emphasis on spontaneous prophecy 
in worship, and the hurdles that are faced in incorporating Pentecostal ideas and practices 
into the liturgical practices all seem to point to the extent of this departure.   
McIntyre concludes his exploration of this pattern by offering some concluding 
remarks on Pentecostalism in light of the original research question.  For McIntyre, this 
concentrates on the question of how mainstream churches can incorporate a sense of the 
presence of the Holy Spirit within their own worship practices.  This begins with creating a 
sense of expectation that the Holy Spirit will be present in worship by praying for the gift of 
the Holy Spirit, praying that the Holy Spirit will be present in worship, and praying to the Holy 
Spirit to fulfill his promise to be present with his people.  It includes allowing for spontaneity 
in the practice of preaching and the delivering of sermons as a way of reclaiming the 
prophetic function of proclamation.  Finally, it calls for a serious reevaluation of the liturgical 
place for the Holy Spirit in baptism, communion, and confirmation in the mainstream 
churches. 
 Ultimately, it is these three polarities of conversion, ecclesiology, and charismatic 
experience that constitute the clusters of probability.  Despite all of the data, categorization, 
and exposition these three polarities manage to encapsulate the multiple ‘patterns’ of 




 What emerges here is the final piece of the theological vision outlined in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination that McIntyre completes in his lifetime.  In it he takes liberties with 
his method in order to adapt to the chaotic field of Pneumatology while adhering to a faithful 
fleshing out of the outline from Faith, Theology and Imagination. 
                                                        
73 James D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM, 1975). 
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 In terms of McIntyre’s method the change can be observed in contrast to the other 
‘Shape of’ books.  Where The Shape of Soteriology is determined by models being viewed 
in the complex yet beautiful constellation overlay of their inputs, and The Shape of 
Christology is determined by the working out of the perennial problem posed by the 
simplified formula of Chalcedon, The Shape of Pneumatology is found only through the 
discernment of the work of the Spirit in clusters of expected and unexpected spaces within 
the whole realm of human and divine interaction.  These clusters emerge as polarities of 
concentrated data that relate to the person and work of the Holy Spirit within the broader 
field of theology and the life of God in the church.  While these clusters may not always be 
easily relatable to each other, the significance of the presence of the spirit in each is 
profound and undeniable. 
 In relation to Faith, Theology and Imagination, The Shape of Pneumatology re-
asserts and expounds on the initial claims, patterns, and the outline of the idea of 
imagination as a category of a theology of the Holy Spirit.  While the specific correlations 
between the outline and later work is not always a one-to-one relation in the cases of 
Christology and Soteriology, in the instance of Pneumatology McIntyre could not be more 
clear in his commitment to the first principles of his theological method and the system that 
he outlined in Faith, Theology and Imagination. 
 From the very beginning, McIntyre is very clear in Faith, Theology and Imagination 
that there is, for him, a close connection between the Holy Spirit and imagination.  This 
begins with the idea that we need to fully integrate our understanding of the Holy Spirit with 
the imaginative work of Creation.  It is also why there needs to be a better account of the 
Holy Spirit in a theology of work and art in which creativity and imagination are 
indispensable.  It is why when McIntyre, as Moderator, advocates for a reform in worship his 
vision is for worship that is imaginative and Spirit-filled.74  For McIntyre these two things go 
hand in hand.  When the Spirit is present, it is by God’s imagination; and when we see God 
at work in ways that are creative and imaginative, we can be assured of the presence of the 
Spirit.75 
 Here, not the Holy Spirit is the imagination of God set loose in the world as one, an 
outworking of God’s own imagination, that is in his essence as a divine perfection; two, as 
                                                        
74 The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.1.1. This was McIntyre’s address as the Moderator during the General 
Assembly as a sermon preached at St. Giles.  Some of the language is quite forceful in calling out the Kirk 
for a style of worship that was stagnant and lacking in creativity.  For McIntyre the solution of 
approaching new worship practices of imagination was a way of cultivating Spirit-filled worship in the 
Kirk. 
75 The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.14.17.  McIntyre echoes similar sentiments to his Moderatorial address in a 
more theological context that he gave as the honorary president of the Edinburgh Theological Society.  
This address is dated February 1994. 
121 
 
an outworking of God’s own imaginative nature; and three, an affirmation of the Holy Spirit’s 
own imaginative nature and function as a divine person.  No matter what model or account 
of this essential outworking of God’s own self, in each instance there is work involved on the 
human part to see what cannot be seen, to know what cannot be known, to imagine what 
cannot be imagined.  Our task is to faithfully trace their shape and to see in them the Spirit at 





























Part III: Constructive Synthesis 
 
Chapter 6: What is missing?  
 
 There are two things that appear to be missing from the original vision that McIntyre 
laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  First, there is no expansion of his outline for a 
doctrine of creation, at least not in the same way that there is for the doctrines of atonement, 
Christology, and Pneumatology.  Finally, there is no complete formulation of a doctrine of 
God built on the claims about God that McIntyre makes in FTI.  This creates a problem.  
Without these two components McIntyre’s theological system remains incomplete and his 
theological vision remains unrealized.   
 First of all, the absence of a doctrine of creation is problematic not only because it is 
a central doctrinal theme of any theological system.  It is particularly important to McIntyre’s 
system, because it provides the basis for his theological anthropology in which imagination 
is the primary aspect of the imago Dei.  However, McIntyre’s ideas about creation also teach 
us important things about his understanding of God.  This is particularly true in his insistence 
on the role of the Holy Spirit in creation and the ongoing concern that God has for his 
creation. 
 Second of all, the prospect of laying out a doctrine of God in terms of imagination 
presents its own specific challenges.   Part of the challenge is that the formulation of a 
doctrine of God is a more sensitive subject.  In FTI McIntyre makes a very strong, clear and 
concise argument for the idea that imagination ought to be understood as a divine 
perfection, that is an attribute of God that is constitutive of his substance.  Thus, just as God 
is love and not just loving, so also God is imagination and not merely imaginative.  That is to 
reiterate that God’s imagination is constitutive of his being as a perfection and not merely 
attributive. 
 The implications of this claim are huge and far-reaching.  It is a claim that could be 
applied in different ways.  The question is how we, as receptors of McIntyre’s theology, think 
this claim ought to be perceived and applied.  The closest thing that we get to a definitive 
direction from McIntyre is his own desire to re-write On the Love of God in terms of 
imagination.   
 The question then becomes a matter of how should these themes be developed in 
order to fill in the gaps left in McIntyre’s system.  Part of this is taking cues from McIntyre in 
order to identify the gaps in the final outworking of his theological system and to trace the 
trajectory and shape of his ideas.  The other part of this is a matter of identifying what 
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portions of McIntyre’s presentation of his system in Faith, Theology and Imagination and the 
‘Shape of’ books give insight and direction into how these themes might be more fully 
formulated in McIntyrian terms.    
 This chapter will focus on these two topics as parts of McIntyre’s theological system 
that are not fully developed.  This includes examining the pieces that are present and inform 
these gaps.  In terms of creation, there will be an examination of specific sections of Faith, 
Theology and Imagination and The Shape of Pneumatology that are relevant.  In relation to 
the doctrine of God, this includes a survey of On the Love of God as an outline of the 
components that McIntyre identifies as necessary for a developed doctrine of God. 
 As such, this chapter moves beyond a focus on interpretation.  In the case of 
Creation, I am arguing that the theological vision that McIntyre presented Faith, Theology 
and Imagination is incomplete without a doctrine of creation.  While some signposts are left 
by McIntyre is the outline of his proposal in Faith, Theology and Imagination, McIntyre’s 
system as a whole is incomplete without further work on this topic, especially since it 
encompasses the concept of the imago Dei, which is a significant bridge between and 
understanding of God in his imagination, an understanding of people as products of God’s 
imagination, and a theological anthropology in which people are bearers of the divine 
imagination. 
 This also highlights the gap left by the fact that McIntyre does not offer a more fully 
developed doctrine of God after Faith, Theology and Imagination.  Fortunately, McIntyre has 
left us more to work with than in the case of creation.  In his earlier work On the Love of God 
McIntyre provides a thorough account of God in terms of love.  The argument here is that if 
we can understand both the role that McIntyre claims for imagination as a divine perfection 
and gain insights into his mode of operation in relation to a doctrine of God, some synthesis 
of the two is possible.   
 This chapter examines what is missing in terms of creation and what is missing in 
relation to Imagination and the love of God.  If we can identify what is missing, we can 




 When we examine the outworking of McIntyre’s system from his outline in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination into the ‘Shape of’ books, the first thing that is missing is a 
doctrine of Creation.  While this is a key component of the system that McIntyre outlines in 
Faith, Theology and Imagination, there is no substantial follow-up to this.   
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 There are two caveats that I would like to add to this.  First of all, there is the distinct 
possibility that McIntyre simply did not have the time to fully realize his theological vision.  
There are two things that suggest this might be the case.  One, if we examine a 
chronological list of the books that McIntyre reviewed there is some indication that the topic 
of creation was a topic that McIntyre was at least reading from 1999 on.1  This follows a 
similar pattern where McIntyre published reviews of books related to the topics of his 
monographs in a period before and after publication.2  This might suggest that McIntyre was 
at least exploring this as a next project. 
 The second caveat is that in Faith, Theology and Imagination McIntyre draws a 
strong connection between the Holy Spirit and the act of creation.  This is a theme that 
McIntyre develops in The Shape of Pneumatology.  As a result there are some indications of 
what a doctrine of creation might look like beyond the original outline in Faith, Theology and 
Imagination.  
 What we are left with are four select sections of Faith, Theology and Imagination and 
The Shape of Pneumatology that are directly relevant to the doctrine of Creation within 
McIntyre’s system. 
 The first of these sections is right at the very beginning when McIntyre is still directly 
interacting with George MacDonald’s essay on imagination.3  One of the ideas that McIntyre 
gleans from the essay and chooses to develop is the idea that imagination is the primary 
aspect of the imago Dei.4  First of all, while this is a significant decision, in some ways this is 
not much of a stretch.  The alternative concepts, which are more traditionally associated with 
the imago Dei, generally deal with cognitive capacity and the human capacity to know God.  
                                                        
1 There is at least some limited indication that McIntyre was considering a volume on creation.  In 
addition to the doctrine of creation being one thing absent from the areas present in Faith, Theology and 
Imagination, in 1999 McIntyre published John McIntyre, Review of The Cosmos and the Creator: An 
Introduction to the Theology of Creation, by David Fergusson (London : SPCK, 1998), in Studies in World 
Christianity 5, no. 1 (1999): 117-119.  As an isolated event, this might be dismissed as an excellent teacher 
taking interest in the work of a former student.  But we can see that McIntyre often published reviews 
and papers on topics in and around the time that he was writing and compiling his books.  Additionally, 
we know, thanks to the McIntyre papers that he was holding onto a manuscript copy of the Gifford 
Lecture series Genes, Genesis & God by Holmes Rolston, III.  These are dated 1997.  Finally, McIntyre’s last 
four publications from 2002-2004 are all directly related to the subject of Adam.  They are: The Historical 
Adam,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 54, no. 3 (2002): 150-157. “The Real Adam,” 
Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 56, no. 3 (2004): 161-170. “The Real Adam and Original Sin,” 
Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 58, no. 2 (2006): 90-98. and “A Reply to the Responders,” 
Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 58 no. 2 (2006): 106-108.  These may be well be an indication 
of a pattern heading in certain direction. 
 
3 MacDonald, George. A Dish of Orts: Chiefly Papers on the Imagination and on Shakespeare (London: Edwin 
Dalton, 1908). 
4 FTI, 114. 
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Things like rationality and reason are meant to reflect those gifts that God has given to 
people that set them apart from the rest of creation as fully sentient beings.   
 Imagination as a faculty of the mind and as an epistemological concept lends itself to 
a similar type of characterization.  Imagination, understood in these cognitive-
epistemological terms, is capable of replacing these types of concepts to describe these 
aspects of what God has imbued to us as our creator.   
 What changes things for MacDonald and in turn changes things for McIntyre is the 
way that the concept of imagination becomes fully integrated into a series of connections 
between God as creator and people created in his image.  This begins in God’s own self as 
an attribute of God’s being.5  In MacDonald’s account, Imagination begins in God.  It is 
God’s imagination that leads God to create, and it is in that act of creation that God makes 
people.  It is in the creation of people, that God imbues them with his image, an image that 
must in turn include the same imagination that God has, or at least enough of an imprint of it, 
in order for them to reflect his being.  God in turn makes himself known by giving image to 
himself, and people are capable of knowing God because they have within themselves the 
faculty of imagination (as an aspect of the imago Dei) which allows them to see the ways 
that God gives image to himself. 
 While this is something that McIntyre discusses in the context of MacDonald, this is 
not a concept that he develops much further and it is something that would be a significant 
contribution to an understanding of the doctrine of creation in terms of McIntyre’s system.  
Without further development, we do not know what that would have looked like.  That said, if 
we take McIntyre’s utilization of MacDonald at face value, it is safe to say that any account 
of creation along McIntyrian lines, must include some account of imagination as an integral if 
not defining aspect of the image of God in people, as a product of God’s own creative 
imagination. 
 The second section is also from Faith, Theology and Imagination in which McIntyre is 
concerned directly with imagination as a theological category of creation.  Part of this has 
already been discussed, but what we see in the outline that McIntyre provides here is a 
desire to move on from the three-form doctrine of creation ex nihilo, per Verbum, and 
continua, which McIntyre labels as being at once both doctrinally proper and vacuous.6 
 McIntyre accuses this account of not providing any engagement with the creativity 
and imagination of God that must necessarily be present in order to create such a world as 
this, with all of its wonderful and imagination features, creatures, etc.  In turn, this means 
                                                        
5 FTI, 114. 
6 FTI, 50. 
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that we have a doctrine of creation that does not engage in any meaningful way with the 
creation itself as a product of this mighty act of God.7 
 McIntyre lays the blame for such inadequacies, especially in protestant circles, 
against skepticism of natural theology and an unhealthy understanding of humanity’s 
dominion over creation.  In the first instance, McIntyre cautions against selling God short as 
creator in order to assuage anxieties about natural theology.8  In the second instance, the 
concept of taking dominion over creation has resulted in an abdication of our responsibility to 
creation.9 
 For McIntyre the ecological crisis was one of the most pressing ethical issues of his 
day, and this is something that continues to be the case.  Consequently, McIntyre advocates 
for a theology that is affirming of creation both as a beautiful creation by God and a theology 
that addresses the ecological crises from a thoroughly theological perspective.  What 
McIntyre proposes is that the starting point for this process is “to get a right beginning in our 
doctrine of nature and of the God who so imaginatively created it.”10  Without an affirmation 
of God as creative and imaginative, it becomes an even greater challenge to affirm the 
goodness and beauty of creation as a product of God’s divine activity.  It is only within a  
positive affirmation of God as creator that we can reclaim a positive view of his creation.  
The language that McIntyre uses is evocative. 
 We have to begin again to see nature as the Psalmist saw it, the handiwork of God 
 which our ineptitude and greed are destroying; or as Christ saw it, with God clothing 
 the lilies of the field in a glory which outshone Solomon’s finery, and having such a 
 care for the minutiae of nature that he was aware of a sparrow falling to the ground, 
 and, by implication, of ten thousand gannets destroyed by one carelessly released 
 oil-slick.  Somewhere in the midst of that theology I want to find a place for the 
 imagination of the Creator-God.11 
 
The fact is that McIntyre does not make significant strides to this end.12  This is yet another 
area that needs additional attention.   
                                                        
7 FTI, 51. 
8 FTI, 51. 
9 FTI, 51-52. 
10 FTI, 53. 
11 FTI, 51 
12 He does have an additional essay on the ecological crisis, John McIntyre, “The Theological Dimensions 
of the Ecological Problem,” The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.3.10.   However, he does not move these ideas much 
more than he does here.  While there are more specifics related to how theology might approach 
environmental issues, these are not necessarily situated in the doctrine of creation.  That said, McIntyre 
does raise issues about the challenges of addressing these problems in ways that are not anthropocentric.  
This is due to the fact that the strongest theological language provided for the protection and care of 
creation are rooted in God’s impartation of his image to humanity.  As a result, he notes that a 
thoroughgoing ecological theology will have to overcome these obstacles in order to offer a theological 
approach that has an intrinsically high view of creation that is not dependent on any particular 
127 
 
 Once again we do not know what McIntyre’s doctrine of creation might have been, 
but it should be clear that he intended to have one and that certain ideas would be a part of 
that equation.  Namely, any doctrine of creation developed along the lines of McIntyre’s 
system would need to 1) positively affirm God’s imagination and creativity in the act of 
creation, 2) positively affirm the worth of creation as a product of God’s handiwork, 3) 
positively formulate theological responses to the ecological disasters of our times. 
 By the time that McIntyre writes The Shape of Pneumatology it becomes clear that 
the Holy Spirit is going to be an important part of McIntyre’s solution to this problem.  This 
brings us to our last two sections, which are both related to the doctrine of creation as it 
relates to the Holy Spirit.   
 The first indication that we have of this idea is also in McIntyre’s treatment of 
imagination as a theological category in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  Simply put, there 
is not any fully formulated idea present at this juncture.  That said, it is significant to note that 
in his account of imagination as a theological category of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, John 
McIntyre associates the Holy Spirit with one, “God’s imaginative creative activity” and two, 
“imaginative creation.”13  In neither of these instances is McIntyre actually referring to the 
doctrine of creation.  In the first, it is God’s activity in the “spiritual sphere;” and in the 
second, it is “in the spirits of believers.”14   
 Consequently, the point here is that it is not surprising that when we begin to 
understand the Holy Spirit in terms of imagination that we also begin to see the works of the 
Spirit as creative.  In turn, it is not surprising that when we begin to see the imaginative 
creative activity of the Holy Spirit that we begin to see that creativity as a significant aspect 
of who the Spirit is and what the Spirit does. 
 Consequently, it is not surprising that when McIntyre returns to the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit in The Shape of Pneumatology that McIntyre’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as 
creative and involved in acts of creation has developed into an association of the Holy Spirit 
with the doctrine of creation.  The fact is that McIntyre goes to some length in order to make 
a case for including the Holy Spirit in our doctrine of creation.15  Perhaps part of McIntyre’s 
reticence to say more in Faith, Theology and Imagination can be seen in the way that 
McIntyre very carefully develops his argument in relation to particular textual interpretations.   
 The fact is that the textual issues, while important to McIntyre, are not enough to 
deny the activity of the Spirit in creation.  While there have been irresponsible readings of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
anthropology (Note: this paper had multiple copies at multiple junctures in the files. AA 4.3.10 contains 
the copy that I first viewed.  It was dated 1980, which is the earliest date I saw on any subsequent copies).   
13 FTI, 64. 
14 FTI, 64. 
15 SOP, 35-40.   
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texts to make this point, McIntyre points to other texts that seem to associate the Spirit with 
the work of creation.  All of this cannot stand up to the scrutiny of the inseparability of 
operations of the persons of the Trinity.  The fact is that if God is acting all of God is acting.  
No one person can act independently.16  In conclusion, McIntyre asserts that this 
interpretation that incorporates the Spirit offers “the interpretation which the passage 
demands, namely, the valid account of how the writer of the book of Genesis pictures 
creation as taking place.”17 
 Once again, this is one small piece of an incomplete picture.  For McIntyre’s system 
to be complete a more comprehensive doctrine of creation is necessary.  While we do not 
know what McIntyre’s doctrine of creation might have been, it is clear that the role of the 
Holy Spirit in creation is something that was important to him and to his system as a whole.  
Consequently, any development of a doctrine of creation along the lines of McIntyre’s 
system would need to 1) actively affirm the work of the Spirit in creation and 2) ground this 
creative activity of the Spirit in the imagination that is integral to the being of the Spirit of 
God.  
 
2. On the Love of God: Framework for a McIntyrian Approach 
 When it comes to working out a doctrine of God in terms of McIntyre’s theology, the 
starting point is the affirmation that this is a doctrine of God in terms of imagination.  The 
basic idea of this is laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination when McIntyre presents 
imagination as a theological category.  The key thrust of this thesis is a two-pronged 
argument.  One, it is to establish the place and function of imagination as a divine perfection.  
Two, it is intended to raise the profile of imagination as a divine perfection.  It is this two-
pronged approach that leads Gary Badcock to conclude that imagination does indeed 
function “as a divine perfection- and perhaps even as the divine perfection par excellence.”18   
 That still leaves a question of what this would actually look like.  However, McIntyre 
does seem to provide some indication when he expresses an interest to “re-trace the map of 
the world of love” he would do so in terms of imagination.19  As such, it would seem that 
McIntyre, in affirming imagination as a divine perfection of primary importance, is suggesting 
that imagination as a divine perfection should 1) at least follow the same pattern of love and 
2) that the shape of love in turn should be understood in terms of imagination.  What we will 
be examining at the moment is McIntyre’s understanding of love in the first place and the 
                                                        
16 SOP, 40. 
17 SOP, 40. 
18 Gary Badcock, “The Theology of John McIntyre: A Critical Introduction” in Theology After the Storm 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). 
19 FTI, 73. 
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relationship that has to McIntyre’s understanding of a doctrine of God.  In order to do this, 
full attention must be given to McIntyre’s earlier work On the Love of God. 
 On the one hand, On the Love of God is one of McIntyre’s more comprehensive 
approaches to theology as a whole, but it is also less polished than some of his later works.  
The work seeks to answer the primary question: What is the love of God?  To this question, 
McIntyre offers his simple answer: “Jesus Christ, as prepared for under the Old Covenant 
and present in reality and fulfillment under the New Covenant.”20  To this end, McIntyre 
constructs a series of objectives and methodological constraints to govern his work. 
 The primary objective is, in a word, integration.  It is an acknowledgment that “the 
Liberals were right in the place they gave to the concept of the love of God both in their 
theological constructions and in the proclamation of the Gospel.”21   It is an 
acknowledgement of the problems posed by that same theology.  It is an acknowledgement 
that to re-introduce the primacy of the love of God “in our theological presentation then we 
must discover for it a content which will enable it to bear this responsibility.”22  The objective 
of integration is to bring all of these ideas into some sort of cohesion.  McIntyre sets out to 
do this by showing “how the insights which theology has been given in the past fifteen years 
[1947-1962] or so may be employed to give the content to the concept of the love of God.”23 
 The method that McIntyre proposes to do this is Christocentric but ‘not narrowly.’  For 
McIntyre this Christocentricism should be placed within the gospel story found in both the 
new and old covenants, and it should acknowledge the difficulty of using love in those 
contexts.  As he writes, “we are admitting that ‘love’ is an enigma, a problem, and we are 
endeavoring to establish its meaning by putting it in the very closest relation to Jesus 
Christ.”24  In a move toward this method, McIntyre proposes that he will include in his 
“description of what the love means, not only certain attributes, but also actions, operations, 
purposes, relations, and attitudes.”25  McIntyre presents this broader approach as a way to 
come to terms with “the living quality of the God and Father of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus 
Christ.”26 
 The structure of the remaining content is broken into seven chapters.  Chapters two 
through seven define love in relation to the understanding of love in God.  These are: Love is 
Concern, Commitment, Communication, Community, Involvement, and Identification.  The 
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final chapter turns the focus to the love of God in humanity.  Here love is offered definition as 
Response and Responsibility. 
 McIntyre begins his treatment of love as concern by drawing on the concept of 
concern developed by Paul Tillich.  Tillich presents concern in light of God being the ultimate 
concern of people.  McIntyre repurposes this in terms of its relation only in order to 
understand concern in light of the concern that God has for people.  For McIntyre there are 
five chief features of this concern. 
 First, he writes “In a field of ultimate concern, the subject of such concern constitutes 
the centre of the field and all other interests are oriented towards it.”27  Secondly, “the 
attitude of concern supplies meaning to the rest of life by giving it a centre of reference.”28  
Next, “the subject of the concern might be said to enter into its own rights and to exercise its 
own authority within the field” and in this way the field becomes dynamic.29 Fourthly, “the 
emotional or affective and the cognition aspects” are added to the “conative and volitional 
aspects of personality.”30  Finally, “The character of the field is determined by the nature and 
reality of the subject of the concern.”31  This moves the field of concern beyond something 
that is merely happening in the mind of the subject.  McIntyre notes that this is merely a 
pattern of concern in people.  Thus one should be careful not to understand this, especially 
in relation to God, as something that is merely attributive or in anthropomorphic terms. 
 In order to understand this concern in relation to God, McIntyre breaks the concept of 
concern into five subsections on concern as: Understanding, Compassion, Value, Belonging, 
and Meaning.  Understanding is put simply in terms of the idea, found in the Sermon on the 
Mount, where God “knoweth that you have need of these things.”32  The assurance of this 
understanding is found in Christ “has sojourned among us, bone of our bone and flesh of our 
flesh, living our life and dying its death.”33  This is closely connected to McIntyre’s 
presentation of compassion as part of concern, in which “God’s compassion is never far 
from his forgiveness.”34  Thus compassion is the understanding that God has of human need 
for him and his love. 
 This compassionate concern then becomes the basis of the value that God places on 
people.  As McIntyre writes that one “immediate result of the understanding and 
compassionate concern which God shows towards His creatures is that He invests them 
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with value, and that they come to an awareness of their value in His sight.”35  In this the 
ambiguity of the value of a person’s life is removed from the realm of human evaluation and 
it becomes solely “a function of God’s concern for him.”36  This in turn is closely related to 
the idea that this value is found in belonging to God, and that this belonging is a 
demonstration of God’s concern for people.  This then “gives us a sense of belonging, of 
being at home in this field of concern.”37 
 Finally, McIntyre turns his attention to the idea of love as concern creating “a field of 
meaning.”38  McIntyre uses this phrase “to describe the integrating effect of God’s concern 
upon the lives of those who accept Him as the subject of ultimate concern.”39  For McIntyre, 
from this position within the field of God’s concern:  
 We receive a centre of reference by which to regulate the motives and drives 
 which control our lives.  God becomes the supreme end by means of which all 
 lesser ends of our existence are co-ordinated.  In Him we find something, or 
 more accurately, someone to live for.40 
 
For McIntyre, it is important then that this concern is not dismissed.  So he goes on to 
defend this idea of concern against dismissal by notions of impassibility and immutability or 
by accusations of anthropomorphism.  McIntyre posits that any such notions can be met by 
stating that God feels “in the manner appropriate to His nature, and according to the 
infinitude of His understanding and compassion.”41  Thus when it comes to concerns about 
anthropomorphism, one must understand the place of the truly human aspects of God’s 
relation to people in which God “calls now for the living response of wills conformable to 
His.”42 
 It is at this point that McIntyre turns his attention from love as concern to love as 
commitment.  In this exposition, McIntyre distances the concept of God’s commitment to 
people from being somehow historically or doctrinally necessary.  Instead, he places this 
commitment as love within “the very quality of that love,” thus “The historical circumstance 
serves as a catalytic agent to bring into prominence something which is already there.”43  In 
exploring this theme, McIntyre offers further definition to the concept of commitment through 
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commitment in terms of: choice and decision, pledging and promise, act, faithfulness, its 
multi-dimensionality, and personal knowledge and personal hazard.44   
 Offering a number of scriptural examples of God’s consistent act of choosing people, 
McIntyre makes a straightforward case for this aspect of commitment.45  Along this line, he 
concludes “The single uniform witness to the Hebrew-Christian God is that He has chosen 
us before ever we came to the point of choosing Him-if ever indeed it would be true to say 
that we did so.”46  In close connection with this theme, McIntyre addresses its essential 
counterpart, commitment as pledging or promise.  For McIntyre, this aspect of commitment 
is a point of integration in which along with this commitment “promise and sacrifice are 
bound up together in the love of God as we know it in Jesus Christ.”47  Thus he presents the 
idea “that in promising to save sinners, God gave Himself as the pledged commitment that 
that salvation would come to pass” as “the given from which all theories of the atonement 
start.”48 
 For McIntyre there is in this presentation an inherent promise from God “that He will 
do something.”49  It is this latent action that McIntyre treats separately in the next section on 
commitment as act.  This section focuses on the idea that commitment is revealed in action.  
The implied action mentioned accounts for this conceptually.  But as McIntyre points out, 
“No one could have forecast the cross of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.”50 In this way, the 
commitment of the love of God “laid bare the fact” that through “His action in Jesus… 
nothing less than His whole being was committed to man, to sinful man.”51   This action, for 
McIntyre, offers a unique integrative function as well in that it has a unifying effect in relation 
to God’s past and future acts.  This is presented as the inherently eternal nature of God’s 
love and commitment.52 
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 McIntyre goes on to look at this idea of commitment in terms of God’s faithfulness.  
McIntyre moves beyond a basic treatment of the faithfulness of God as a descriptive 
attribute by looking at the Greek term aletheia.53  McIntyre points out that this word, and its 
Hebrew equivalent, is translated in the Old Testament as faithfulness.  However, when it is 
used in the New Testament it is translated as truthfulness.  Here McIntyre offers a 
theological interpretation of this change to say that truthfulness is the fulfillment of 
faithfulness.  Thus when we talk about faithfulness as the love of God as commitment, it is 
also the assertion that God demonstrates this faithfulness in the fulfilling truth of the 
incarnation. 
 For McIntyre, all of these aspects play into what he calls “the multi-dimensional 
quality of the love of God.”54  The key to these dimensions is the understanding of the love of 
God in reference to its object.  Thus these dimensions are dimensions of the love that God 
has for people.  For McIntyre, this means that the object of God’s love cannot be limited to 
the individual; it means that it must not be understood as strictly limited to the community; 
and that these two understandings of God’s love should not be understood as antithetical.  
McIntyre concludes, “Each existed as part of the other so that neither could be thought about 
or dealt with, without the other.”55 
 Drawing on the Gifford Lectures presented by Michael Polanyi, McIntyre posits that 
this love as commitment includes a level of Personal Knowledge that must include, in God’s 
relation to people, an element of hazard.56  Despite the challenges of doctrines that can de-
emphasize the personal nature of God’s relation to people, McIntyre holds that “Human sin, 
my human sin, creates the hazard in God’s commitment of Himself to me here and now 
which is the equal which He encountered” both in or prior to the incarnation.57  This hazard 
of relating with people becomes the point at which McIntyre returns to the idea of covenant 
in commitment and reminds his reader of “the obedience which God demands of His people 
is itself part of the covenant relation” thus “Christ is said to bring the covenant to its 
consummation by offering to God, by His life and death, that very obedience which Israel 
throughout her long and tortuous history was unable to give.”58  In this way, Christ’s act 
becomes the obedience necessary for this covenant.  As McIntyre concludes: 
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Such obedience was the very thing which Christ offered in blood poured forth to the 
last drop, and the obedience was offered to God by Christ in the room of those 
whose humanity He bore.  So firmly has God put this obedience in our human hearts 
that whenever we now seek to obey His will we must do so in the name of that 
obedience which is Christ’s.59 
 
In bringing the idea of love as commitment full circle in light of obedience as integral to this 
commitment as covenant, McIntyre turns his attention to love as communication. 
 McIntyre sets this idea of God’s love as communication against the backdrop of 
cultural understandings of communication in which communication is presented as broken 
and the source of human suffering, or as a linguistic notion that is tied up in understandings 
of logical relations.  For McIntyre, communication must break out of its logical-linguistic 
bounds in order to address the hurt of broken communication; and he seeks to do this in his 
own treatment of the love of God as communication.   
 McIntyre treats this topic within both biblical and theological notions of the phrase 
“the Word of God.”  In this treatment McIntyre attempts to move away from “the mystique” 
that this phrase has been imbued with.  In reference to biblical texts, McIntyre focuses on 
making the assertion that:  
 The form which God’s communication takes in His Word… it is seen to be 
 historical occasion; it is something which happened; it is historical reality.  
 When this interpretation of the factuality of God’s communication in His Word is held 
 to be the key to the nature of his love, a sharp departure has been made from the 
 notion that love is an attribute, a timeless and trans-historical existent.60 
 
Thus the content of this communication is not some abstraction, hermeneutic or otherwise, 
but it is instead the “specific life, death, and resurrection” of Jesus Christ.61 
 In regards to theological notions of this phrase, McIntyre interacts primarily with the 
theology of Karl Barth and its particular understanding of the term revelation.  Here McIntyre 
is more accepting of Barth’s position than he is in other writings.  The point of contact for 
McIntyre in this favorable treatment seems to be Barth “conceding more to the doctrine of 
predestination” in The Doctrine of the Word of God than he does “in volume II/2 of his 
Church Dogmatics.”62  Here McIntyre notes Barth’s main intention “that the Word of God 
calls forth a response from him to whom it is addressed, and this response is tied up in an 
integral way with what the Word is that is addressed to the man” as well as the difficulty that 
Barth notes in understanding this communication by saying that “God’s language is God’s 
mystery.”63  This does not mean that McIntyre has abandoned the skepticism that he has of 
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the onus that Barth’s system places on the doctrine of revelation.  However, he does note 
places of convergence with his own thought, that understanding God’s love, as 
communication is key to seeing the way that God’s love mends the fragmented relationship 
of people with each other and mends the relationship between God and his people. 
 With this theme of mended relationship still fresh, McIntyre turns to the love of God 
as community.  Here McIntyre begins to delve into the ethical aspects of the love of God for 
people and the reality of that love in relations with and among people.  McIntyre begins this 
line of thought by pointing out the way that Christ creates a reality of community into which 
people grow.  In this way, the love of God as community is not something that people make 
themselves.  Instead, “Christ is the condition of continuance of a world which has contracted 
to the narrow dimensions which we now know.”64  The task of people then is a work of 
imagination that leads “to a new realisation that the barriers are down, because Christ has 
already removed them.”65 
 Here McIntyre again draws on Karl Barth’s presentation of predestination where he 
states that: 
 One of the profoundest insights of Karl Barth into the traditional problems of 
 theology is his discernment that “elect” and “reprobate” are not names for  two groups 
 of people but of Our Lord Himself in His Incarnation and Atonement.66 
 
From this McIntyre concludes, “If Christ really became the reprobate for us, then no one 
thereafter can ever stand under the absolute judgment of God as He did.”67  In this way, it is 
not the responsibility of people to create relations of community.  Instead, they are made by 
Christ coming “into this far country which is the place of our abiding.  So a theological pose 
can only become a reality in our world when it fulfills itself in a morality of community.”68 
 In this morality of community, it becomes imperative that the Christian community 
moves away from understandings of love as a private ethic of intimate relation, because this 
private ethic diminishes the responsibility that people have to others with whom they do not 
have such an intimate relation.  McIntyre points to the “ruthlessness” of capitalism and the 
problems of irresponsibility in politics within Christian thought and practice as symptoms of 
this problem.  Drawing on Reinhold Niebuhr, McIntyre challenges the antithesis of love and 
justice by arguing that justice is love at a distance, and as such Christians have a 
responsibility to love in an expanded “range” of influence and that this responsibility “is 
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absolutely normative now.”69  What one is left with then is “the ethic of Jesus [which] is not a 
system of rigorous laws, such as was developed in the lex naturalis theories, but rather a 
basis of imaginative insight into a whole new range of relations in which we stand to our 
fellows.”70 
 Here, imagination plays a prominent role in the ethic of morality in the community.  It 
is the way that “the agent may penetrate sympathetically to the heart of the situation in which 
he has to act;” “It leads to actions and courses of action, in which the ordinary concomitants 
of love are not at all observable;” and it “acquires a versatility, or adaptability, which 
particularly suits it in view of the vastly increased range of the community within which it has 
to operate.”71   
 Imagination becomes an act of faith in which love as community can be expressed in 
the difficult places where there is “no clear biblical injunction to guide us.”72  McIntyre goes 
on to say then that “in the end it is faith and not moral sight, or even insight, which is going to 
be the probe whereby the Christian, under God’s mercy and at God’s command, penetrates 
to the farthest crannies which love in its inclusiveness has created.”73  This inclusiveness of 
love becomes the inclusiveness of all that God does, including his atoning work.  It is in this 
way that the inclusive love of God as community becomes the means by which Christ’s 
atoning work is “an all-inclusive Atonement, without before or after, without higher or 
lower.”74 
 Love as involvement then becomes, for McIntyre, the place where the love of God is 
put into action.  This action is undertaken in the way that God becomes involved with 
humanity through Jesus Christ.  McIntyre juxtaposes this involvement with “dogmatic 
theories about his assuming human nature” that do not engage with the complicated world 
with which Christ was involved.75  As McIntyre writes, Jesus was so involved “with the sinful 
nature that He has taken, and with the sorrow and suffering of humanity that He atoned for 
the one in the profoundest depths of the other.”76 
 In McIntyre’s mind, this involvement clouds the clarity of revelation.  Drawing again 
on Barth, McIntyre highlights the idea that “God reveals Himself in a situation which is also a 
veiling of Himself.”77  For McIntyre, this is not a Barthian dialectic.  Instead, it is the 
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recognition that “God whom the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain is in the 
Person of His Son involved in the ordinariness of everyday life to the point of being 
incarnate.”78  This is not a sanitized revelatory concept.  This is the revelation of God in the 
opaque and veiled realities of a world in which knowing itself is challenged by limitations of 
understanding.   
 Inherent in this involvement then is for McIntyre the “range of risk that [this 
involvement] entails.”79  McIntyre highlights this risk in two major areas.  First, he highlights 
this in the area of history.  Here he focuses on how “history is the field of ambiguity” in which 
interpretation and knowledge are tenuous at best.80  For McIntyre, “for our time the greatest 
risk is in the fact that Love has become involved in a person in history.”81   
 Another challenge in this ‘range of risks’ is the problem of interpretation, that is the 
problem of interpreting who Christ was and what it meant for him to be human and divine.  
McIntyre addresses this challenge in the context of contemporary Kenoticism, which he 
accuses of “in its earnestness to ensure [the humanity of Christ], it [is compromising] the 
Deity of Christ.”82  In this compromise, McIntyre sees a denial of God’s involvement with 
humanity and consequently of God’s love for humanity.  He writes that God “in giving 
Himself to mankind in the love that was in Jesus Christ, not only did He become involved in 
the totality of the human situation, in its sorrow and its sin as well as its hope and its joy, but 
He in His totality became involved.”83  For McIntyre, this ties into his presentation on the love 
of God on the whole.  In his presentation of the love of God as fulfillment, “the character of 
God’s concern is now elucidated… It is a practical concern which takes the form of action… 
It is embodied, dynamic concern turning out from itself and passing over into the situation 
which is its object.”84 
 There is then a reciprocal aspect of God’s involvement with humanity, and that is the 
involvement of humanity with God.  From the perspective of this reciprocal aspect, McIntyre 
introduces three consequences.  First, drawing on Leonard Hodgson’s The Doctrine of the 
Trinity,85 McIntyre writes: “the Christian is now gathered into ‘the social life of the godhead,’ 
and views the world from this quite new vantage point.”86  Secondly, there “is a renewal of 
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the contention that human nature has a place within the godhead.”87  Finally, “in the Person 
of Jesus Christ there takes place the Revelation not only of God but also of man.”88 
 This reciprocity, and the anthropological implications of the third consequence in 
particular, lead McIntyre to reflect on the image of the life of Christ: 
 Here, therefore, is the image that claims precedence over all the others which 
 compete for the control of our imagination, and therefore of our wills, our desires, our 
 affections and our reason… the image of man, the true man, Jesus Christ, which is 
 likely to gain control of our wills and affections and reason, will be the specific image 
 of Him of whom the Bible speaks, rather than the construct of the Councils.  The 
 latter may reinforce the former to some extent, but it can never be expected to 
 replace it.89 
 
This assertion of the primacy of these anthropological aspects of Christ’s existences and its 
influence on both the formulation of doctrine and the interpretation of the scriptures is 
echoed in the final assertion that the culmination of the love of God is identification. 
 Here McIntyre uses the account of John’s baptism as, perhaps, the prime example of 
God’s love expressed through his identification of Christ with humanity.  The focus of this 
presentation is that Christ, who had no need of righteousness, is baptized in the baptism of 
repentance to “fulfill all righteousness.”  In this act, Christ identifies himself with humanity.  
McIntyre takes this a step further though, when he argues that this act is a baptism on behalf 
of humanity.  His act becomes an act of repentance for the humanity with whom God has 
identified himself for the fulfillment of their righteousness.  John the Baptist’s statement 
“Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world,” by occurring “in the context 
of the baptism does imply that it has the specific as well as the general reference.”90   
 Thus McIntyre concludes from this passage that, “at the baptism began that overt 
identification of Christ with the sin of mankind which was to culminate in His crucifixion.”91  In 
this more comprehensive identification of God with man it becomes evident to McIntyre that 
“it is inaccurate to suggest that Jesus Christ in His life and death took upon Himself the 
consequences of human sin and wrong doing.”92  Christ identifies with humanity without 
precluding the possibility of encountering “all possible contamination from the sin for which 
He was dying.”93 
 From here, McIntyre argues that identification “is the consummation of everything 
that had gone before” and that “there is not one of the previous descriptions of love which 
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does not find its fulfillment here.”94  He goes on to relate the other aspects of God’s love to 
the concept of fulfillment in terms of the “many faceted love of God of which we are here 
speaking.”95  Returning to the theme of risk, McIntyre argues, “it is only love of this supreme 
[multi-faceted] kind which could take this apparently suicidal risk and emerge triumphant.  
Any lesser love would have been tainted with something of that in which it was being 
involved, or with which it sought to identify itself.”96  
 However, McIntyre is quick to point out that God’s identification with humanity does 
not end with Christ, “the identification with mankind which took one form in the Incarnation, 
takes another form in the indwelling Holy Spirit.”97  In this identification:  
 The Holy Spirit is the context within which faith is created; by Him we are led to 
 Christ; and in Him do we live… For the more effectively He works, the more clearly 
 do the life and passion and resurrection of Our Lord stand  revealed before us, and 
 make their offer to us and their claim upon us.98 
 
In this way, McIntyre notes the ‘transparency’ of the work of the Holy Spirit.  The Holy Spirit 
does not “add another voice to Scripture, but in fact facilitates the hearing of what scripture 
has to say.  He removes every let and hindrance so that the Word of God may be heard in 
its own authority addressing us.”99  McIntyre highlights the function of this transparency 
when he writes “when we are most in the Spirit, we should be least aware of Him, so 
attentive have we then become to God’s address to us in His own Word.”100 
 This loving identification then is something that is a present reality for people that “On 
the human side… takes place by means of forgiveness.”101  This forgiveness is offered freely 
and universally by the fact that God’s identification with humanity was total and complete.  
As McIntyre writes: 
 As Our Lord in His earthly life, death and resurrection made Himself one with 
 humanity at the deepest point of its sorrow and suffering so now in that glorified life 
 He continues that identification wherever need exists in the midst of His brethren.  To 
 this identification, there is not limit of race or class or creed.102 
 
For McIntyre, this forgiveness places an onus on people who have received this forgiveness 
to offer it to others as freely.  This reflexive responsibility to forgive becomes the basis of our 
“response to Christ and responsibility to our brother.”103 
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 McIntyre frames this love as response and responsibility within the story at the end of 
the Gospel of John where Jesus repeatedly asks Peter “Lovest thou me?” and offers the 
command in response “Love my sheep.”  In this passage, McIntyre argues that “There, then, 
is the character of the supreme response to Jesus Christ-that of love; and there too is the 
character of the obligation which Jesus Himself lays directly upon us, the moment that we 
declare that love.”104 
 McIntyre first focuses on the response to Christ.  He argues then that the supreme 
response to Christ is not faith, nor is it the knowledge of God, and that it is not even 
obedience to God.  Instead, it is love.  However, this is not just any love.  This is the love 
that God has already demonstrated.  As McIntyre writes, “we must say that as through His 
love God expresses His whole mind, will and heart to us, so through our love to Him do we 
express most comprehensively our response to Him.”105  In order to draw this out, McIntyre 
seeks to put love as a response to God in terms of the love of God that he has already laid 
out, except this time in reverse order.  So, McIntyre commences of a presentation of Love as 
a response to God in terms of: identification, involvement, community, communication, 
commitment, and concern.   
 This recapitulation of the Love of God back on to him in response begins with 
identification in which baptism and communion become acts of participation on the part of 
people in the loving acts of identification which have already taken place in Christ.  In a 
similar function to the one described above, this act of identification integrates all other 
aspects of this love.  A loving identification with God is then the beginning of involvement 
with God from the human side.   
 Like identification, involvement is something that has been initiated by the love of 
God.  It is highlighted here in terms of creation and redemption.  Thus there is a two-fold 
aspect of this involvement.  The aspect of creation reflects the universal involvement of 
people with God, whereas the involvement in redemption denotes “a more conscious, more 
explicit involvement on our part in the things of God… living the life for which we were 
intended when God created us in His own image.”106  Thus community is discussed in terms 
of “our involvement” as “a life lived in fellowship with Him in Christ through His Spirit.”107 
 In regards to love as communication, McIntyre simply states, “God communicates 
Himself to us in love.  We respond to that approach by listening to what He has to say.”108  
For McIntyre the primary act of listing is the reading of scripture.  As he concludes: “For the 
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Christian in earnest about His response to Christ, there can never be any substitute for daily 
reading and study of the Bible, and no other means by which he may learn what God 
demands of him.”109   
 In a similar vein, commitment is an act of continuing commitment.  This continuing 
commitment is made up of “decisions and decisions.”110  There are those decisions of future 
commitment, baptism etc., and there are those commitments that are made by decisions in 
“countless situations which we cannot at that moment even imagine.”111  It is here that 
McIntyre includes the reflexive aspect of Covenant, in which the love of God as commitment 
in covenant “kindles love, [and] creates its response, within the fellowship, and in fellowship 
with Himself.”112 
 This section concludes with the presentation of love in response to God as concern.  
For McIntyre this love as concern has two major elements.  The first is the concept of love 
as concern that he borrowed from Tillich in the second chapter in which “the believer only 
truly loves God when God is for him the subject of ultimate concern.”113  However, in the 
overall context of his argument McIntyre believes that this idea moves beyond its formal 
structure and “embodies its proper content in the being of God.”114  The second element is 
that of caring that “entails becoming entangled, dependent, obligated.”115  This stands 
against an outlook of apathy in which people cannot be bothered to care about anything, 
even God.  This caring love as concern is for McIntyre “an essential part of love for God, 
[and] is the antithesis of that sort of apathy.”116  It is the assertion that and the living out of 
the reality that “God matters profoundly.”117 
 This cumulative love for God in all of its aspects stands against all attempts “to de-
personalise this relation.”118  For McIntyre this danger can be plainly seen in the reduction of 
this relation to belief, credo, and intellectualism, intelligo.  For him, reducing this relation to 
belief latently holds the possibility “that God becomes a means to his own private ends… 
that the image of God [of God in worship] becomes the substitute figure for the reality Who is 
God… [And] a tendency for the believer to invest his own preferences and intention with a 
sanctity that they do not merit.”119  For McIntyre, it is “love for God [that] provides the proper 
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basis upon which to secure the truly person-to-person character of our response to God, in 
prayer and worship, in life and deed.”120  It is the concern of the believer’s love for God that 
makes the believer loathe to compromise God’s character in any of these fashions.  In a 
similar fashion the danger of de-personalisation of this relation in intellectualism is refuted by 
the infusion of love into the intellectual exercise of faith.  McIntyre’s conclusion states this 
strongly: 
It must be the Christian doctrine of the love of God which is our final theological 
justification for, or refutation of, the introduction of Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism, 
Hegelianism, or Existentialism into the central doctrines of the Christian faith; and it is 
the criterion by which we judge all the other metaphysical concepts not obviously 
connected with any system which from time to time we employ to describe the faith 
to ourselves and others.121 
 
It is here that McIntyre concludes his section on love as a response to God and shifts his 
attention to love as a responsibility to others. 
 Here McIntyre follows a similar pattern to that followed in the first part of the 
passage.  He seeks to place this love as responsibility to others in relation to the love that 
God has for humanity.  He deems it necessary to order these in reverse order to the aspects 
of love as he finds them in the love of God.  Thus he follows the pattern of discussing this 
love as responsibility in terms of: identification, involvement, community and communication, 
commitment, and concern.  The specific content of this presentation and its constituent 
sections is not integral to his overall argument.  However, there are three general 
observations that McIntyre makes that sufficiently make this point in relation to his broader 
argument.  
 The first is that love as responsibility to our brother is “integrally bound up” with the 
love of God.122  They cannot be separated as they share common content and function.  
Secondly, McIntyre makes the point that love as responsibility for the other is not equivocally 
the same as the love of God.  For McIntyre to do so is to reduce theology to ethics, which is 
something that he opposes.  Finally, McIntyre argues “the structure implicit in God’s love will 
provide the means whereby he may detail and specify the responsibilities which bind us to 
that brother.”123  Thus this love brings the love of God full circle to be an expression of the 
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 There is a lot to summarize in this chapter.  As a whole, this chapter moves beyond 
interpretation of McIntyre and offers and evaluation of his overall system, in light of what he 
proposed in Faith, Theology and Imagination,  What is evident is that there are things 
missing.  McIntyre proposes a certain understanding of God in which imagination is a divine 
perfection.  McIntyre proposes an understanding of creation in which imagination is a 
theological category.  He then proposes that imagination is and should function as a 
theological category of Christology, the doctrine of the atonement and the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit.  If we accept that the latter three are brought to life in the ‘Shape of’ books, we 
have to ask about the first two. 
 While there is some indication that McIntyre had intentions of writing a ‘Shape of 
Creation’ or equivalent, this does not happen.  This leaves not only a gap in the vision laid 
out in Faith, Theology and Imagination, but it also leaves gaps in our understanding of 
imagination, which is intended to be a highly integrated concept.  The problem here is that 
without a doctrine of creation, the concept of the imago Dei is also under-developed.  This 
creates problems because of the role that the imago Dei, as a concept, plays in integrating 
the concept of imagination from God to humanity and creation.  
 That said, in the examination of the text of On the Love of God, there is more to work 
with when it comes to the topic of a McIntyrian doctrine of God.  On the one hand, we have 
the account of imagination in Faith, Theology and Imagination.  This provides us not only 
with McIntyre’s proposed concept, but it also provides us with additional context both from 
George MacDonald in the germ and with Karl Barth in the development of imagination as a 
perfection.124  On the other hand, On the Love of God provides substantial insight into the 
way and manner that McIntyre thinks about the character and nature of God.  As such On 
the Love of God provides a sort of complementary structure to the proposal in Faith, 
Theology and Imagination that would be requisite for any constructive development of a 
McIntyrian doctrine of God.  This leads to the final chapter of this thesis that examines how 
these structure might work together in order to make constructive progress along these 
lines, including criteria for evaluating any such attempt. 
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Chapter 7: Imagination and God 
 
 At this juncture, we are moving beyond an interpretation of McIntyre and an 
evaluation of his work.  What is being offered is a constructive reading of McIntyre.  In this 
thesis I have argued that imagination is the central theme that allows McIntyre’s theology to 
be read as a cohesive whole; I have shown how imagination is developed in Faith, Theology 
and Imagination and the ‘Shape of’ books, and I have indicated what is missing from a full 
development of McIntyre’s theological system. 
 What I am arguing now is that by a rigorous development and application of 
McIntyre’s concept of imagination it is possible to both fill in the gaps of what is missing, in 
terms of creation and a doctrine of God, and provide additional consistency in language and 
method across the fields of meaning which McIntyre has already addressed. 
 
1. The Place of Imagination 
 Looking back to the summary of On the Love of God, it can be seen that McIntyre 
goes to great lengths to integrate the love of God with and in every area and aspect of 
theological inquiry.  It is the totality of God’s orientation toward humanity and in the totality of 
human orientation to God.  As such, love is not and should not be a concept that can be 
replaced by imagination or any other concept for that matter.  This is, of itself, an imaginative 
approach to and presentation of the theology of the love of God, but any re-interpretation of 
this love in terms of imagination would alter this narrative from concern to identification. 
 What must be understood is the fact this coup is not something that McIntyre has in 
mind.  The goal is not to replace the love of God, but instead to give an account of how it is 
that God loves.  Echoing the sentiment of the Psalmist asking, “Who are human beings that 
you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them?” the question becomes why is it 
that God loves people in the first place?1  It is in response to this question that McIntyre finds 
imagination helpful in that if God first imagines himself on the side of people, then it follows 
that a loving concern for and ultimately a loving identification with people would be the result. 
 In turn, we can also look back to the summary of Faith, Theology and Imagination.  In 
that summary, there are two accounts of imagination that McIntyre provides.  The first is the 
account along Barthian lines, in which McIntyre makes his initial argument for imagination 
being a divine perfection.  The second is McIntyre’s account of how to understand 
imagination as a divine perfection in relation to love as a divine perfection. 
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 This is a point at which I have been critical of McIntyre for a lack of precision in his 
language.  This is an uncommon accusation against him, and it is not one that can be used 
at many junctures.  Unfortunately, at this particular juncture there are aspects of what 
McIntyre is writing that are unclear.  What is clear is that McIntyre is trying to offer an 
account of imagination as a divine perfection that is very similar to Barth’s treatment of the 
divine perfections.  A key aspect of this understanding of divine perfections that McIntyre 
holds onto is the Barthian claim that God in his mercy is a “personal God [who] has a heart.  
He can feel, and be affected.”2  McIntyre sees imagination as a divine attribute as the way to 
defend this type of internal affectation.  Where it is easy to observe discrepancies from one 
account to the other in which one perfection initiates another, McIntyre is trying to illustrate 
not just that God loves but to offer an account of how God loves.  
 As such, Imagination offers a space in which this feeling and affectation can happen 
and in which God can be moved to love.  McIntyre’s elevation of the concept of imagination 
then is not a way of diminishing the love of God at all but is instead a way of providing 
insight into God’s love by seeing it in process and in action.   
 The function of this distinction finds analogous formulation in Jüngel’s Being Is in 
Becoming.  For Jüngel: 
 God’s placing of himself in relation (being as event) qualifies God’s act of  revelation 
 as love.  God acts as the loving one in that he wills to be ours.  But since his being as 
 Father, Son, and Holy Spirit God is already ours in advance, then in analogy to God’s 
 relationship ad extra, it must follow from the  relation of God’s three modes of being to 
 one another that God acts as the loving one.3 
 
McIntyre instead would say that it is imagination that qualifies God’s act of revelation as 
love.  He imagines himself in relation to us according to the love that he has already given 
both externally to us and internally among the persons of the trinity.  Thus imagination 
replaces what Barth and Jüngel in turn called the ‘primal decision’ of God which is God’s 
‘election of grace.’  God’s free imagining of himself on the human side leads to God’s 
election of humanity, which in turn leads to the continued fulfillment of the imaginative God 
who further imagines himself in the works of creation, incarnation, salvation, and the sending 
of the Holy Spirit.  Thus the internal and external realities of God’s imagination are manifest. 
 In short, it is the self-imagining of the Son by the Father that leads to the love of the 
Son, and the self-imagining of the Spirit by the Father and the Son that leads to the love that 
they share in emperichoretic union.  This same imagining is then made manifest in the 
sending of the Son and the Spirit to humanity to concretely establish this relation that always 
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was, in the here and now of time and space.  In this way it becomes appropriate to speak of 
the Son and the Spirit as the self-imagining of God, even in the acts of incarnation and the 
sending of the Holy Spirit.  These acts are the imagining (as event) of who God has always 
imagined himself to be eternally as Father, Son, and Spirit. 
 It is this understanding of imagination that provides the framework for moving beyond 
a vague notion of imagination as a theological category to a developed doctrine of God in 
terms of imagination to a concept that can be worked out further in the areas of theology that 
McIntyre addressed: Creation, Christology, Soteriology, and Pneumatology.  The tenets and 
conditions of this framework can by systematized into the following claims: 
 i. Imagination in God is primary in God’s being.  Thus imagination is the locus and 
 beginning of all of God’s attributes and perfections including God’s love and God’s 
 freedom.   
  
 ii. Imagination in God is primary in God’s action.  Thus imagination in God is the 
 locus and beginning of God’s loving, God’s creating, the incarnation, God’s act of 
 salvation, and the sending of the Holy Spirit. 
  
 iii. Imagination as the locus and beginning of God’s love as both being and act is the 
 locus and beginning of God’s concern for, commitment to, communication with, 
 community among, involvement in, and identification with people, and indeed all of 
 his creation. 
  
 iv. Imagination in people then is the primary expression of the imago Dei in them, in 
 which Imagination is a meta-rational concept, which is prior to ratio, which is the 
 locus and beginning of all human knowing.  This includes all knowledge about and 
 knowledge of God.   
  
 v. Imagination is the locus and beginning of all human responses to God in which 
 God’s loving Imagination is shared in the ethical engagement of the self with an 
 other, and in which people love God by means of that love by which he first 
 imaginatively loved them. 
 
This provides a systematic presentation of what is meant by imagination in McIntyre.  If we 
are going to read him systematically, we must apply these claims in order to demand 
consistency from McIntyre throughout his treatments of creation, Christology, soteriology, 
and Pneumatology.  These systematized claims offer an understanding of who God is that 
first reflects McIntyre’s own understanding of the love of God and secondly outlines how this 
imaginative understanding of God’s love serves to inform the formulation of doctrines of 
creation, Christology, soteriology and Pneumatology in terms of imagination. 
 With this synthesis firmly in place, we can return to the concept of imagination as a 
theological category and trace it through from its beginning in the being of God through to 





 This process begins with Creation.  Creation, while not a theme that McIntyre takes 
up in the ‘Shape of’ books, is the first locus of imagination as a theological category that 
follows from his defense of imagination as a divine attribute and divine perfection.  McIntyre 
begins his section on creation by first offering an evaluation of the traditional three-fold 
formula of that doctrine: Creatio ex nihilo, Creatio per Verbum, and Creatio continua.    
 On the one hand, this formula is a correct description of the Christian doctrine of 
creation.  God is said to create out of nothing, if only to eliminate the possibility of an eternal 
material existence diminishing the eternally pre-existent nature of God, or worse pre-dating 
an ancient but not eternal God.  By saying that God creates out of nothing both of these 
negative possibilities are eliminated.   
 God is also said to create by his word.  This is largely derivative of the formula in the 
first account of creation in Genesis 1, where the pattern of “God said, let there be… and 
there was.”  This of course does much to highlight the authority and Lordship of God over all 
creation in that it comes into existence not by his hard labor, or by the management of the 
hosts of heaven, but by the words of his mouth.  This does however seem to overlook other 
key points of the texts presenting the work of creation.  For instance, in the first account, 
God rests on the seventh day, an act that seems to suggest that even in creating by the 
word of his mouth, creation is an act of taxing toil and labor.  Similarly, in the second account 
of creation in Genesis 2, there is the making of Adam out of the dust of the earth and Eve 
out of the flesh of Adam.  If the making of people is meant to be understood as the work of 
creation, it should be noted that this creation is not described in the same terms of Creatio 
per Verbum.  However, this has also been taken up as a way to relate Christ to the work of 
creation in response to this language being closely associated with the prologue to John’s 
gospel.   
 The function of Creatio Continua is merely meant to reject any notion that God 
abandons his creation after his initial work.  This later became the position of the Deists, who 
affirmed that “when [God] first created the world, God left it to its own devices and withdrew 
into the solitude of his own being.”4  This came to be represented by the analogy of the 
watchmaker who makes the clock, winds the clock, and then leaves it because his work is 
done.  Creatio Continua rejects this notion by affirming that God continues to be involved in 
and with his creation and that this aspect of the work of creation is an ongoing process.  
 For McIntyre it is a true but empty formula, and he cites Barth’s own frustration that 
“within the sphere of ideas possible to us, creatio ex nihilo can appear only as an 
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absurdity… We have no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God as 
Creator can be accessible to us.”5  However, McIntyre is not so quick to dismiss the 
impossibility of finding an analogy.  He sees imagination as a way to side-step the formulaic 
presentation of the doctrine of creation and to reinvigorate it with new verbiage that 
acknowledges the role that imagination plays in any understanding of creative work.  His 
simple solution is to affirm this in God, claiming, “God’s creative action is consummately 
imaginative.”6   
 Once again, the concept of logical priority proves helpful in moving this towards a 
more systematic account of what McIntyre is proposing and provides a means of 
supplementing the traditional account of creation rather than by supplanting it.  To do so, it 
must first be said that these aspects of the work of creation (Creatio ex nihilo, Creatio per 
Verbum, and Creatio continua) are predicated by the imagination of God, the same 
imagination by which the heart of God is stirred to love.  Thus even these vacuous formulae 
are capable of being seen in a new light. 
 To simply restate the first formula, it could be said: God imagines all of this out of 
nothing.  Doing so places emphasis on the fact that God imagines all of this.  This is the 
primary statement.  The concept of ex nihilo is relegated to a secondary role that only adds 
wonder to the spectacular uniqueness of this imagining.  The all of this is simply a reference 
to all of the places and instances that we find the beautiful, wondrous, majestic, spectacular, 
creative, and imaginative in the world around us. 
 In a similar way, to restate the second formula, it could be said:  God creates through 
the fullness of the imagination of the Triune God.  Thus the work of creation is not simply the 
dictated commands of God on high.  It is the ever involved and involving work of God as 
Father, Son, and Spirit.  The authority of God is not diminished in this statement, and the 
suggestion that the Son as Word is present and active in creation is not abandoned.  
Instead, the work of God is enriched in an understanding of it as more than just the spoken 
word or the result of divine procession.  It is God speaking, but it is also God forming and 
molding.  It is God speaking, but it is also God creatively, lovingly, and imaginatively 
engaged in every detail of the glorious creation.  It is every scent, texture, sound, taste, and 
sight; because the fullness of God’s imaginative power has been exercised in its making. 
Additionally, it offers a corrective to what McIntyre identified as a serious oversight, that of 
the Holy Spirit being widely absent from formulations of the doctrine of creation.   
 The fact that God continues in this work of creation should then be obvious.  To 
restate this formula, with imagination given its proper place, it could be said: the imagination 
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of God is directed towards continual concern for, involvement in, and identification of himself 
with his creation.  In other words, God’s imagination has stirred the heart of God to a loving 
disposition to all that he has made, because he loved that creation in the first instance 
before it even came to be.  This lovingly concerned involvement in and with his creation 
takes on a whole new life that is concerned with more than keeping the clock ticking or the 
world spinning on its axis.  The continued work of creation is opened up to the surprising, 
unexpected, and truly imaginative works of God that culminate in the sending of the Son and 
Spirit into the world that he made. 
 There is one further formula that is related to creation that McIntyre does not treat 
directly in the context of creation, but is equally important to a constructive outworking of his 
approach to this doctrine.  That is the doctrine of the imago Dei.  It must be said that in the 
basic pattern that McIntyre follows, creation is the source of human imagination and that 
imagination is intended to be the prime aspect of the image of God.  This God-given, human 
capacity for imagination places us in a unique position within the creation as both creatures 
who are a part of the creation and a creatures, by nature of this capacity, capable of being 
observers of this creation while still within it.  Simply put, by nature of our having an 
imagination, we are capable of seeing what God has done and appreciating it. 
 Thus in a unique way the creation was meant for us.  That is to say that the creation 
is not simply meant to provide a suitable environment for our existence, or to provide us with 
the necessary resources to survive and thrive in it.  Instead it was meant for our seeing, our 
understanding, and our appreciation.  We are the observers, spectators, viewers, and 
connoisseurs of the world around us that God has made.  We were meant to see it and 
appreciate it.   
 The question then becomes: What were we meant to see?  Surely, this must tell us 
something about the God who created it, who created it as it is, and who created it for our 
viewing.  Surely, this must tell us something about who we are meant to be in this creation, 
given that we have a unique perspective on what it is we are seeing as imaginative viewers.  
This is certainly part of the conclusion that McIntyre has in mind when he refers back to 
Aquinas’ claim that God is known per ea quae facta sunt.7  That God would be known in his 
creation is an obvious fact. 
 Thus it would be absurd to hold to a doctrine that God created an observable world, 
placed people in it capable of observation, and yet deny that God intended for them to see 
something.  In uncharacteristically impassioned tones McIntyre writes: 
 This is the kind of God with whom we have to do, who spreads forth beauty in such a 
 lavish profusion.  Our long-sustained strictures on natural theology, our almost 
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 pathological unwillingness to allow any way from the world around us to the God who 
 created it, have together almost succeeded in killing within us any perception of the 
 character of God as it is revealed in the beauty about us.8 
 
For McIntyre this begins with the task of extricating concerns about natural theology from the 
formulation of the doctrine of creation. 
 However, this brings us back to the point about the imago Dei.  Along with an 
acknowledgement that knowledge of God is present in the work of creation, there must also 
be an acknowledgment of the fact that people are indeed capable of seeing and interpreting 
the creation in just such a light.  At a fundamental level, this includes the ability to see God in 
works of his imagination.  This is true whether that is in God’s self-imagination as Son and 
Spirit or in the act of loving imagination that is creation in all of its beauty and splendor. 
 If we again place imagination in a place of priority, traditional notions of the aspects 
of the image of God in people are relegated to secondary, if not tangential roles.  If we say 
that imagination is indeed the content of the image of God, then it is also being said that 
being made in the image of God is not merely a matter of human intelligence, rationality, or 
even cognizance.  Instead, a simple statement of being made in the image of God could be 
restated as: God has made us with his imagination, so that we can see him as he intends to 
be seen by us.   
 This changes the entire dynamic of what it means to be made in God’s image.  To be 
made in God’s image becomes a matter of God making us in such a way as to be directed 
toward him.  Further, this inclination is not about human ability at all.  It is about God’s 
intention for us, namely to see him as he wants to be seen, or in seeing him as he intends 
for us to see him. 
 This change in dynamic has the added benefit of offering an account of being made 
in the image of God in terms of faculties that can be severely limited.  Some people are not 
intelligent, and that is not and should not ever be a barrier to salvation or our understanding 
of it.  Some people have severe handicaps that limit their ability to process information and 
make rational decisions.  Such limitations are not and should not be understood as barriers 
to anything that God offers of himself to those he created in his image.  Putting the image of 
God in terms of intelligo and ratio cannot evade such questions arising.  When instead the 
verbiage of imagination becomes the defining aspect of that image, all people are equally in 
need of God’s intent to be seen and dependent upon the imagination he has given them. 
 Recognizing creation in this fuller sense, as an act of imagination, and understanding 
the human place in the creation as both creature and as those capable of appreciating what 
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 Imagination as a theological category in the field of Christology is something that 
McIntyre develops more fully in Faith, Theology and Imagination and The Shape of 
Christology, but there are also very helpful ideas that can be drawn from his earlier work, 
The Christian Doctrine of History.  These together provide a framework for a robust 
Christology in terms of imagination.  This is largely due to the significant role that McIntyre 
saw the locus of Christology playing in his understanding of God as imaginative.  McIntyre 
wrote in Faith, Theology and Imagination: I know of no better argument for placing 
imagination at the heart of God’s dealings with us than the single, unique, unpredicted and 
unpredictable event of the incarnation.9  In many ways, this is the starting point for McIntyre 
in the process of developing imagination as a theological category. 
 Thus if one accepts my claims that McIntyre’s concept of imagination must be 
integrated with and developed into the doctrine of God, there is first and foremost the 
challenge to relate imagination not only to a theological method but also to the content of 
theology itself.  In the realm of Christology imagination must first and foremost be 
understood in relation to the incarnation as itself a work of God’s imagination.  This idea is a 
notion that can be found in the scriptural affirmation that Christ “is the image of the invisible 
God.”10  The incarnation then is the primary way in which God gives an image and an icon of 
himself.  It is the means by which the invisible and eternal God is made visible in time and 
space.  It is the way that God imagines himself.  More explicitly, it is the way that God 
imagines himself in relation to people. 
 For McIntyre, this is the premise of all Christological inquiry.  It supersedes notions of 
Christological doctrine, including classical definitions of who Christ is, even Chalcedon.  
Christ incarnate first exists as an outworking of God’s eternal imagination before he can be 
understood in terms of dual natures and hypostatic union.  No category of ontology and no 
product of experience can ever diminish the incarnation as a supreme expression of God’s 
imaginative love. 
 In this way the incarnation is the way that God makes himself known to people.  
While this is not an idea exclusive to McIntyre, the function of this revelation is distinctly 
shaped by imagination.  For McIntyre, the incarnation is the way that God represents himself 
to people.  It is a divine communication not simply as word and not formed by preconceived 
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notions of humanity, but it is instead God himself in a shape and image that can be received 
and seen.  God’s revelation then is removed from the realm of abstraction by the very fact 
that this revelation is not the revelation of an unknowable God.  It is instead God in a 
knowable form.  It is God making himself known in a way that can be known simply and by 
all people.    
 In this way, imagination, before it can be understood in terms of human knowing of 
God, must first be understood in terms of God’s self-imagination in Christ.  This self-
imagination moves beyond the realm of what Ian Ramsey called “picturing models.”11  This 
is not simply a matter of Christ being a model of God in miniature.  However, it is not simply 
a matter of what Ramsey terms “a disclosure model,”12 or what Max Black before him 
termed an “analogue model.”13  That is to say that it moves beyond the isomorphism of 
Black’s concept of analogy, and it moves beyond being a mere “structural echo,” as Ramsey 
states it.  To put it more plainly Christ must share more with God than a mere similarity or 
imitation, as is true of an isomorphism; and Christ must be more than the subsequent echo 
of God’s involvement in the world, as Christ is more directly given that an echo or resonance 
and is more truly God than this terminology would allow or suggest. 
 God’s imagining of himself in Christ must transcend all notions of shortcoming that 
these ideas of imagination and modeling must maintain as merely methodological devices.  
This imagining, as a self-imagining, maintains a true likeness that is directly due to the will of 
the one who desires to be imagined.  While God may not always be rightly understood from 
this imagining of himself, this is in no way the fault of God who not only imagines himself in 
Christ but also is himself in Christ. 
 This connection between the one who is imagining and the one who is being 
imagined as being both one and the same and yet distinct creates a link between that which 
is being imagined and that which is real.  This real existence of that which is imagined, in the 
case of the incarnation, moves beyond any aspect of description that is usually found in 
concepts of models as a means of imagination.  Thus for McIntyre, it must always be “God in 
Jesus Christ” and no longer “God in his revelation” that is the subject of dogmatics.14 
 Unfortunately, this level of certainty and the connectedness between what is 
imagined and the reality which it imagines is something that is not a clearly evident when the 
self-imagination of God in Christ must in turn be understood by means of imagination as a 
human faculty.  In offering shape to this process of imagining and knowing, one must 
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address three key points.  First, there is the source of human imagination.  Second, there is 
the process of human imagination.  Third, there is the product of that imagination and 
imagining.   
 To address the first point, if one again begins with the doctrine of God in which 
imagination is a primary category of God’s own existence, which has been formulated 
above, one must also accept the claim that imagination is the primary way in which the 
image of God in humanity is manifest by means of imagination.  Simply put the source of 
human imagination is God’s own imagination, and God’s own imagination is present in the 
image of God with which God imbues humanity as his creation.  It is this fact that grounds 
human imagination in a reality that is beyond that type of speculative imagination that is 
often disregarded as being a flight of fancy.  This faculty of imagination is rooted and 
grounded in God’s own being and self.  In the same way, this faculty of imagination is 
sanctified and made holy by its source; and it is this sanctification of the imagination that 
makes it a fit and proper means by which people can know God. 
 To address the second point, the process by which this imagining and knowing of 
God takes place can be explained in terms that are both simple and complex.  In the first 
instance, the knowing of a person is infinitely easier than the knowing of God.  So, in its 
most simple form, knowing God in Christ is made possible by God being in the knowable 
human form with which all people are accustomed.  It is this simplicity to which John refers 
in the first epistle when he writes, “We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we 
have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our 
hands, concerning the word of life.”15  Christ here is known in the simple, visible, and 
tangible life that he lived. 
 However, this process of knowing God is complicated in two key ways.  First, people 
today do not benefit from this real, tangible and visible existence in the same way that John 
and his fellow contemporaries did.  Secondly, there is the understanding that knowledge of 
other people is not always so simple. 
 The first problem is primarily a historical problem.  This historical problem of knowing 
Christ is something that was always an interest of McIntyre’s, and it is this problem that is 
the primary motivation for his work The Christian Doctrine of History.  What is significant in 
the way that McIntyre understands these problems is that he is not only concerned with the 
limitations of historical knowledge.  In fact, he is quite opposed to an overly skeptical 
approach to history.  Rather than focusing on the challenges of knowing Christ in relation to 
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distance from the event, the reliability and accuracy of sources, et cetera; McIntyre focuses 
on the uniqueness of the historicity of Christ as a point, act, and time of fulfillment.   
 The fact for McIntyre is that the incarnation within a Christian doctrine of history must 
be understood in terms of fulfillment.  While there are aspects of this historical instance that 
can and should be understood in the same terms as all history and should in turn be 
approached through the same approaches as all history, there are aspects of the incarnation 
that are historical in a theological rather than chronological sense.  However, this sense of 
fulfillment should not be limited to an understanding of the incarnation as being the 
culmination of messianic expectation.  This fulfillment is both retrospective and prospective.  
It fulfills not only the past but also the future.  It fulfills what has been promised in the 
Messiah, in that Jesus is the Messiah; but it also fulfills the perfect will of God to be united 
with humanity which point to a salvation that supersedes any notion of what was expected of 
Jesus as Christ.  Thus the incarnation must also be understood in terms of: forgiveness, 
reconciliation, identification, and victory.16   
 The second problem is both epistemological and psychological.  It raises questions 
about what it means to know another person and how one can come to know a person in 
that way; and it raises questions about the human capacity to access the psyche of another 
person and the ability of a person to disclose their psyche to another person.  It is this 
psychological aspect of personhood that has also been used to highlight the challenges of a 
contemporary understanding of Chalcedon, thus it is highly consequential within this 
discussion of Christology.   
 The third point is related to the product of this imagination and imagining.  The point 
here is an acknowledgment of the limitations and benefits of the conclusions derived from 
this method.  The limitations of this method are rooted in the acknowledgment that as 
products of imagination the conclusions of this method are limited in their authority and in 
their normative function.  The products of this method are not intended to have authority 
over the conclusions of other methods or indeed over other products of this same 
imaginative method.  They can still have a normative function, but this normative function is 
not a matter of authority but instead of continuity and fittingness.  These conclusions can 
have a normative function that influences the outcomes of other explorations and 
conclusions in theology insofar as they offer a perspective on what is fitting within a broader 
imaginative context.  Conclusions of this sort should not be in opposition to one another but 
instead should offer constructive and complimentary perspectives that offer collaborative 
insight into a particular subject or area.  In this way the conclusions of even disparate lines 
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of imaginative inquiry can shape each other by means of this normative function of 
imaginative fittingness. 
 This, I would argue, offers a healthy perspective of humility to the conclusions of all 
lines of theological inquiry when faced with the supremacy and unfathomable expansiveness 
of the character and nature of God.  However, dwelling on this limitation has its dangers and 
challenges.  It would be easy to be overwhelmed by the fallibility and futility of such 
exercises.  This is where the benefits of the imaginative method are found.  By 
acknowledging the limitations of these conclusions there is an increased acceptance that the 
conclusions of this method will be limited and that when images are used in exclusion they 
will eventually prove to be wrong when the analogy eventually breaks down.17  The point of 
the exercise becomes to know God better, even if that knowledge increases only by the 
smallest of increments.  It is freeing to know that all answers do not need to be provided but 
that the small insight provided by the development and exposition of any image old or new 
has real and significant impact on human knowledge of God as a whole.  It is a holy 
boldness that dares to know God, despite the impossibility of such a task. 
 Ultimately, these challenges re-introduce many, though not all, of the difficulty found 
in knowing the unknowable God.  Once again there is both a simple and complex approach 
to such a question.  Jesus’ assertion to his disciples in the upper room discourse is “If you 
have seen me, you have seen the Father.”18  However, how it is that God can be known in, 
with, by, and through this person is one of the great mysteries of the Christian faith; and the 
answer is one that has engendered a significant body of speculation and formulation. 
By the remoteness of history and by the frailty of human understanding in regards to 
knowing things in history, the knowable icon of God becomes remote and unknowable once 
again.  However, the fact that God has imagined himself in Christ makes a re-imagining of 
Christ in the here and now a possible task.  This task though must always then be shaped 
by the limits of imagination by which people come to know God in the icon in whom God 
intended himself to be known.  In this way the theological schizophrenia of the simple 
and complex are reconciled: this is the way in which we know that when we have 




                                                        
17 This breakdown is inherent to any approach that incorporates any analogy, because all analogies 
breakdown at some point.  Otherwise, the analogy would be the thing itself and not an analogy of a thing.  
The very nature of an analogy is that it is not the same thing as that which it is analogous to. 
18 John 14:9. 
156 
 
4. Soteriology  
 Imagination as a theological category in the field of soteriology is unique in that, as 
McIntyre himself observes, “…the use of images, and by implication imagination, is almost 
universal in accounts of the atonement.”19  Here, McIntyre is referring to the evocative 
images of ransom, reconciliation, sacrifice, atonement, propitiation, salvation, redemption, 
Christus Victor, satisfaction, vicarious penitence, moral example, and revelation. They are 
imaginative interpretations, as McIntyre might have later termed them, to the problem of how 
the God-Man saves. 
 However, to truly understand imagination as a theological category of soteriology, it 
must first be understood how the work of salvation is an act of God’s imagination.  There are 
three things that must be understood about the field of soteriology and McIntyre’s particular 
treatment of it: the freedom of God to act, his identification with humanity and for their 
salvation, and the forgiveness that God offers in that salvation.  
 First, it should always be understood that salvation is something that God freely 
chooses to do.  This is not something that God must do, needs to do, or is compelled to do.  
God’s absolute freedom is maintained.  This is true from the very earliest treatments of 
salvation and atonement as a doctrinal subject.  For instance, Anselm spends more time 
defending God’s freedom and reconditioning concepts of necessitas in order to clarify that 
God is not obligated or bound to this work, even by his own nature and character.  This 
vigorous defense is something that remains a hallmark condition of this field of theology.  
This is why Barth refers to this as God’s ‘primal decision’, that is a decision not conditioned 
or predicated by any other decision or act of God.  In Jüngel’s terminology it is the first act of 
God’s becoming in which God becomes the saving God that he always was.  God does not 
make the decision because of his nature and character, but instead God is further defined 
and confirmed in his nature and character by this decision to save. 
 Second, for McIntyre, identification is the basis upon which the whole of the doctrine 
of atonement rests.20  Without God’s identification with us there would be no atonement and 
no salvation.  For him it is a pervasive notion that bridges the full spectrum of theological 
models and theological perspectives, and it is a term that recurs frequently and prominently 
in his thought.  It is introduced in The Christian Doctrine of History, finds its fullest 
development in On The Love of God, it is descriptive of what God is doing in the incarnation 
and the sending of the Spirit, but it is here in the field of soteriology that it finds its most 
direct application. 
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 In Faith, Theology and Imagination it is a concept that McIntyre only briefly mentions 
the term in his outline of imagination as a theological category of the atonement.  However, it 
is widely employed in the eventual expansion of this outline in The Shape of Soteriology; 
and it is heavily featured some of McIntyre’s most impassioned passages on the role of love 
effecting our salvation, in On the Love of God. 
 The basic idea, traditionally located in the language of 2 Corinthians 5:21, is that 
Christ becomes sin for us, so that “in him we might become the righteousness of God.”21  
McIntyre chooses to focus on the story of Jesus’ baptism by John.  Here, Jesus chooses to 
be baptized in order “to fulfill all righteousness” despite John’s protestation that instead it is 
he that is in need of baptism.22 For McIntyre, in choosing to partake of the baptism of 
repentance that is offered by John, Jesus is firmly identifying himself with sinners.  It is an 
identification that bookends his ministry by beginning with his baptism and culminating in his 
death with sinners “outside the gate.”23  As he concludes in The Shape of Soteriology, 
“Jesus identified himself with the criminals, the rejects, all sinners at the point of their utmost 
dereliction and distance from God.  He bore their griefs; he carried their sorrow; he 
descended into hell.”24 
 However, identification is never an isolated concept in McIntyre’s thinking.  Instead, it 
is the culmination and fulfillment of all of the other aspects of the love of God: concern, 
commitment, communication, community, involvement, and identification.  In it the concern 
of God for us has “coalesced” out of the abstract sentiment “in One Who is the God-man.”25  
His communication ceases to be sign and symbol; it ceases to be about meaning and 
interpretation.  Instead, “the word and its meaning, the sign and the symbolised, the event 
and its significance have all become one” in Jesus Christ and his real, factual act on the 
cross.26  The boundaries between God and people being in community are rendered 
irrelevant by Christ being on our side and one with us.  Finally, Christ was so involved “with 
the sinful nature that He had taken, and with the sorrow and suffering of humanity that He 
atoned for the one in the profoundest depths of the other”27 
 As the fulfillment of this profound account of the love of God, the identification of God 
with us is a profound act of risk and hazard on the part of God, who opens himself up to 
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every chance at being misunderstood and rejected.  Even to the point, as McIntyre daringly 
claims, of Christ taking on our sinful nature.28  Thus: 
 His identification with sinners was… so obviously final and complete, that  for them 
 [sinners] the issue was closed.  But there is another side to involvement and 
 identification, to the self-veiling that took place even at the centre of the revelation: is 
 that it is only love of this supreme kind which could take this apparently suicidal risk 
 and emerge triumphant.29 
 
McIntyre in turn concludes from this total assumption of our sinful human nature and the 
totality of Christ’s triumph, despite every hazard, that atonement in this vein cannot be 
thought of as limited in any way.  It leads him to hope that those previously “placed in what 
you might call the dust-bin of damnation are wrongly so regarded.”30  In terms of an 
elect/reject spectrum McIntyre argues that those deemed rejected are still subject to the 
terms of elect and reject.  It is not an affirmation of universalism, nor can it be rejected on 
those grounds.  Instead, it is an affirmation that the appeal of the gospel is applicable to the 
most reprobate, for there will never be one more damned than Christ in his identification with 
us.  Limited atonement “prematurely and with insufficient evidence, reconciles the damnation 
of so many with not only the love, but also the justice and the judgment of God.”31 
 The third and final aspect of imagination as a theological category in soteriology that 
will be examined here is that of forgiveness.  It is easily forgotten that the fact that God’s 
salvific acts result in our forgiveness is not a given and is instead a surprising and 
imaginative act on the part of God.  The first part of this surprising work is that God does not 
simply offer forgiveness apart from the onerous task of incarnation and the suffering of the 
cross.  The second is that there is nothing prior to Christ to indicate that this would be God’s 
course of action in offering us forgiveness.  For McIntyre “wherever and whenever God 
offers to men and women his forgiveness… that forgiveness springs from a love that is 
costly.  At no point say, in the previous history of Israel, could he be conceived of as 
forgiving, other than at the cost of that cross” and that it is always a “forgiveness which is 
both freely offered to us, and which is costly to God.”32 
 This is the challenge that is posed to formulations within the field of soteriology: that 
they are in danger of, when worked to their logical conclusions, making “it appear that 
forgiveness on God’s part [is] no longer either necessary or possible.”33  Either God has 
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already done all that is necessary for our salvation by accomplishing what was ‘necessary’, 
or in so doing render God incapable of further action for our forgiveness.  For McIntyre then 
the free act of God’s forgiveness must be defended in such formulations by formulating them 
and interpreting them as “as portraying to us, through these [various] images, the way in 
which forgiveness works…. how forgiveness is appropriated…. and represent the terms in 
which we proclaim the Gospel of salvation by Jesus Christ.”34 
 In this way, imagination also has a role as a theological category in our knowing, 
understanding, and experiencing salvation.  In terms of knowing and understanding the work 
of salvation, it begins with the various models.  As has already been discussed at length, 
there is the methodological aspect of first formulating models and of relating the models to 
one another in a logical field of meaning.  In regards to content, it is a matter of seeing the 
field as a whole, evaluating the value of each model in their unique and unifying aspects 
within that field, and in finding value in both the individual models and in the whole.   
 However, for McIntyre the introduction of forgiveness introduces an aspect that must 
be a component of the field of soteriology as a whole and an aspect of each model.  
McIntyre presents these various models as relating to each other in ways that are 
complimentary and help each other provide a more diverse nuanced image of what God 
accomplishes in our salvation.  Forgiveness, however, is the only term of salvation that 
escapes this categorization as an aspect of atonement.  Instead, forgiveness is the one true 
thing that holds all of the images together.  Whether God saves, reconciles, ransoms, et al., 
what God certainly does is forgive. 
 A model without forgiveness fails to be a model of salvation at all, because without 
forgiveness there is no possibility of our salvation.  The fact remains though that the scope 
of forgiveness in light of the models, especially as McIntyre see them in concert with one 
another, is vast.  Thus: 
 One of the reasons for emphasising the importance of having all of the ingredients of 
 the nuclear event which is the death of Christ presented in the description of the 
 foundation and possibility of forgiveness, is that the different models, in addition to 
 being components in the event, also lay out the paths which men and women are to 
 follow to find their way to that forgiveness.35 
 
It is this kerygmatic element that for McIntyre has preserved the place and role of images in 
the formulation of this doctrine, saved it from “aniconastic thought” and prevented it from 
being “conceptualised into ineffectuality.”36  The point though is that this is the aim of 
imagination and the models are not limited to knowing and understanding forgiveness. 
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 The aim and goal, on the human side, is to be led to forgiveness and to receive it.  In 
turn it is through the “means of forgiveness” that the loving identification of God takes 
place.37  Thus it is the point of contact between the act of God’s imagining and our imagining 
of him.  It is in this that all of the fruits of forgiveness are made available to us.  In being 
forgiven our “sin is wiped” and “so, too, our guilt.”38  Thus our encounter with the loving 
imagination of God in his identification with us is a radical re-orientation of ourselves to God 
in a forgiveness that can “re-make the past, in the present and for the future.”39  This radical 
re-orientation results in the “restoration of fellowship with God” that constitutes our freedom 
to participate in: 
…a whole range of sustaining activities- of prayer and worship, of daily dedicated 
and obedient discipleship, a continuing sensitivity to the fact that forgiveness has to 
be constantly sought and acceptance constantly acknowledged, and through all in 
all, the entreaty that God should provide his Spirit as the only Lord and Giver of life, 
who will make such discipleship and friendship daily possibilities and realities.40 
 
However, forgiveness also calls for an outward imagination “to those about us” in 
participating in the divine life and work of God by “the mediation of forgiveness.”41  As such, 
we are not only offering our forgiveness to those around us for wrongs against us but also 
offering the forgiveness of God for all of their sins.  This in turn requires our own task of 
imagining, in not only seeing God on our side but in seeing ourselves on his. 
 
5. Pneumatology 
 The final locus of imagination as a theological category in McIntyre’s presentation is 
the Holy Spirit.  To begin, the function of imagination as a category within the field of 
Pneumatology follows a similar patter to that within the field of Christology.  In the same way 
that Christ is the image of the Father and thus his begetting and incarnation are acts of 
God’s imagination, so to the Holy Spirit is the self-imagination of God in his eternal 
procession from the Father and the Son and in the sending of the Spirit by the Father and 
the Son to the church at Pentecost.   
 This is a claim that finds full expression in McIntyre’s first treatment of Pneumatology 
in terms of imagination in in Faith, Theology and Imagination, which carries over into The 
Shape of Pneumatology is that “The Holy Spirit is God’s imagination set loose and working 
with all the freedom of God in the world, and in the lives, the words and action of the men 
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and women of our time.”42  It is the claim that, in my mind, comes the closest of any 
theological statement to Jesus’ words to Nicodemus “The wind blows where it chooses, and 
you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes.  So it is 
with everyone who is born of the Spirit.”43  It is a claim that encapsulates all of the 
spontaneity and possibility that characterizes the complex, sporadic, and indeed surprising 
instances that the Spirit is present and at work. 
 As has already been noted, what McIntyre has done in terms of methodology is to 
group and collate an impressively diverse and varied amount of data about the person and 
role of the Spirit in the scriptural texts and in theological formulation into various moulds and 
fields of polarity.  What remains is to reformulate the function and roles of the Spirit in terms 
of them being expressions of this divine imagination set loose in the world and in our lives. 
 The basic frame though that McIntyre provides in Faith, Theology and Imagination 
and the Sitz em Leben that significantly influences his definition of imagination as a 
theological category of Pneumatology is based on two distinct trajectories of contemporary 
theological formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
 McIntyre first notes a conservative trajectory of pneumatological considerations along 
the lines of Barth’s two-fold presentation of the Holy Spirit in which the Spirit is both at work 
in revealing God in the life of believers and is also working in the lives of all to prepare the to 
receive the gift of salvation as it is “offered to us by a gracious God.”44  However, McIntyre 
here offers his own synthesis of these two ideas by saying “…the Holy Spirit is God from 
[below] meeting God from above, the God from within the sinful heart meeting the 
[transcendent] God coming down from heaven to be enfleshed, to suffer, to die and to be 
raised again, for the saving of men and women.  When these two meet, salvation is 
effected.”45 
 The other key expression of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit that McIntyre addresses in 
Faith, Theology and Imagination is the charismatic movement.  While McIntyre shares 
concerns about the charismatic movement, especially in sectarian divisions of its 
Pentecostal expressions, he is also quite apologetic in his treatment of the movement.  For 
one, McIntyre sees the transcendence of denominational barriers in the charismatic 
movement, while being controversial, as having a unifying aspect in creating common 
ground.  McIntyre’s apologetic is also informed by a caution in dismissing the work of the 
Spirit.  For him, this is an area that should be approached with wide tolerance.  He proposes 
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that “the charismatic movement is yet another demonstration of the Spirit’s acting 
imaginatively” and warns stonily that “We may do well not to fight against the movement lest 
we be found to find against God himself.”46   
 These two trajectories represent two interpretations of the work of the Spirit that have 
been set in competition with one another.  On the one hand, there is a theologically rich and 
sacramentally grounded approach that represents the culmination, though not necessarily a 
final one, of a long tradition of the church informed by classical Trinitarian definitions and the 
best of the reformed tradition.  On the other hand, there are these new and rich expressions 
that have highlighted the fact that God’s Spirit is present and active in ways that, while 
surprising and shocking to some, are in fact firmly grounded in the Scriptures, in a place no 
less foundational than Pentecost, and that open up new perspectives on the relational 
realities of being indwelt by the Holy Spirit of God.   
 The challenge that McIntyre undertakes in his multi-faceted approach is that of 
reconciling the fact that:  “What look like two disparate series of phenomena are in reality the 
different expressions of the one single Person of the Godhead, the Holy Spirit” and arguing 
further that it is the Spirit “whose characteristic activity, the opus ad extra, to which he is 
appropriated is imaginative creation in the spirits of believers and of unbelievers in whom he 
works according to God’s uncovenanted mercies.47 
 On the one hand there are the “traditional loci” and “traditional roles” (if we can call 
them that) of the Holy Spirit.  The Holy Spirit is located in the Trinity, is present in the work of 
the incarnation and in the work of the incarnate Christ, is operative in the outworking of 
salvation, especially when this goes on to affirm the process of sanctification, and there is an 
understanding that the Holy Spirit is present in the Sacraments.  Additionally, the Holy Spirit 
is understood to have a role in the interpretation of scripture, an ethical role, and a pastoral 
role.   
 On the other hand, there is an emphasis on the role of the Spirit in the mission of the 
church and in the spirituality of Christians that often ignores, or calls for the radical review 
and revision of, understandings of the Holy Spirit within the traditional loci. 
 The fact of course is that for McIntyre the Holy Spirit is present in all of these 
situations and is active in all of these roles.  To say that the Holy Spirit is present in the 
Eucharist and to say that the Holy Spirit is present in the speaking of tongues is not 
antithetical.  To say that the Holy Spirit is present in the reading and interpretation of 
scripture and to say that the Holy Spirit is present in one’s cathartic spiritual experience are 
not opposed.  To say that the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity who proceeds from 
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the Father and the Son, does not preclude that the Holy Spirit in the emperichoretic dance 
as the go between God.48  On the contrary, they are mutually integral to any understanding 
of the Holy Spirit that makes any serious effort at understanding the Holy Spirit as the Spirit 
is.    
 It is in the Epiklesis that the Holy Spirit is invoked as the prime agent both sanctifying 
the bread and wine and in administering it to us by grace.49  If God is the same yesterday, 
today, and forever then it should be no surprise that the gift of tongues should persist.  If it is 
“the function of the Spirit not to add another voice to Scripture, but in fact to facilitate the 
hearing of what Scripture itself has to say,” then is it not also possible that the Spirit can 
facilitate the hearing of what God has to say in silence and meditation?50  The church is a 
place for both confessional affirmation in community and for a real expectation that God will 
be present in and among his people as he draws us into his divine life by the Spirit. 
 This is why the relationship between the Holy Spirit and imagination is so important 
for McIntyre.  It serves as the place where God’s self-imagination and our imaginative 
reception of him connect.  Here the Holy Spirit is both present in the imaginative act of loving 
identification and also “stimulates, controls, and confirms the imagination in the part that it 
plays in the Christian life.”51  It is this extreme proximity that leads McIntyre to write that, 
Both the naturalisation of God and the deification of man are live possibilities in a 
situation in which God and man come so close to one another as they do in the 
presence of God with us in and through His Holy Spirit.  It is, then, no exaggeration 
to say that only this God could escape those contrasting perils.  So assuredly is He 
other than man, so completely his Creator, so unequivocally his Redeemer; so 
unalterable are the ultimate relations that hold between God and man; that when 
God elects in His own freedom to cross over to man’s side and complete the work 
begun  in the whole Incarnation, and identifies Himself with us in His Spirit, there is 
never any suggestion that this identification in any way nullifies any of the original 
relations.  In fact, it establishes them and secures them, and brings them home to us, 
with finality and decisiveness.52 
 
It is then the this convergence of proximity that in turn allows the imaginatively present Spirit 
to be both an expression of divine love and to “regulate what otherwise might become 
fantasy or extravagance.”53  
                                                        
48 This is a phrase by John Taylor in his book The Go Between God that McIntyre uses at length to discuss 
contemporary implications of emperichoresis. 
49 On the Love of God, 214. 
50 On the Love of God, 215. 
51 SOP, 271. 
52 On the Love of God, 214. 
53 SOP, 271.  It should also be noted that critics of imagination as a faculty in this regard, might see this 
possibility of fantasy as a reason to abandon imagination as an appropriate term.  However, as McIntyre 
points out here and elsewhere, to speak of knowing God by reason, intelligence, rationality, or any other 
faculty of cognitive function is equally susceptible to error and folly.  In either case, it is the Spirit who re-
directs our attention and serves as a corrective to our misguided notions. 
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 It is the Holy Spirit who mediates the historical nature of faith, in that it happens 
historically and happens in terms of history and fulfillment, and yet it is meant to be known 
and experienced personally.  It is imagination that enables us “to transcend our rootedness 
in time.”54  It is what allows us to be present in and enter into the events of the mighty acts of 
God in and among his people Israel; it is what allow is to walk alongside Jesus in his life and 
ministry; it is what allows us to join in the early uncertain days of the early church; and it is 
what allows our own experiences of faith to not be relegated to the past of our remembering 
but to act as ever present reminders of God’s presence in and with us. 
 Finally, it is the Holy Spirit who “uses the imagination to create space, that is space 
for ourselves, for each one of us.”55  It is a space that we need in the midst of a busy, taxing, 
and often worry filled world.  It is a space that is carved out to allow us silence in which to be 
and become who God wants us to be.  It is the space of spiritual experience, the space of 
meditation from which the walls of the world fall away.  It is the presence of the Spirit in this 
place that fills our human experiences of wonder, serenity, and vulnerability with the very 
presence of God. 
 Ultimately, for McIntyre these are not just aspects of who the Holy Spirit is and 
functions of what the Holy Spirit does.  They are parts of a whole that must be viewed, 
accepted, and indeed believed together.  Any omission of any of these parts diminishes our 
understanding of the Spirit and is a rejection of how God has imagined himself in the Spirit 
and his work.  Any doctrine of the Spirit that can affirm with enthusiasm the presence of God 
in the sacrament but precludes any possibility of God’s presence through charismatic 
experience does not understand the Spirit through whom they are partakers of Christ.  
However, an equally cautionary note is that any understanding of the Holy Spirit that 
celebrates charismatic experience but denies that God is and always has been present in 
the church throughout history in the sacraments slights the faithfulness of God to be present 
ever and always, not just in moments of ecstatic awareness.   
 Our imagination of the Spirit must take all aspects of the work of the Spirit into 
account.  For McIntyre, the frontier of this imaginative task is what he calls God’s 
“uncovenanted mercies.”  It is a term often used in terms of the Christians hopeful longing 
for the salvation of the world outside of the church and outside of our understanding of the 
New Covenant made in Christ.  However, McIntyre, cleverly, uses this in a broader sense to 
incorporate and affirm the experience of the Spirit in the charismatic movement.  The aim 
being that in affirming and confessing our unknowing, that is in acknowledging the fact that 
God is capable of acting and indeed does act in ways that we do not understand and do not 
                                                        
54 SOP, 274. 
55 SOP, 275. 
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fit our theological schema, we can find a way of accepting the full expression of the 
imagination of God in the Spirit that is more than capable of encompassing all of our sisters 
and brothers along with it.   
 
6. Summary 
 In summation, what separates McIntyre from his contemporaries in the realm of 
models and their implementation is that he both removes any connotative notion of their 
having any particular theological value in and of themselves in order to render them a purely 
methodological device and in turn uses them as a placeholder for the concept of imagination 
in his own writing.  This allows imagination to take a prominent place in his thought not 
merely as a methodological device and to instead to be a category of the theological content 
that he addresses. 
 As such, McIntyre’s concept of imagination is not, cannot, and should not be 
understood strictly in terms of method.  That is the function of models.  Imagination 
transcends its epistemological function and becomes located in the content of theology itself. 
 While McIntyre does not always apply this concept consistently his elevation of the 
prominence of imagination into the very existence of God dictates that imagination must 
have a logically primary position in order to have the influence that McIntyre claims for it, 
even if he is sometimes hesitant to do so himself.   
 By placing this concept of imagination in relation to McIntyre’s concept of the love of 
God, we are able to synthesize a position that allows McIntyre’s concept of imagination to 
function in a way that is reflective of the prominent position that McIntyre claims for it.  This 
in turn has a profound impact on the place the imagination has and the way that it operates 
as a category of theological fields across the frontier of theological inquiry. 
 If it is indeed God’s own imagination that stirs his heart to love both within himself in 
the intra-Trinitarian relations of the persons and in his love and loving acts ad extra then it 
follows that all of who God is and what God will be are marked by this imagination in the 
same way that the love of God pervades all of God’s being and action.  Thus the work of 
God’s loving imagination must be seen in the work and act of creation, and creation must be 
understood both in terms of the love that is exemplified in the caring act of creation and in 
terms of the immense imagination that brings it to life.  The incarnation becomes not merely 
an act of becoming flesh or of revelation but a profound act of God’s self-imagination and an 
act of pure love in God’s identification with us in this act of imagining himself with us and for 
our salvation. 
 Perhaps this loving self-imagination is epitomized in the absolute freedom of God to 
become all things to us and for us in the unencumbered work of the Holy Spirit, who is both 
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grace and the presence of Christ in the sacraments and the full expression of the 
charismata, the gracious gift of God himself in the lives of his people.  These are graces that 
are beyond our expectation, beyond our explanation, and beyond our understanding of God 
who remains absolutely free in the fullness of God’s imagination above and beyond all that 
we ask or think. 
 This is the overall impact of imagination i. becoming a category of theology ii. being 
rooted in the doctrine of God through a synthesis of McIntyre’s claims iii. being formulated 
into a systematic set of criteria iv. applied consistently in the fields of creation, Christology, 
soteriology, and Pneumatology.  Each of these fields are expanded by the facts that it is 
God’s own limitless imagination that is present, active and at work in them; and they are 
each seen in a new light as we see what God intends for us to see in them. 
 McIntyre earns the distinction of being the first, and to date, only theologian to 
formulate imagination as a divine perfection.  In this, McIntyre emerges as an innovator in a 
tradition of thought that includes Kant, Novalis, Schelling, and George MacDonald.  Not only 
does he claim a place in the development of the concept of imagination, but he also 
formulates a manner of applying that across the full spectrum of theological fields.  The 
insight and filter provided by the lens of the imagination allows him to hold an open view of 
Christology that is both inviting of and provides a foundation for further Christological 
formulation.  He has laid academic and theological foundations for Pentecostal and 
Charismatic expressions of the Holy Spirit to interact with and be mutually incorporated with 
traditional, sacramental understandings of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the church.  He 
has demonstrated to a generation of students the systematic compatibility and integration of 
soteriological models in a field long dominated by a mode of mutual exclusion. 
 This provides opportunities for significant growth from a McIntyrian theological 
perspective.  McIntyre’s contributions to Christology could prove increasingly helpful as 
additional pressure is placed on the Chalcedonian definition by contemporary and alternative 
Christology.  It is hard to imagine that his work on the Holy Spirit will not be a necessary ally 
if liturgical and sacramental churches are going to fully embrace the Spirit-filled worship he 
always hoped they would have.  It is possible to see McIntyre’s system as the basis for 
further developing other soteriological models and bringing them into the broader thought, 
life and worship of the church.  McIntyre was always hopeful that new theological 
expressions would find their way into the heart of the church from outside of the traditional 
hubs of doctrine. 
 The main contribution in all of this is his work on the imagination.  His work on 
Christology, soteriology, and pneumatology are all dependent on it; his work on history and 
the Love of God must be understood in light of it.  While there are many lines of thought that 
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merit additional thought and pursuit, imagination is the one thing that opens up all of these 
lines.  The first step in that process is going to be an in depth exploration of the implications 
of an understanding of God that includes imagination as a diving perfection.  The second 
step is going to be determining where such a system would and should fit within the broader 
context of the field of systematic and dogmatic theology.  Further work on the doctrine of 
creation and an explicit treatment of the imago Dei could prove helpful in shedding light on 
what that might look like.  This might mean an adaptation of existing systems, for instance 
exploring how McIntyre’s imagination as perfection might fit into the multi-layered structure 
of Barth’s account of the perfections.  It might mean developing the idea as a separate 
model in order to offer fresh insight and outside perspective.  The lack of work done thus far, 
means that the field is wide open. 
The beauty of this system and this idea is that it is rooted in God’s imagination and 
not our own.  Imagination begins with God, and it ends with God.  “For now we see in a 
mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, 
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